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I. INTRODUCTION 
In March of 1997, Ronald Crystal, a researcher at New York Hospital-
Cornell Medical Center, requested permission from the National Institutes 
of Health ("NIH")2 to conduct an experiment in which altered genes would 
I. B.A Reed College; B.A Oxford University; J.D. Yale Law School. The author is Ar-
thur E. Petersilge Professor of Law and Director, The Law-Medicine Center, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law, and Professor of Biomedical Ethics, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Medicine. This article was written under a grant from the Ethical, Legal, 
and Social Implications Research Program, Human Genome Research Institute, National 
Institutes of Health (No. 1 R01 HG01446-01A1). The author thanks Michael Cosgrove and 
Jennifer Walker for their exceptional research help, and the faculty at the University of Con-
necticut School of Law and the members of the American College of Legal Medicine for their 
helpful comments on presentations based on an earlier draft. 
2. Specifically, permission was requested from the Recombinant DNA Advisory Com-
mittee ("RAC''), which had the authority to approve protocols for genetic experiments that 
were fmanced by NIH grants. See 42 U.S.C. § 282(b)(6) (West 1998) (giving the Director of the 
National Institutes of Health the authority to establish scientific review groups and advisory 
committees such as RAC). This authority was transferred to the Food and Drug Admini'stration 
on October 31, 1997. See Notice of Action Under the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving 
Recombinant DNA Molecules, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,496 (1994), amended by 59 Fed. Reg. 40,170 
(1997); 60 Fed. Reg. 20,726 (1997); 61 Fed. Reg. 1482 (1997); 61 Fed. Reg. 10,004 (1997); 62 
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be introduced into human subjects.3 The proposal was historic. Although 
the NIH had previously approved numerous experiments in which func-
tioning, modified genes were inserted into patients suffering from fatal 
illnesses,4 and despite the fact that the purpose of Crystal's experiment was 
to foster the treatment of patients suffering from cystic fibrosis, this was the 
first time that the NIH was asked to permit the irtiection of modified genes 
into normal, healthy volunteers. 5 Officials at NIH recognized the signifi-
cance of this event. Crossing the threshold between patients and healthy 
individuals introduced the possibility of manipulating the genes of normal 
people for non-therapeutic reasons.6 It signaled a mqjor step toward em-
ploying gene transfer technology to enhance inherited traits, as opposed to 
curing, mitigating, or treating disease. 
While Crystal's proposal was an historic event, his experiment was not 
the first instance in which products and techniques that emerged from the 
Fed. Reg. 4782 (1997). For a history of the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, see Na-
tional Institutes of Health, Recombinant DNA Research: Proposed Actions Under the Guide-
lines, 61 Fed. Reg. 59,726 (1996); Judith Areen, Regulating Human Gene Therapy, 88 W.VA. L. 
REv 153 (1985-86). 
3. The researcher, Dr. Ronald G. Crystal, planned to introduce into twenty-one subjects 
a virus that had been genetically altered to prevent it from replicating, and to produce a non-
human enzyme. The objective was to ascertain the response of the subjects' immune systems to 
the virus. The ultimate goal was to use the virus to deliver genetically altered substances to 
treat patients suffering from cystic fibrosis. See RECOMBINANT DNA ADVISORY COMMITrEE, 
DISCUSSION REGARDING THE USE OF NORMAL SUBJECTS IN HUMAN GENE TRANSFER CLINICAL 
TRIALS 2 (March 6-7, 1997) (on file with author) (discussing protocol to characterize local, 
systemic and distant compartment immunity in normal individuals after intradermal admini-
stration of a replication deficient Ad5-based vector carrying gene coding for the E. coli en-
zyme, cytosine adenase). 
4. These illnesses are: Fanconi anemia, lung cancer, breast cancer, ovarian cancer, brain 
cancer, melanoma, leptomeningeal carcinomatosis, eolon cancer, renal cancer, neuroblastoma, 
chronic myelogenous leukemia, prostate cancer, central nervous system cancer, head and neck 
squamous, astrocytoma, chronic granulomatous, multiple myeloma, gastrointestinal tract 
cancer, malignant glioma, testicular cancer, partial ornithine transcarbamylase deficiency, 
bladder cancer, Non-Hodgkin's disease, B-Cell Lymphoma, bone marrow transplants, HIV, 
cystic fibrosis, glioblastoma multiform, Gaucher Disease, rheumatoid arthritis, Alpha-1-
Antitrypsin Deficiency, Hunter Syndrome, peripheral artery disease, Hodgkin's Disease, and 
Canavan Disease. Office of Recombinant DNA Activities, Protocol List (last modified April 7, 
1998) <http://Www.nih.gov/od/orda/protocol.hmu>. 
5. See Rick Weiss, Gene Therapy Has Skin Crawling, WASH. PoST; Oct. 12, 1997, at AI 
(discussing the potential implications of gene therapy on healthy adults). 
6. Accordingly, NIH convened its first Gene Therapy Policy Conference on September 
II, 1998, entitled "Human Gene Transfer: Beyond Life-Threatening Disease," to consider the 
scientific, ethical, legal, and social implications of genetic enhancement technologies. See 
Letter from Debra Knorr to Maxwell Mehlman, Acting Director, Office of Recombinant DNA 
Activities, National Institutes of Health (August 6, I 997) (on file with author) (inviting author 
to address meeting on regulating genetic enhancement). 
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revolution in human genetics were deployed to . improve normal human 
traits. The NIH previously approved the use of gene transfer technology to 
boost the functioning of low density lipoprotein receptors above the normal 
range in persons suffering from hypercholesterolemia (an inherited inabil-
ity to clear cholesterol from the blood). According to one expert, the result 
was to give these patients a "super-cleansing ability."7 Genetically engi-
neered products are also used by healthy persons to give them a physical 
advantage in sports. For example, parents with children of normal height 
sometimes request that pediatric endocrinologists prescribe human growth 
hormone, which is genetically engineered through recombinant DNA tech-
nology, with the hope that their children will grow tall enough to play 
highly competitive basketball. 8 The use of growth hormone by athletes to 
increase muscle and bone growth appears, in fact, to be widespread.9 
Against this background, the Human Genome Project is nearing its 
completion. This project, which began in the early 1990s at an estimated 
cost of $3 billion, 10 and which is due to be completed by 2003, is mapping" 
7. See Eric Juengst, Remarks at the meeting of the NIH Recombinant DNA Advisory 
Committee, Discussion Regarding the Use of Nom1al Subjects in Human Gene Transfer Clini-
cal Trials 3 (March 6-7, 1997) (describing protocol submitted by James Wilson, #9110-012). 
Juengst noted that experiments aimed at using genetically engineered substances to immunize 
patients against cancer also constitute attempts to enhance people beyond their nom1al range. 
Id. 
8. See Rita Rubin, Giving Grou•th a Synthetic Hand Use of Hormone Sparks Debate, DALLAS 
MORNING NEws, July 7, 1986, at AI. For a discussion of the use of human growth hormone in 
healthy children, see American Academy of Pediatrics, Considerations Related to the Use of Recom-
binant Human Growth Hormone in Children, 99 PEDIATRICS 122 (1997); Leona Cuttler et a!., 
Short Stature and Growth Hormone Therapy: A National Study of Physician Recommendation Patterns, 
276 JAMA 531 (1996); Barry Werth, How Short Is Too Short?, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1991, § 6, at 
14. 
9. See Daniel A Smith & Paul J. Perry, The Efficacy of Erogogenic Agents in Athletic Competi-
tion Part II: Other Performance-Enhancing Agents, 26 ANN. PHARM. 653 (1992) (describing the 
effects of human growth hormone on muscle mass and bone growth); Michael Bamberger & 
Don Yaeger, Over the Edge Au•are That Drug Testing Is a Sham, Athlete to Rely More Than Ever on 
Banned Performance Enhancers, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 14, 1997, at 60 (referring to the use 
of human growth hormone by athletes to increase growth of muscle and bones). 
10. The Human Genome Project is international in scope. At least 18 countries have 
established human genome research programs. Some of the larger programs are in Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Europe, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mex-
ico, Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. U.S. Dep't of En-
ergy Human Genome Program, Human Genome Project Information (last modified July 8, 1998) 
<http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human _ Genome/faq/faqs l.html>. Some notable inter-
national collaborations are: United States-United Kingdom on sequencing the Caenorhabditis 
elegans genome; Los Alamos National Laboratory-Australia on developing a physical map of 
chromosome 16; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Japanese scientists on developing 
a physical map of chromosome 21. The NIH is working with the Centre d'Etudo du Polymor-
phisme Humain (CEPH) on the genetic map of the human genome and the White-
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and sequencingi2 the three billion nucleotide base pairs that comprise the 
entire human genetic code. I3 The scope of the project extends well beyond 
discerning the structure of human genetic material. Researchers are at-
tempting to correlate genes with specific human disorders. This knowledge 
will enable physicians to test individuals for inherited conditions. 14 Moreo-
head/Massachusetts Institute of Technology is working with Genethon on the whole-genome 
approach to the human physical map. However, the bulk of the research is being conducted in 
the United States and is being funded by the Department of Energy Human Genome Program 
and the National Institutes of Health Human Genome Research Institute. See Francis Collins 
& David Galas, A New Five-Year Plo.n for the U.S. Human Genome Project, 262 SCI. 43 ( 1993 ). 
11. . "Mapping" refers to locating genes on particular chromosomes. A complete genetic 
map of the human genome was completed in 1994. See Jeffrey C. Murray et a!., A Comprehen-
sive Human Linkage Map with Centimorgan Density, 265 SCI. 2049 {I 994). 
12. "Sequencing" refers to identifYing the order of the four molecules, called nucleotides 
(adenine, thymine, guanine, and cytosine), that carry genetic information. The order of these 
molecules determines what proteins they "code for" (through the production of RNA and the 
translation of RNA into sequences of amino acids); the proteins in tum control and provide 
the raw material for all chemical reactions in the body. Although there are 3 billion pairs of 
these nucleotides, most of them appear to be nonfunctional, and are known as "junk DNA." 
See Katheleen Gardiner, Clonability and Gene Distribution on Human Chromosome 21: Reflections of 
junk DNA Content?, 205 GENE 39 (1997) (raising the possibility that more than 90% of the 
DNA in the largest gene on Chromosome 21 may be functionless); Nicholas Wade, The Strug-
gle to Decipher Human Genes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1998, at Fl (stating that "97 percent of 
human DNA consists of a variety of identical sequences repeated over and over"); see also Wil-
liam A. Haseltine, Editorial, Gene-Mapping, Without Tax Money, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1998, at 
A33 {stating that "less than 5 percent of our DNA contains real information"). There has been 
some evidence, however, that these so-called 'junk" sequences may play a functional role in 
the genome. See Emile Zuckerkandl, Revisiting junk DNA, 34 J. MoL. EVOL. 259 (explaining 
that the sea of nonfunctional DNA is to a "significant extent permeated by function"); see also 
Laura Manuelidis, A Vieu• of Interphase Chromosomes, 250 SCI. 1533 (I 990) (discussing the possi-
ble role of'junk" DNA in chromosome folding). 
13. The original projection was that it would cost $3 billion to map and sequence 3 billion 
base pairs, or $1.00 per pair. The goal of reducing the cost to $.50 per base pair was targeted 
for 1996. Collins & Galas, supra note 10, at 43. Now at the best facilities the cost is between 
$0.30 and $0.50 per base pair, and there are estimates that this will be further decreased to 
$0.10 per base pair. E-mail from Marissa Mills, Technical Assistant, Human Genome Manage-
ment Information Systems, to Maxwell Mehlman (May 21, 1997) (on file with author). 
14. Conm1ercial tests are currently available for approximately 550 genetic disorders. E-
mail from Debra Collins, Genetic Counselor, University of Kansas Medical School, to Maxwell 
Mehlman Uune 12, 1998) (on ftle with author). Some of these tests identify a genetic condition 
that is responsible for a person's current symptoms, such as cystic fibrosis; others identify a 
genetic condition such as Huntington's disease that may not be producing symptoms currently 
but instead may only produce symptoms in the future; still others indicate only that a person 
has a genetic susceptibility to a certain future condition, such as breast cancer, and may indi-
cate the genetic probability that the person in the future will suffer from the condition. See 
Bruce Ponder, Genetic Testing for Cancer Risk, 278 SCI. 1050 (1997) (explaining the opportunity 
for genetic testing to family members); see also Tom Caskey et al., The American Society of Hu-
man Genetics Statement on Cystic Fibrosis Screening, 46 AM. J. HUM. GENET. 393 (1990) (propos-
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ver, the combination of information generated by the Human Genome 
Project with genetic engineering techniques already under development 
will enable physicians to devise gene therapies for these individuals. Gene 
therapy will thus allow doctors to delete defective or disease-producing 
genes from patients' DNA, or to insert therapeutic genes. 
Genes are responsible for more than just diseases, however. In con-
junction with environmental influences, 15 they engender physical appear-
ance, personality traits, and mental faculties such as cognition16 and intelli-
gence.17 The same genetic testing and engineering techniques that are be-
ing guidelines for cystic fibrosis testing); Michael R. Hayden et al., Improved Predictive Testing 
for Huntington Disease by Using Three Linked DNA Markers, 43 AM.]. HUM. GENET. 689 (1988) 
(explaining how the use of three markers increases the reliability in the estimation of genetic 
risk); Neil A Holtzman et al., Predictive Genetic Testing: From Basic Research to Clinical Practice, 
278 SCI. 602 (1997) (explaining regulations for offering commercial genetic tests). Testing for 
conditions that will not manifest symptoms until some point in the future leads to concerns 
that the tested individuals will face discrimination if the test results become known to employ-
ers or insurers. See generally LORI ANDREWS & jANE E. FUUARTON, AsSESSING GENETIC RISKS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY (Neil A Hotzman & Arno G. Motulsky eds., 
1994) (describing ethical, legal, and policy issues raised by genetic testing). 
15. The precise interaction of genetic and environmental factors-the so-called "nature 
versus nurture" question-is as yet poorly understood. Francis Galton, Charles Darwin's 
cousin, coined the phrase "nature-nurture." His view was that nature prevailed enormously 
over nurture, that genetics determine who we are and how we behave. Galton thought envi-
ronment played a minor role in behavioral development. People in this school of thought 
became known as "hereditarians." "Environmentalists," on the other hand, argued that there 
was "no such thing as an inheritance of capacity, talent, temperament, mental constitution and 
characteristics" and that the environment determined our behavior. See J.B. WATSON, 
BEHAVIORISM 74 (1925). Today there is probably not a single scientist who would assert that 
behavior is ruled completely by the environment or completely by genetics. Research in the 
field of behavioral genetics has shown that "genetic influence is significant and substantial for 
most areas of behavioral development, even though it is not true that 'nature prevails enor-
mously over nurture."' ROBERT PLOMIN, GENETICS AND EXPERIENCE 3 (1994); see Susan M. 
Wolf, Beyond Genetic "Discrimination": Toward the Broader Harm of Geneticisim, 23 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 345 ( 1995) (pointing out that those who assert the importance of genetic factors are 
criticized by others for their "genetic determinism" or "geneticism"). 
16. Studies comparing twins who were separated at birth and raised in different families 
reveal that non-disease traits such as personality and cognition are genetically influenced. See 
Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr., Genes, Environment, and Personality, 264 SCI. 1700 (1994) (stating that 
"two-thirds of the reliable variance in measured personality traits is due to genetic influence"); 
see also Deborah Finkel et al., Heritability of Cognitive Abilities in Adult Twins: Comparison of Minne-
sota and Swedish Data, 25 BEHAV. GENET. 421, 430 (1995) (estimating that cognition in early 
and middle adulthood has a heritability factor of approximately 81 %); Stephen A Petrill et al., 
The Genetic and Environmental Variance Underlying Elementary Cognitive Tasks, 25 BEHAV. GENET. 
199 (1995) (demonstrating that elementary cognitive tasks display genetic effects). 
17. See Richard Lynn & Ken Hattori, The Heritability of Intelligence in japan, 20 BHL\V. 
GENET. 545 (1990) (finding that intelligence has a heritability of .582); Laura A Baker et al., 
The Genetic Correlo.tion Between Intelligence and Speed of Information Processing, 21 BEHAV. GENET. 
351 (1991) (explaining that common biological mechanisms underlie "performance in both 
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ing developed to respond to genetic illness eventually may be employed to 
identify and alter a person's non-disease traits. The Crystal protocol and 
the NIH's recognition of the need to explore its policy implications suggest 
that this day may not be far off. 
In this article, I will explore some of the legal implications of this 
emerging technology-the technology of genetic enhancement. 18 Specifi-
cally, I will discuss how the law might respond to two related consequences: 
an increase in social inequality, and the unfairness that may result when 
genetically enhanced individuals compete with un-enhanced persons for 
scarce resources. 
In order to comprehend how these societal concerns might arise, it is 
necessary to understand what is meant by genetic enhancement, to consider 
the many forms of genetic enhancements, and to predict the methods that 
individuals are likely to employ to acquire them. First, what is "genetic" 
enhancement? People employ various means in an attempt to improve 
themselves and their children. Their efforts may affect and may be af-
fected-at least in part-by their genetic, inheritance. For example, some-
one who is attractive by virtue of their genetic good fortune may find it 
easier to marry an attractive mate and produce attractive children. But for 
purposes of this paper, an enhancement is deemed "genetic" only when it is 
the product of biotechnological processes. These include DNA recombina-
tion to make pharmacological products, and direct manipulation of genes, 
such as gene insertion or deletion. These new biotechnological capabilities 
are creating a revolution in human genetics, which in tum is producing the 
social and legal challenges that are the subject of this paper. 
If the foregoing paragraph describes what is meant by "genetic" in the 
context of enhancement, what, then, is the meaning of "enhancement"? 
Not all genetic interventions are enhancements. Many, and for the time 
intelligence tests and speed of information processing"). 
18. Although there is an enormous and growing body of literature on the ethical, legal, 
and social implications of the Human Genome Project, much less exists on the topic of genetic 
enhancement, perhaps because it is thought to be more speculative or farther in the future. 
See, e.g., LEROY WALTERS &JULIE G. PALMER, Enhancement Genetic Engineering, in THE ETHICS 
OF HUMAN GENE THERAPY 99 (1997); George J. Annas, Mapping the Human Genome and the 
Meaning of Monster Mythology, 39 EMORY LJ. 629 (1990); Alexander M. Capron, Which Ills to 
Bear? Reevaluating the "Threat" of Modern Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J. 665 ( 1990); William Gardner, 
Can Genetic Enhancement Be Prohibited?, 20 J. MED. & PI·IIL. 65 (1995); Eric Parens, The Goodness 
of Fragility: On the Prospect of Genetic Technologies Aimed at the Enhancement of Human Capabilities, 
5 KENNEDY INST. ETI-IICS J. 141 (1995 ); John Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Character-
istics, 76 B. U. L. REV. 421 ( 1996); E. J. Rosenkranz, Custom Kids and the Moral Duty to Genetically 
Engineer Our Children, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 3 ( 1987). For a provocative work on the related issue 
of performance enhancement, see Michael H. Shapiro, The Technology of Perfection: Performance 
Enhancement and the Control of Attributes, 65 S. CAL L. REV. II ( 1991 ). 
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being, almost all, are aimed at treating or preventing disease. A genetic 
intervention is an "enhancement," however, (1) when it is undertaken for 
the purpose of improving a characteristic or capability that, but for the en-
hancement, would lie within what is generally accepted as a "normal" range 
for humans; or (2) when it installs a characteristic or capability that is not 
normally present in humans. 19 
19. For a general discussion of the distinction between enhancement and therapy, see 
Norman Daniels, Growth Hormone Therapy for Short Stature: Can We Support the Treat-
ment/Enhancement Distinction?, 8 GROWTH, GENET., & HORMONES 46 (1992); Eric T. Juengst, 
Can Enhancement Be Distinguished from Prevention in Genetic Medicine?, 22]. MED. & PHIL. 125 
(1997); Eric T. Juengst, What Does Enhancement Mean?, in ENHANCING HUMAN CAPACITIES: 
CONCEPTUAL COMPLEXITIES AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS (Eric Parens ed., 1998); Parens, supra 
note 18, at 141. 
The concept of enhancement invariably leads to consideration of what is meant by 
"normal." Typically, the term refers to a certain distribution of a population around an aver-
age measure for a trait, a distribution which has come to be accepted as the norm. For exam-
ple, people are generally considered to be "abnom1ally short" or "abnormally tall" if their 
height is more than two standard deviations from the mean height of the population. Cuttler 
et al., supra note 8, at 532. Approximately 90,000 of the three million children born each year 
will fall into this category. See Werth, supra note 8, at 14; c:f. E. Kirk Neely & Ron G. Rosenfeld, 
Use and Abuse of Human Growth Hormone, 45 ANN. REV. MED. 407 (1994) (revealing that most 
endocrinologists require a height that is at least iliree standard deviations below mean height 
before they will administer growth hormone therapy). Since two standard deviations com-
prises, by definition, 95.4% of the population, this practice automatically identifies 4.% of the 
population as either "too short" or "too tall." But there is no inherent reason why two standard 
deviations is considered "normal," rather ilian one, or iliree, which would lead to "abnormal" 
percentages of 31. 7'lc: and 0.3% of the population respectively. 
A more sophisticated defmition of "nom1alcy" is that it is a level of functionality that 
allows an individual to enjoy the ·oppormnity range typical of their species. However, this 
approach, championed by Norman Daniels, falters when it attempts to delineate the boundary 
between therapy and enhancement. See Daniels, supra, at 46 (segmenting gene ilierapy from 
gene enhancement). As Ericjuengst observes, Daniels' iliesis assumes that we can defme "spe-
cies-typical function" and mat an individual's "skills and talents" are fixed according to the 
"narnral lottery" of human genetics, neither of which obtains once genetic enhancements 
become available. See Juengst, supra; see also C. John Dupre, Normal People, 65 Soc. RES. 221 
( 1998) (clain1ing that there is no such thing as normal behavior). It is beyond ilie scope of this 
paper to attempt to resolve ilie problem of defming "normal." It is sufficient that the reader 
understands both that the concept refers to some degree of prevalence o'f a trait in society, and 
that the concept is changeable, value-laden, arbitrary, and subjective. For iliese reasons, I will 
use it in quotes. 
A discussion of genetic enhancement does tend to avoid the objectionable practice of 
equating "normal" with "good" or "desirable" or "worthwhile," a practice iliat understandably 
infuriates people who are not "normal" in regard to characteristics such as height, weight, and 
so on. The concept of enhancement stigmatizes everyone who is unenhanced-both people 
who are "normal" as well as those who are not or who are "below normal" (although iliose who 
are "below normal" may be regarded as worse oft). For a discussion of ilie relative positions of 
those who are enhanced, those who are "normal" but not enhanced (the "un-advantaged"), 
and those who are neither "normal," nor enhanced (the disadvantaged), see infra notes 114-
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Genetic enhancement can occur in a number of ways. It can take the 
form of somatic enhancements in adults and children, pre-conception en-
hancement, selective abortion, embryo selection, and germ-line enhance-
ment. Each of these will be described in turn. 
Genetic enhancement may produce a somatic enhancement effect in an 
adult. A somatic effect is one that affects the non-reproductive portions of 
the anatomy, and therefore cannot be inherited by one's children. A classic 
example of a non-genetic somatic enhancement in adults is the use of drugs 
to improve athletic and cognitive performance. People occasionally use 
caffeine and nicotine to improve their concentration, 20 and athletes long 
have been reported to use performance-enhancing drugs, particularly ana-
bolic steroids, to increase muscle mass.21 Advances in human genetics will 
open the door to a new range of somatic enhancements manufactured with 
genetic technology. Athletes already use genetically-engineered products, 
like erythropoietin manufactured by recombinant DNA technology, to en-
hance endurance. 22 
Another type of genetic enhancement is somatic enhancement in 
children.23 This type of somatic enhancement is exemplified by the reported 
123 and accompanying text. 
20. See Peter J. Whitehouse et al., Enhancing Cognition in the Intellectually Intact, 27 
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 14 (May-June !997) (discussing advances in the development of drugs 
that enhance cognition in "normal" individuals, albeit not yet involving DNA recombination 
or genetic engineering). 
21. See Thomas H. Murray, Drugs, Sports and Ethics, in FEELING GoOD AND DOING 
BETTER: ETHICS AND NONTHERr\PEUTIC DRUG USE 107 (Thomas H. Murray et al., eds., 1984) 
(describing use of steroids by athletes). The practice is not limited to adults. See Dan Barry, The 
Hidden Aspects of Showy Muscles: Despite the Dangers of Steroids, Bodybuilders Are Still Tempted, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 21, 1996, § 1, at 27 (stating that officials estimate that between five and twelve 
percent of teen-age boys have used steroids by the time they graduate from high school); 
College Study: Girls' Steroid Use Up, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at 8 (stating that as many as 
175,000 high school girls have used steroids). 
22. Erythropoietin, administered by injection, enables the blood to carry more oxygen, 
thereby improving stamina. See Lawrence M. Fisher, Stamina-Building Drug Linked to Athletes' 
Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, !99!, § 1, at 22 (discussing how this genetically engineered drug 
increases stamina). 
23. Administering genetic enhancements to children at the request of their parents raises 
concerns that go beyond the scope of this article, in particular, concerns about the rights of 
parents to control the lives of their children. When would it be appropriate, for example, for 
parents to provide an enhancement to their children when the enhancement carried with it a 
he~lth risk? These same concerns are raised by germ line genetic enhancements that are 
passed on to one's children. See THOMAS H. MURRAY, TilE WORTII OF A CHILD 115-41 (1996) 
(discussing the ethics of manipulating genes to achieve a "perfect" child); Dena S. Davis, Gee 
netic Dilemmas and the Child's Right to an Open Future, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 549, 575 (1997) (noting 
that "[a] decision made before a child is born that confines her forever to a narrow group of 
people and a limited choice of careers, so violates the child's right to an open future that no 
genetic counselor should acquiesce to it"); Robertson, supra note 18, at479 (arguing that "[a) 
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use of genetically-engineered human growth factor in children of "normal" 
height. Again, because the effect is somatic, it is not genetically transferred 
to successive generations.24 
Genetic enhancement also is made possible by the development of 
tests to identify genetic characteristics, including non-disease traits that 
have genetic components. These tests create the possibility of several types 
of enhancement approaches related to reproductive decision-making. The 
first of these is pre-conception enhancement, in which decisions about whether 
or not, ·and with whom, to conceive a child are made on the basis of pre-
conception genetic testing. Just as some people now test themselves to 
avoid conceiving a child with another person who is a "carrier" for a reces-
sive genetic disorder,25 prospective mates could test themselves to deter-
mine if they are likely to produce offspring who would be desirable in terms 
of non-disease characteristics. Unsatisfactory test results may cause couples 
to refrain from marrying or conceiving, at least not without employing ge-
netic manipulations to improve the genetic profile of the offspring. If the 
couple refrains from genetic manipulations, this is a passive version of en-
hancement. This technique would not produce a "better" child, but only 
enable prospective parents to avoid giving birth to a child whose genetic 
characteristics they deemed to be undesirable. Nevertheless, it qualifies as a 
genetic enhancement because one may assume that the child's characteris-
tics would be "better" than if reproduction took place without pre-
conception testing of the potential parents. 
Enhancement via selective abortion is another passive form of genetic en-
hancement stemming from genetic testing. With this approach, fetuses are 
tested in utero and those that do not meet the parents' expectations are 
aborted. 26 An alternative to selective abortion would be embryo selection for 
consistent conm1itment to procreative liberty necessarily leaves parents wide prebirth discre-
tion to select-or not-the characteristics of their offspring"). 
24. A fonn of somatic enhancement of a child also could occur if the parents had the 
child genetically tested for non-disease traits and then intervened in various ways to enhance· 
the child's genetic characteristics. For example, assuming that musical ability is related at least 
in part to a person's genes, see Sandra Blakeslee, Perfect Pilch: The Key May Lie in the Genes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 1990, at C1, the parents of a child whose genetic testing showed it to be musi-
cally gifted could provide the !=hild with music lessons to enhance its innate talent. 
25. A successful example is screening programs for Tay-Sachs disease carried out under 
the auspices of local Jewish community groups. See Paul J. Edelson, The Tay-Sachs Disease 
Screening Program in the U.S. as a Model for !he Control of Genetic Disease: An Historical Vieuo," 7 
HEALTH MATRIX 125, 126 (1997). 
26. See ROBERT BLANK & JOANNE C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING 
TECI!NOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 134, 135 (1995) (discussing the increasingly com-
mon use of amniocentesis, chorion villus sampling, and other techniques to detect genetic 
disorders with the possibility of abortion as a consequence of an unfavorable result); see also 
NE\VYORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, AsSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
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enhancement. This technique combines genetic testing with in vitro fertiliza-
tion. Embryos are tested before insertion in the womb, and only embryos 
with advantageous characteristics are implantedY 
Finally, and most dramatically, an early-stage embryo might be geneti-
cally altered prior to implantation, with DNA inserted or deleted to pro-
duce desired traits in the child. If performed at an early-enough stage of 
embryonic development, 2~ the alteration affects all subsequent fetal cells, 
165 {1998) {hereinafter NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE REPORT) (discussing pre-
implementation genetic diagnosis and sex selection). A particularly controversial form of 
genetic selection is the abortion of a fetus because of its gender. See Dorothy C. Wertz & John 
C. Fletcher, Fatal Knowledge? Prenatal Diagnosis and Sex Selection, 19 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 21 
(1989) (discussing the conm10n use of prenatal diagnosis for sex screening); Lynne Marie 
Kohm, Sex Selection Abortion and the Boomerang Effect of a Woman's Right to Choose: A Paradox of 
the Skeptics, 4 WM. & MARY L. REV. 91, 92 (1997) (discussing how sex selection results in an 
unbalanced sex ratio). For an expansive view of genetic selection of offspring, see Robertson, 
supra note 18, at 479 (arguing that "commitment to procreative liberty necessarily leaves par-
ents wide prebirth discretion to select--or not-the characteristics of their offspring"). Fetal 
genetic testing currently requires a sample of fetal DNA, which currently must be obtained 
from the fetal organism or from anmiotic fluid. On the horizon is a technique in which fetal 
DNA is obtained from fetal cells circulating within the maternal blood supply. This will signifi-
cantly simplify fetal genetic testing. See Y.M. Dennis Lo et al., Presence of Fetal DNA in Maternal 
Plasma and Serum, 350 L\NCET 485 (1997) (explaining how the finding of "fetal DNA in ma-
ternal plasma may have implications for non-invasive prenatal diagnosis"). 
27. In vitro fertilization ("IVF") refers to the union of sperm and egg, or oocyte, in a 
laboratory dish. It involves stimulating the ovaries to produce several mature oocytes in a 
single cycle, collecting these oocytes before they are released from the ovaries, and fertilizing 
them with spem1 in a nutrient-rich culture medium. Fertilized oocytes are then transferred 
into the uterus. Another pre-implantation fertilization technique, zygote intrafallopian trans-
fer, involves the same procedure but the embryos are transferred into the fallopian tubes 
instead of the uterus. The rationale behind this procedure is to increase the chance of the 
embryos implanting into the uterus. See generally NEW YORK STATE T,\SK FORCE REPORT, supra 
note 26, at 51-63 (discussing zygote intrafallopian transfer). IVF now makes it possible to 
screen embryos for inherited diseases before pre-implantation. See Alan H. Handyside & Joy 
D. A. Delhanty, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Strategies and Surprises, 13 TRENDS IN 
GENETICS 270 (1997) (explaining that preimplantation genetic diagnosis avoids the possibility 
of having to decide whether or not to terminate an established pregnancy diagnosed as af-
fected); e.g., Asangla Ao, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis of Inherited Disease, 34 INDIAN J. OF 
EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY 1177 (1996) (showing that preimplantation diagnosis was successfully 
achieved for cystic fibrosis, Tay-Sachs, and Duchenne muscular dystrophy). 
28. The best time to genetically alter an embryo would be at the first cell stage so that all 
cells would be affected. See Regulatory Issues: Department of Health and Human Services National 
Institutes of Health Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee Minutes of Meeting, 8 HUM. GENE 
THERAPY 1137, 1160 (1997). It is believed, however, that genetic alteration could be per-
formed at later stages. Preimplantation diagnosis involves the analysis of a blastomere from a 
two day-old embryo containing four cells or the cells of a five day-old blastocyst after IVF. 
Removal of these cells "does not appear to alter the embryo's developmental possibilities." 
Jacques Testart, The Neuo Eugenics and Medicalized Reproduction, 4 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF 
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 304, 307 (1995). It is doubtful that genetic manipulation would succeed 
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including germ cells-that is, those that become eggs or sperm. This proc-
ess yields germ-cell enhancement, in which genetic changes are passed on to 
successive generations when the enhanced individual reproduces. 29 
It is currently impossible to be certain when these genetic enhance-
ments will become available and how successful they will be. 30 Moreover, 
there are good reasons for doubting that extensive and successful genetic 
enhancements are achievable. For example, it may be that somatic en-
hancements are accompanied by serious adverse side effects. 31 While ma-
nipulating embryos genetically may prevent further embryonic develop-
ment, it is also possible that it may create non-viable or severely impaired 
organisms.32 Altering genes that interact with other genes may have unfore-
more at a later stage than preimplantation diagnosis, since beyond that point, the cells of the 
embryo are no longer "totipotent" but would begin to differentiate, and it would be difficult to 
ensure that the genetic alteration affected the correct organs or tissues. Embryo-splitting 
(which results in twinning) involves isolating individual cells of very early embryos at the blas-
tomere stage and growing them into separate embryos. This must be done at the blastomere 
stage when the cells are still totipotent and carry their full genetic complement for develop-
ment. See Nat'! Advisory Bd. on Ethics in Reproduction, Report on Human Cloning through 
Embryo Splitting: An Amber Light, 4 KENNEDY lNST. OF ETHICS J. 251 ( 1994). 
29. Note that genetic selection for enhancement also would have genetic effects on subse-
quent generations, since it would block the transmission of those genes that would have been 
possessed by the individuals whose birth was prevented. 
30. A recent study, for example, failed to find that injections of human growth hormone 
increased the height of hormone-deficient children of short stature. This casts doubt on its 
utility in children of "nonnal" stature as well. See Susan Gilbert, Growth Hormone Use in Children 
Found Ineffective in Large Study, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1997, at B15. 
31. Adverse effects are attributed to the use of similar products that are currently avail-
able. These include the risks of toxicity, cancer, and generalized infections from gene therapy; 
abnormal liver function, tumors, testicular atrophy, masculinization in women, acne, and 
aggressive behavior from the use of steroids; acromegaly (resulting in increased size of facial 
bone, thickening of hands and fingers), impotence, diabetes from human growth hormone; 
and increased blood viscosity from erythropoetin which can lead to hypertension, stroke, 
congestive heart failure, headache, and clot formation. See Nick A Ghaphery, Performance-
Enhancing Drugs, 26 SPORTS MED. 433, 437 (1995) (explaining that most of the adverse side 
effects associated with growth hormone are irreversible); Rebecca Kolberg, Gene-Transfer Virus 
Contaminant Linked to Monkeys' Cancer, 4 J. NIH RES. 43 (1992) (explaining the discovery of 
cancer in primates after gene therapy); David R. Lamb, Anabolic Steroids in Athletics: How Well 
Do They Work and Hou• Dangerous Are They?, 12 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 31, 35-36 (1984) (describ-
ing the potentially harmful side effects of anabolic steroids); Nelson A Wive!, Regulatory Con-
siderations for Gene-Therdpy Strategies and Products, II TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 189 (1992) 
(stating that "certain types of vectors used to deliver genes pose a small risk of causing cancer" 
or contamination by micro-organisms); see also Smith & Perry, supra note 9, at 654 (discussing 
the adverse effects of human growth hormone and erythropoetin). 
32. Attempts to clone frogs by genetically manipulating the nuclei of fully differentiated 
cells have resulted in abnormal frog embryos. See John Gurdon, The Developmental Capacity of 
Nuclei Taken from Intestinal Epithelium Cells of Feeding Tadpoles, I 0 J. EMBRYOLOGY & 
EXPERIMENTAL MORPl!OLOGY 622 (I962). 
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seen dangers; enhancing one trait may cause the degradation of another.33 
Finally, the effects of genetic interventions may be negated or transmuted 
by environmental factors. 34 
Yet uncertainty works both ways. While the availability of some of these 
technologies is unlikely for several years, particularly those involving the 
successful genetic manipulation of embryos, there are no obvious insur-
mountable scientific barriers to genetic enhancement. 35 Methods of genetic 
enhancement may not confer the benefits that recipients anticipate; but 
then again, there is a good chance that they might. What if they do? What if 
the new genetic technologies can significantly improve inherited traits? 
What might those traits be? They might comprise physical traits like 
beauty, 36 stature, 37 strength, 38 and stamina;39 personality characteristics such 
33. In a policy statement on the appropriateness of genetic enhancement, the Council on 
Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association noted this concern when it 
recommended that "genetic interventions to enhance traits should be considered permissible 
in severely restricted situations [when there is] no trade-off with other characteristics or traits . 
. . . " AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues Related to Prenatal Genetic Test-
ing, 3 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 633, 640 (1994). The AMA council does not explain why someone 
should be prevented from deciding to enhance one trait at the expense of another-for exam-
ple, gaining a fo.ot in height at the expense of putting on twenty extra pounds-so long as the 
individual to be enhanced, and perhaps the health care professionals who are involved in 
providing the enhancement service, agree that the benefit outweighs the harn1. 
34. See the discussion of the nature versus nurture controversy at supra, note 15. 
35. Theodore Friedman, Remarks at the Gene Therapy Policy Conference, National 
Institutes of Health (Sept. 11, 1997) (transcript on file with author) (discussing scientific pros-
pects for genetic enhancement). Much of the scientific skepticism about the prospects for 
genetic enhancement may have been dulled by the birth of Dolly, representing the first suc-
cessful' example of mammalian cloning via adult somatic cell nuclear transfer. See Gina Kolata, 
Little-Known Panel Challenged to Make Quick Cloning Study, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1997, at Cl 
("Dr. Wilmut's feat shocked the world, for even most scientists had assumed that the cloning of 
adults was biologically impossible and was merely the stuff of science fiction."). 
36. According to the Center for Medical Genetics at Johns Hopkins University, there are 
398 gene-specific traits and diseases that influence appearance. If gene therapy can be done to 
correct any one of these diseases and thereby in1prove appearance, then the possibility of 
enhancing appearance exists. See Online Mendelian Inheritance in Man, OMIM (TM). Center 
for Medical Genetics, Johns Hopkins University (Baltimore, MD) and National Center for 
Biotechnology Information, National Library of Medicine (Bethesda, MD) (visited Sept. 12, 
1997) <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/htbin-post/Omim/getmim>. Linda Evangelista, for ex-
ample, is quoted as saying that she and fellow super-models are "genetic freaks." Model Says 
Super Looks just a Freak of Nature, PLAIN DEALER, May 16, 1996, at 2A. 
37. There are 475 gene-specific traits and diseases that affect stature (visited Sept. 12, 
1997) <http ://www.ncbi.nlm.nili.gov /htbin-post/Omim/getmin >. 
38. There are 51 gene-specific traits and diseases that affect strength (visited Sept. 12, 
1997) < http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/htbin-post!Omim/getmin >. 
39. OMIM lists one gene-specific disease that affects stamina (visited Sept. 12, 1997) 
<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/htbin-post/Omim/getmin>. Specifically, researchers found a 
gene that is correlated with physical endurance. Science Briefs, PLAIN DEALER, June 21, 1998, at 
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as charm, cheerfulness, charisma, confidence, and energy;40 or mental ca-
pabilities, including memory, 41 intelligence,42 and creativity.43 Ultimately, 
the aging process too might become subject to genetic manipulation. 44 
These kinds of improvement will be in great demand. 45 But how widely 
BJ. Manipulation of this gene might enhance physical endurance beyond the capacity of per-
formance-enhancing drugs in sports. 
40. OMIM lists 443 gene-specific traits and diseases that affect personality characteristics 
(visited Sept. 12, 1997) <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/htbin-post/Omim/getmin>; cf Genetic 
Defect May Make Some Men Aggressive, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 22, 1993, at I 0-A (suggesting that 
aggressiveness, or its lack, could be genetically enhanced). 
41. OMIM lists 47 gene-specific traits and diseases that affect memory (visited Sept. 12, 
1997) <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/htbin-post/Omim/gemlin>. Specifically, Columbia Uni-
versity neuroscientist Eric Kandel has identified a pair of genes, CREBJ and CREB2, which 
would help regulate the memory process. Memory might be enhanced by partially disabling 
CREB2. This might help people retain information more easily. See Geoffrey Cowley & Anne 
Underwood, Forgetfulness Is America's Latest Health Obessession, NEWSWEEK, June 15, 1998, at 49. 
42. OMIM lists 205 gene-specific traits and diseases that affect intelligence (visited Sept. 
12, 1997) <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/htbin-post/Omim/gemlin>. Studies of twins reveal 
that heritability increases over a lifetime for general cognitive ability. See Gerald E. McCiearn 
et al., Substantial Genetic Influence on Cognitive Abilities in Twins 80 or More Years Old, 276 SCI. 
1560 (1997). 
43. Four gene-specific traits and diseases have been found that affect musical ability (vis-
ited Sept. 12, 1997) <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/htbin-post/Omim/gemlin>. The manipula-
tion of these genes could potentially enhance one's musical ability or creativity. 
44. Telomeric DNA, located at the ends of chromosomes, consists of repeated sequences 
that protect the information-containing part of the chromosome. As cells divide, the chromo-
somes lose telomeric DNA and eventually start to lose sequences containing important infor-
mation. This results in cell death. If telomerase, an enzyme that adds telomeric DNA, is acti-
vated in normal somatic cells, these cells could become immortal. See Alexey M. Olovnikov, 
Telomeres, Telomerase, and Aging: Origin of the Theory, 31 ExPERIMENTAL GERONTOLOGY 443 
(1996); N.E.A. Crompton, Telomeres, Senescence, and Cellulo.r Radiation Response, 53 CELL. & 
MOL. LIFE SCI. 568 (1997). 
45. Although many people will find the prospect of enhancing their genetic traits or 
those of their children extremely desirable, some, of course, may not. They may feel that 
enhancing one's children robs them of their autonomy, or turns them into objects, a hazard 
known as commodification. See, e.g., Vicki G. Norton, Unnatural Selection: Nontherapeutic Preim-
plo.ntation Genetic Screening and Proposed Regulo.tion, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1581, 1606-10 (1984): 
If access to [preimplantation genetic screening] were unrestricted, parents 
could choose traits in their children, much as animal breeders have 'uncon-
sciously' selected traits in animals for humankind's use .... Although par-
ents have children for many reasons, there is a fine line between wanting a 
child to be the 'best he can be' and wanting to bear a talented child whose· 
talents can be financially exploited. 
!d. They may also object on religious grounds-whether from a specific doctrinal perspective 
or from a fundamental unwillingness to "play God." See infra note 81 (discussing religious 
objections to genetic engineering). They may hesitate for fear that genetic enhancement will 
promote unfairness or inequality, as discussed below. They may claim that genetic enhance-
ment is simply too hubristic. See, e.g., W. FRENCH ANDERSON, HUMAN GENE THERAPY: WHERE 
TO DRAW THE LINE 6-7 (1986), reprinted in L\W, SCIENCE, AND MEDICINE 27 0· Areen et al. 
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available will the technologies be that make them possible? The answer 
depends both on how many instiJ:utions and professionals are willing and 
able to provide enhancement services, and on the cost of such enhance-
ments. While some genetically engineered drugs that produce somatic en-
hancements may be relatively affordable; others may not. Growth hormone 
therapy for a 20 kilogram child, for example, costs $14,000 per year.46 This 
is, conceivably, a manageable sum for a number of parents. In addition, 
some types of genetic enhancements may not add much to the cost of 
therapeutic or preventive measures. For example, it may not cost a great 
deal more to include a number of tests for non-disease traits in a battery of 
genetic tests performed on fetuses in utero designed for the purpose of de-
tecting abnormalities or disease. 47 This might make genetic selection for 
enhancement, in which in utero testing is combined with abortion, the en-
hancement technique of choice for the less well-off.48 Other enhancement 
approaches, on the other hand, will be quite expensive. Enhancements 
performed on embryos, including germ cell enhancement, would be costly 
since they necessarily impose the cost of in vitro fertilization, which cur-
eds., 1st ed. Supp. 1987) (comparing a person altering a characteristic to a "young boy who 
loves to take things apart" taking apart a watch, adding that "[a]ttempts on his part to improve 
the watch will probably only harn1 it"). 
46. See Beth S. Finkelstein et al., Insurance Ccroerage, Physician Recommendations, and Access 
to Emerging Treatments: Growth Hormone Therapy for Childhood Short Stature, 279 JAMA 663 
(1998). Originally, human growth hormone was extracted from cadaveric pituitary glands and 
the NIH made it available free of charge. In early 1985, however, a process was developed to 
manufacture the hormone using recombinant DNA processes. Although the supply was now 
almost inexhaustible, the companies making the substance (Genentech and Eli Lilly & Co.) 
began charging high prices-an estimated $10,000 to $50,000 annually per child depending 
on the child's body weight. American Academy of Pediatrics Conm1. on Drugs and Bioethics, 
Consideration Related to the Use of Recombinant Human Growth Hormone in Children, 99 PEDIATRICS 
122, 125 (1997). The cost of the hormone products might decline once they lose their current 
status as orphan drugs, which confers on the manufacturers a period of marketing exclusively, 
thereby preventing price competition. See id. 
47. Anmiocentesis and CVS each cost approximately $1,800. See Carolyn Poroit, Prenatal 
Tests Help Prepare Moms-to-Be, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Apr. 15, 1998, at E03. 
48. The social and policy implications this raises are beyond the scope of this article, but 
it is important to keep them in mind. To take but one example, some advocates for the less 
well-off argue that the government should subsidize genetic testing and abortions under pro-
grams such as Medicaid. See David T. Morriss, Cost Containment and Reproductive Autonomy: 
Prenatal Genetic Screening and the American Health Security Act of 1993, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 295, 
313 ( 1994) ("[I]f an indigent woman receiving health care coverage under Medicaid is found 
to be carrying a fetus with a major genetic defect, she has no alternative but to carry the preg-
nancy to term unless she is able to pay for an abortion herself."). If this occurs, and genetic 
testing extends beyond detection of abnorn1alities or disorders to "norn1al" traits, then the 
government's involvement smacks of eugenics. Yet it may be difficult to restrict government-
funded genetic testing to abnormalities, especially in view of the vagueness of that term as 
described supra note 19. 
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rently costs an average of $37,000 per delivery,19 onto the cost of the ge-
netic manipulations themselves. Moreover, these manipulations are likely 
to cost substantially more than the costs of in vitro fertilization (particularly 
when the technology is first introduced). 
It is unlikely that public or private health insurance will cover the costs 
of genetic enhancement. This assessment seems plausible because insur-
ance policies do not cover costs associated with cosmetic medicine, the most 
analogous biomedical technology currently available. The legislation gov-
erning the Medicare program contains a general prohibition against paying 
for "items or services . . . which are not reasonable and necessary for the 
treatment of illness, or to improve the functioning of a malformed body 
part,"50 and includes a specific exclusion for "cosmetic surgery."51 Some 
states adopted the same coverage exceptions under their Medicaid pro-
grams:"2 Additionally, private health insurance plans do not cover cosmetic . 
medicine; the language in the author's high-option Blue Cross policy is 
typical: "Coverage is not provided for services and supplies ... for surgery 
and other services primarily to improve appearance or to treat a mental or 
emotional condition through a change in body form .... "53 
49. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 26, at 60. 
50. 42 U.S.C. §1395y(a){l)(A) {1994). 
5}. !d. §1395y(l0). 
52. Federal Medicaid legislation does not contain the same funding limitations as Medi-
care, but instead "confers broad discretion on the States to adopt standards for determining 
the extent of medical assistance, requiring only that such standards be 'reasonable' and 'con-
sistent with the objectives' of the Act." Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977). State Medicaid 
agencies "may place appropriate limits on a service based on such criteria as medical neces-
sity." 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (1998). State Medicaid programs generally refuse to cover cos-
metic services. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L\WS ANN. ch. 118G, § 1 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998) 
("[M]edically necessary services shall not include: ... cosmetic surgery."); Viveros v. Dep't of 
Health & Welfare, 889 P.2d 1104, ll07-08 (Idaho 1995) (fmding Idaho Department ofWel-
fare's exclusion of "cosmetic surgery which is not medically necessary" not arbitrary and capri-
cious). 
53. Comprehensive Major Medical Health Care Certificate, Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity (Med. Mutual of Ohio), June 17, 1997, at 19 (on ftle with author). The latter language 
responds to the attempt of physicians and patients to force insurers to cover cosmetic surgery 
on the basis that it is intended to alleviate patients' emotional distress at their physical appear-
ance. In Viveros, for example, the court upheld the refusal of the state Medicaid program to 
pay for surgery to reduce the size of the ears of an eight year-old with developmental disabili-
ties despite claims that the teasing he was subjected to would damage his self-esteem. Viveros, 
889 P.2d at 1108. State officials took the position that they would only pay for the surgical 
procedure if the condition of the boy's ears impaired his hearing. !d. at 11 07. 
Some private health insurance plans cover infertility treatments, and under so-called 
"state mandates," some states require health plans to provide this coverage. See, e.g., ARK. 
CODE ANN.§ 23-86-118 (Michie 1992); C,u... INS. CODE§ 10119.6 (West 1993}; CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN.§ 38a-536 (West 1992}; HAW. REV. STAT.§ 431-10A-ll6.5 (1993}; 215 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/356m (West 1993}; MASS. GEN. L\WS ANN. ch. 175, § 47H (West 1987 & Supp. 
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Against this backdrop, it is unlikely that third-party payers will change 
their policies and cover genetic enhancement in the future. Private insurers 
would not add coverage unless all insurers did so, since otherwise they 
would face destructive price competition from plans that denied coverage.51 
Yet the cost of providing universal coverage of genetic enhancements, 
whether through private insurers or the government, would be 
prohibitive. 55 For example, widespread access to enhancements that de-
pended on in vitro fertilization, like pre-implantation genetic selection, 
would cost $120 billion per year for the in vitro fertilization services alone. 56 
Somatic enhancement would not be any less expensive. A single somatic 
enhancement, such as human growth hormone, which costs an average of 
$30,000 per child per year, 57 would cost $22 billion a year just for the 1. 7 
million children who comprised the sho1·test three percent of the population.58 
The cost of multiple somatic enhancements for the entire population over 
time would be astronomical. 
The high cost and lack of coverage by third-party payment plans does 
1998); TEX. INS. CODE. ANN.§ 3.51-6 (3A(a)) (West 1981). Therefore, if genetic enhancement 
were sought in conjunction with IVF for infertility, a portion of the costs-at least of the IVF 
procedure itself-might be covered by insurance. But insurers would not pay for the costs of 
genetic enhancement, or for the costs of IVF if the primary reason for it was genetic enhance-
ment, if the insurer could discern these facts from the claim or the request for pre-certification 
of the service. Moreover, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), health 
plans provided by employers on a self-insured basis are exempt from state mandates. See 29 
U.S.C. § 1144(a) ( 1994) (preempting "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or here-
after relate to any employee benefit plan" governed by ERISA); see also id. §1144(b)(2)(A) 
(saving state laws that regulate insurance from preemption); id. §1144(b)(2)(B) (deeming self-
insured employer plans not to be engaged in the business of insurance and having the net 
effect of exempting self-insured plans from state regulation of insurance and managed care 
plans). In 199,3, approximately 44 million persons were covered under these self-funded plans 
governed by ERISA See GoVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH 
PLANS: ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES POSED BY ERISA 9 (1995). 
54. This stems from the problem of self-selection. An insurer that covered genetic en~ 
hancements when other plans did not would tend to attract precisely those enrollees who 
planned to us,e these costly services away from the other plans. This would require the insurer 
to raise premiums above those of plans that did not cover enhancement services to the point 
that any competitive advantage would be lost. 
:>:>. Bear:this in mind later in the discussion of whether the government ought:to provide 
genetic enhancement to persons with disabilities in order to improve their lot in life. See infra 
notes 117-23 and accompanying text. 
56. This :figure is based on an average cost of $30,000 per in vitro fertilization effort for 
approximately 4,000,000 live births per year. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
HEALTH UNITED STATES 82, tbl.3 (1995). This excludes unsuccessful pregnancies, which also 
might have involved enhancement efforts. 
57. See Guttier et al., supra note 8, at 532. 1 
58. See id. (exploring current recommendations over the use of growth hormone to treat 
children). ' 
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not, however, suggest that no one will gain access to genetic enhancement. 
Rather, it merely suggests that, if left to the forces of the marketplace, ac-
cess will be limited to persons who can purchase it with their own assets. 
Society will thus divide into those who can afford genetic enhancements 
and those who can afford little, if any, just as it now divides into those who 
can and cannot afford cosmetic surgery, prolonged psychotherapy, or pri-
vate schools. 59 
This resulting division will give rise to two related problems. The first 
is the problem of social inequality. Enhanced individuals will achieve social 
success more easily than those who remain unenhanced. For example, 
studies show that people who are tall and physically attractive are more 
likely to be hired and promoted than people who are short or 
unattractive.60 Although Western democratic societies can accommodate a 
certain degree of inequality, the difference in prospects between the en-
hanced and the unenhanced could become so pronounced that serious so-
cial instability would ensue. Taken to the extreme, enhancements could be 
installed by manipulating germ lines, resulting in social advantages that are 
inherited by succeeding generations. This could eventually create a political 
system dominated by a genetic aristocracy, or "genobility," that possesses a 
lock on wealth, privilege, and power. 
The second problem created by wealth-based access to genetic en-
hancement is the individual unfairness that would arise at the micro level if 
genetically enhanced individuals competed for scarce resources, or found 
themselves in conflicts of interest, with persons who were unenhanced. Ge-
59. An important question is whether the societal division would be dichotomous or 
whether there would be a sort of "enhancement mic\dle class" comprised of persons who could 
afford some enhancement but not as much as those with more wealth. This depends on the 
actual cost of genetic enhancement and on the distribution of wealth in the population, For 
purposes of this paper, I will assume that even if a relatively large number of people could 
afford some genetic enhancement, what they can afford will confer relatively little benefit 
compared to the enhancement benefits that will be obtainable by the wealthy. This assumption 
is supported by trends in the societal distribution of wealth. In I 996, the top five percent of 
households saw their proportion of national income rise to 21.4%, the highest level ever re-
ported by the Census Bureau, while the shares of national income going to the bottom four-
fifths of the population were at or near all-time lows. See Center on Budget and Policy Priori-
ties, Poverty Rate Fails to Decline as Income Grouoth of 1997 Favors the Affluent (last modified Oct. 
14, 1997) <http://www.cbpp.org/povday97 .htrn>. 
60. See DanielS. Hamermesh &Jeff E. Biddle, Beauty and the Labor Market, 84 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1174, 1192 (1994) ("Other things equal, wages of people with below-average looks are 
lower than those of average-looking workers and there is a premium in wages for good-
looking people that is slightly smaller than this penalty."); Paula C. Morrow, Physical Attractive-
ness and Selection Decision Making, 16]. MGMT. 45 (1990) (reviewing studies and finding a cor-
relation between physical attractiveness and hiring practices). In addition to hiring prefer-
ences, attractiveness and income appear to be correlated as well. 
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netic enhancement could confer a decisive advantage in social interactions. 
How should society respond to the potential unfairness of these interac-
tions? 
In the next section, I focus briefly on why the inequality and fairness 
issues presented by genetic enhancement are likely to be serious, if not un-
precedented. I argue that the potential benefits from genetic enhancement 
differ sufficiently from other forms of self-improvement that specific atten-
tion must be given to the problems of inequality and unfairness that genetic 
enhancement produces. I then turn to an elaboration of the problem of 
inequality, followed by an evaluation of potential methods for mitigating 
the inequality that wealth-based access to genetic enhancement would pro-
duce. Because some individuals are bound to obtain access to genetic en-
hancement, I address the problem of unfairness, and conclude with a dis-
cussion of potential methods for leveling the genetic playing field in spe-
cific transactions. 
II. THE SPECIAL NATURE OF GENETIC ENHANCEMENTS 
In any society whose members believe in the possibility of upward so-
cial mobility, people seek to better themselves and their children.61 They 
educate themselves and attempt to obtain the best education for their chil-
dren. They may try to marry "upward," hoping for a mate who will increase 
their opportunities, social standing, and wealth. They push themselves and 
their children to cultivate and make the utmost use of their talents;62 
Many of these efforts involve the employment of medical or pharma-
ceutical interventions. People take drugs to improve their athletic and cog-
nitive performance.63 They subject themselves to surgery to improve their 
appearance.64 Some of these activities, selecting one's mate, for example, 
61. See Achy Obejas, Self-Help Radio: Local Station Says New Feel-Good Format Is Smart 
Enough, Good Enough, and Doggone It, People Like It, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 9, 1998, at 2 (describing 
WYPA, a local radio station in Chicago, which touts itself as "your transformation station," 
offering "a constant diet of 'success skills,' 'healthy lifestyles,' and 'business skills.'"). 
62. Sometimes they go to extremes. See Cheerleader Case Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 
1996, at A23 ("A woman who offered her diamond earrings in a murder-for-hire plot aimed at 
getting her daughter on the junior high cheerleading squad was sentenced to 10 years in 
prison today."). In order to increase their toddler's chances of getting admitted to an exclusive 
pre-school in Manhattan, parents repeatedly fed her okra prior to the admissions interview in 
the hope that the answer "okra" to the question "What are your favorite foods?" would give 
her an advantage. See Jane Mayer, It Helps to Thank Headmistress When She Offers Cookies, WALL 
ST. j.. Sept. 29, 1982, at l. 
63. See discussion at notes 19-24, supra, and accompanying text (discussing various types 
of enhancements). 
64. Cosmetic surgery includes breast augmentation and reduction, liposuction, rhino-
plasty, and face-lifts. Liposuction has become increasingly popular in recent years, with a 215% 
increase in persons obtaining liposuction from 1992 to 1997. See American Society of Plastic 
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have at least an indirect influence on the genetic makeup of succeeding 
generations. 
Considering that individuals currently employ enhancement practices, 
what is so exceptional about genetic enhancement? Society has had plenty 
of experience coping with the social implications of efforts at self-
improvement. While society's response has not always been adequate or 
successful,65 we must consider whether the problems created by genetic 
enhancement will be so different that they require special attention. 
Even if we believed that wealth-based access to genetic enhancement 
did not constitute a new kind of threat to social equality, we might still want 
society to respond to its vices in a vigorous fashion. The additional inequal-
ity arising from genetic enhancement, when added to existing sources of 
inequality, might lead to social unrest. At the very least, we might want to 
monitor the situation closely, and stand prepared to respond if necessary. 
Yet in a number of important respects, genetic enhancement does dif-
fer from previous agents of inequality and unfairness. Taken together, 
these differences justify a significantly heightened level of concern, if not 
outright alarm. 
First, due to its expected cost, only a select group of wealthy individu-
als will gain access to genetic enhancement technologies. Currently, nu-
merous types of self-improvement, while often expensive, are not priced 
beyond the means of most people. For example, 20 million Americans are 
members of commercial health and sports clubs.66 Arguably, cosmetic sur-
gery is within the financial means of a wide range of people. For example, 
in 1997, 480,588 persons purchased some type of cosmetic surgery.67 By 
contrast, only 39,390 per year obtain in vitro fertilization, 68 and even fewer 
would be able to afford the additional cost of pre-implantation genetic en-
hancement. Somatic enhancement might be cheaper, but might still be 
and Reconstructive Surgeons, Media Center: Five Year Trends in Cosmetic Surgery 1992 vs. 1997 
(visited May 12, 1998) <http://www.plasticsurgery.org/mediactr/97change.htm>. The surgical 
procedures often seem extreme. In a complete face-lift, for example, the entire face is peeled 
away from the skull to enable the skin to be pulled back and reattached more tightly. See Joan 
Swirsky, A NeU' Method in the Old Practice of Making a Younger Face, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1994, § 
14LI, at 10 (describing traditional methods of cosmetic surgery). 
65. Wimess the difficulties in trying to control the use of performance-enhancing drugs in 
sports. 
66. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 13, 1996, at 20. 
67. See American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, 1997 Cosmetic Procedures 
(visited May 12, 1998) <http://www.plasticsurgery.org/mediactr/97change.htm>. The proce-
dures reflected in this figure are liposuction, breast augmentation, eyelid surgery, facelift, and 
laser skin resurfacing. 
68. The number of deliveries as a result of these cycles· of IVF were far fewer: 9,573. See 
Richard J. Paulson, Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 165 W.]. MED. 377, 377 (1996). 
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beyond the reach of many who desire to enhance multiple traits or produce 
long-term results.69 
Second, genetic enhancements are likely to affect some traits that are 
not easily altered by current forms of self-improvement, which are limited 
in scope. These traits may include some that are fundamental to personal 
success. For example, one can change one's weight (although usually not 
permanently); use cosmetics and cosmetic medicine to improve appearance 
within certain limits; moderately increase one's ability to cope with loss, 
failure, and stress; build muscles; develop greater physical, mental, and 
social skills; and increase reading speed. Genetic enhancement, however, 
may improve intelligence, cognition, charisma, creativity, energy, cheerful-
ness, sense of humor, and other characteristics that are arguably central to 
success and well-being. 70 
In addition, people who are fortunate enough to gain access to genetic 
enhancements are likely to obtain a much greater and longer-lasting ad-
vantage than those who employ more traditional forms of self-
improvement. The athletic use of performance-enhancing drugs does not 
alter the basic human phenotype, and the effects, while perhaps enough to 
· win competitions, are relatively modest. 71 Although cosmetic interventions 
69. Individuals seeking cosmetic surgery for frown lines must be injected with Botulinum 
toxin (Botox), one of the deadliest toxins known to man, every few months to get rid of frown 
lines. See Kendell Hamilton & Julie Weingarden, Lifts, Lasers and Liposuction: The Cosmetic Sur-
gery Boom, NEWSWEEK, June I5, I998, at I4. Performance-enhancing drugs such as anabolic 
steroids must be taken· every 24 hours to enhance performance. Lamb, supra note 3I, at 32 
(demonstrating that weight-trained athletes will use anywhere from IO-I5mg/24 hours to 
2000mg/24 hours). The acute effects of human growth hormone disappear within three to four 
hours. See Smith & Perry, supra note 9, at 653-54. 
70. Ronald Dworkin prominently addresses the treatment to be accorded natural but not 
acquired traits. The distinction is reflected in his twin essays, What Is Equality? Part I: Equality 
of Welfore [hereinafter Dworkin IJ, and What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources [hereinafter 
Dworkin IIJ, in IO PHIL & PUB. AFF. I85, 283 (198I). See JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 237 (I996) ("Dworkin argues that justice requires compensating indi-
viduals for aspects of their situations for which they are not responsible and which hamper 
their achievement of whatever is valuable in life, but only for those aspects."). In perhaps the 
most significant attempt to justifY such a societal response, Rawls posits a veil of ignorance 
behind which individuals choosing the rules by which to govern their society do not know their 
allotment of natural traits. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE I2 (197I) ("[NJo one knows 
his place in society .... [T]he principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance."); see 
also ROEMER, supra, at 175-76 ("[T]he veil of ignorance is only supposed to shield individuals 
from knowledge of their morally arbitrary features."). 
71. Improvement in muscular strength from steroid use has been shown in only one-half 
of the controlled investigations reported. "When positive effects of steroid treatment were 
observed, steroids typically led to increase of 8 kg for maximal lifts in the bench press and II 
kg in the squat." Lamb, supra note 3I, at 3L Sodium bicarbonate, which enhances perform-
ance by delaying fatigue, helps to buffer the build-up of lactic acid within the muscle cells. One 
study showed that sodium bicarbonate could increase a runner's speed by 2.9 seconds, which 
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change the appearance, they rarely stray from "normal" ranges for physical 
traits, and with the exception of cosmetic surgery, are often transitory. 72 To 
date, techniques for improving memory and other cognitive functioning do 
not appear to significantly increase intelligence, or to have a particularly 
profound or permanent effect on the individual.73 It is impossible, however, 
to predict the power of genetic enhancement. It could stretch the limits of 
desirable human traits considerably, perhaps even indefinitely. 71 For ex-
ample, there eventually may be no such thing as being "too intelligent." 
Moreover, enhanced persons could still employ traditional forms of self-
improvement in addition to their genetically enhanced starting points. 
Further, current self-improvement techniques tend to affect only a few 
aspects of performance or appearance at one time. In most cases, people 
work on one trait-their facial appearance, their weight, their ability to 
solve puzzles or memorize facts, and so on. Cosmetic polymedicine, while 
not unknown, is rare. 75 Even a professional athlete in full training mode 
can do no more than exercise and take performance-enhancing drugs to 
increase strength and stamina, hire a good coach and perhaps a sports psy-
chologist, and repeatedly practice a skill or routine. Genetic enhancement 
on the other hand may permit wholesale changes in characteristics. Parents 
with sufficient resources may engineer numerous improvements in them-
could be lhe difference between first and last place. See Ghaphery, supra note 31, at 433 (ex-
plaining the effects of various drogs on lhe athletes' performance). Blood doping, the intrave-
nous infusion of blood to increase oxygen-carrying capacity, has been shown lo increase en-
durance by 15-30'7c. Amphetamines, which are used to increase speed, power, and endurance, 
have been shown lo enhance "performance by 3-4'7c in weight throwers and shot-puuers, l.5'7c 
in runners, and 0.6-1.2 '7c in swimmers." Smilh & Perry, supra nole 9, at 654. Epoetin, age-
nelically engineered human recombinant erylhropoielin lhal slimulales red blood cell pro-
duction, can cul up to 30 seconds from a 20-minute racing lime. Jd. at 657. 
72. See ELIZABETH HAIKEN, VENUS ENVY: A HISTORY OF COSMETIC SURGERY 223 (1997) 
(discussing lhe lendency of cosmelic surgery w lead lo homogenizalion). The exceplion rnighl 
be emertainers, particularly lhose who lrade on lheir sexual appearance. 
73. Memory enhancemem has become the lalesl fitness boom. Techniques to improve 
memory such as Kevin Trudeau's "Mega Memory" and Jack Lannom's "Mind Unlimiled" are 
in high demand. Supplements such as ginkgo biloba, eslrogen, vitamin E, and aspirin are 
claimed lo boosl brain power. There is "nothing magical," however, about the lechniques that 
lhese memory coaches teach. Furthermore, few of lhe supplemenls thal enlhusiasls have em-
braced have been shown lO sharpen recall in healthy people, and some have been shown lO 
have dangerous side effecls. See Geoffrey Cowley & Anne Underwood, Memory, NEWSWEEK, 
June 15, 1998, al54. See generally Whitehouse el al., supra nole 20, at 22 (disrussing side effens 
of drogs that enhance
1 
cognilion). 
74. See Whitehotjse et al., supra nole 20, al 16 (asking if cognilion is similar to lhe propo-
sition lhat "[o]ne can rtever be lOO rich or lOO lhin"). 
75. See What Price Perfection?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 12, 1991, al E2 ("[T]he need for 
plaslic surgery over lhe entire body is minule."). 
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selves and in their children. 76 
Genetic enhancements may give people decisive advantages or major 
success not just in one or two spheres of social activity, but in a broad range 
of social endeavors, since genetic enhancement may make it possible to 
alter multiple traits in significant ways. This may enable them to cross what 
Michael Walzer calls "spheres of distributive justice."77 Walzer encourages 
imagining the following individual: 
Here is a person whom we have freely chosen (without reference 
to his family ties or his wealth) as our political representative. He 
is also a bold and inventive entrepreneur. When he was younger, 
he studied science, scored amazingly high grades in every exam, 
and made important discoveries. In war, he is surpassingly brave 
and wins the highest honors. Himself compassionate and com-
pelling, he is loved by all who know him. 78 
76. As Eric Parens points out, genetic enhancement is not just a new technological prod-
uct that e<in be purchased by people who are lucky in terms of their genetic "draw"; instead, it 
is a means of improving the genetic draw itself, a chance to purchase a new "capacity" rather 
than just a new "tool": 
In the past the rich have had access to new technological tools that enabled 
them to increase their productivity and thus their resources. Access to the 
tool that is the printing press, for example, no doubt conferred a competi-
tive advantage on those who could afford access to it and its products. But 
how much one could benefit from those new tools and products was to some 
extent limited by one's draw in the genetic lottery .... One of the things 
about the new biotechnologies is that one's draw does not pose the same sort 
of limitation. 
Erik Parens, Is Better AlU'ays Good? The Enhancement Project, 28 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 58 (Jan.-
Feb. 1998) . 
. It is necessary to note that multiple somatic enhancements might interfere with one 
another or otherwise adversely affect the health or well-being of the person in whom they were 
installed. Furthermore, genetic enhancement techniques that involve reproductive decision-
making, guided by the results of genetic testing, are likely to be able to improve relatively few 
traits compared to gene transfer enhancement. This is true largely because parents or pro-
spective parents making reproductive decisions would have few choices of mates, embryos, or 
fetuses to enable them to consider more than a few concurrently manifesting characteristics. 
77. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF jUSTICE 10 (1983). 
78. Walzer argues that a society without a dominating class that stands atop the distribu-
tive system, id. at 11, is a society in which there are no monopolistically owned dominant 
goods, that is, goods owned by one group that can conm1and a wide range of goods in other 
spheres of society. !d. at 20. Walzer asserts as an "open-ended distributive principle" that "[n]o 
social good x should be distributed to men and women who possess some other good y merely 
because they possess y and without regard to the meaning ofx" !d .. In a just society, for exam-
ple, wealthy people cannot purchase political office, since this would convert a good in one 
distributive sphere-wealth-into a good in another sphere-political power. But what about 
people who are so gifted that they dominate by virtue of their talents? What would happen, 
asks Walzer, if "the same people were successful in one sphere after another, triumphant in 
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If genetic enhancement made this type of person possible, he and his kind 
would very likely dominate the rest of society. 
Finally, unlike most advantages derived from self-improvement, cer-
tain genetic enhancements-those that are achieved through genetic selec-
tion for enhancement or germ line engineering-will be incorporated into 
the genetic make-up of future generations.79 Both the genetic enhance-
ments and the societal advantages conferred will be inherited and persons 
who obtain them will comprise a special social class. Although initially de-
fined by its wealth, this class will eventually be characterized by its superior 
genetic endowment. 
In short, genetic enhancement raises numerous societal concerns.80 
every company, piling up goods without the need for illegitimate conversions?" !d. Their 
society would not only be inegalitarian, but it would be a society in which equality was not 
possible. See id. (stating that "it would also suggest in the strongest way that a society of equals 
was not a lively possibility"). Walzer dismisses this scenario as unrealistic, contending that such 
individuals do not exist outside of legend. !d. Even if they do exist, he adds, "there aren't 
enough such people to constitute a ruling class and dominate the rest of us." !d. Yet genetic 
enhancement, which is affordable only by the wealthy and inherited by their offspring, creates 
just such a scenario. Similar to Walzer, Robert Nozick also believes that the fact that people 
excel at different things avoids excessive envy. See RoBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY STATE AND 
UTOPIA243-46 (1974). 
79. Non-genetic types of self-improvement may have indirect effects on future genera-
tions. A star athlete who achieves fame and fortune through self-improvement may be able to 
mate with someone with highly desirable genetic characteristics, positively affecting the genetic 
endowment of their children, who will also benefit from the wealth and status that he or she 
inherits from his or her successful parent. Yet this genetic impact is indirect as compared with 
the impact of a genetic selection or manipulation. Note that replicating a genetic enhance-
ment in future generations may require further manipulations, since the DNA of the enhanced 
individual would combine with the DNA of the sperm or egg of the other. mate (assuming 
sexual reproduction), which might not be enhanced or enhanced in the same fashion. 
The negative social effects of genetic enhancement are likely to be less well-
understood, and may be far more profound and long-ranging, than the effects produced by 
other methods of self-improvement. The adverse impact on children of being genetically 
enhanced by their parents, if any, is not clear, and there is little in the way of precedent. For 
example, many parents seek growth hormone therapy for their children because they feel that 
being made taller will benefit the child. Human growth hormone, however, can have some 
very serious adverse physical and psychological effects. There has been evidence that human 
growth hormone may lead to diabetes, production of growth-attenuating antibodies, leukemia, 
acromegaly, and hypertension. It also has a stigmatizing effect because children may perceive 
themselves as incomplete or unacceptable. This in tum may in1pair their ability to concentrate 
on learning, social relationships and other developmental essentials. See Douglas S. Diekema, 
Is Taller Really Better? Grou•th Hormone Therapy in Short Children, 34 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. 
109, 112-13 (1990). See generally MURRAY, supra note 23, at 90-91 (discussing adverse effects on 
children of human growth hormone). No one knows what effects genetic enhancement may 
have on successive generations, especially changes in the gene pool itself produced by germ 
cell enhancement. 
80. Among other concerns are the authenticity of the achievements of an enhanced indi-
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Some of these are metaphysicaL For example, genetic engineering gener-
ally is criticized as "playing God." 81 Critics with this perspective may be 
even more hostile toward genetic enhancements, which aim to improve 
"normal" traits, rather than to cure, mitigate, or prevent disease or disabil-
ity. Beyond philosophical objections, however, genetic enhancement may 
have significant, adverse practical consequences for individuals and for 
society as a whole. In the remainder of this article, I will concentrate on two 
of these practical consequences, beginning with the implications for social 
equality. 
III. THE THREAT TO EQUALITY FROM GENETIC ENHANCEMENT 
Is it fair for some people to have greater genetic advantages than oth-
ers? This is an age-old question, forming the crux of the problem of "natu-
ral inequality" that has plagued philosophers and social theorists for centu-
ries. 82 If it is unfair, then presumably society should do what it can to miti-
gate the consequences. Yet, what forms of intervention should society take, 
and how feasible would they be? 
Some philosophers tolerate natural inequality more than others. 
Meritocrats, for example, welcome the substantial inequalities that result 
from the distribution of natural talents, arguing that society benefits from 
the accomplishments of the gifted. John Gardner objects to what he calls 
vidual and violating the autonomy of embryos, fetuses, and children who cannot make en-
hancement decisions for themselves. See Glenn McGee, Parenting in an Era of Genetics, 28 
HAsTINGS CTR REP. 16 (Mar.-Apr. 1997) (emphasizing the possibility that children will be born 
into a world where their ultimate choices have already been made by their parents); Parens, 
supra note 76, at S11-S13. 
81. See Capron, supra note 18, at 672 (describing the views of religious scholars on genetic 
engineering presented to President's Conm1ission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medi-
cine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research); Elliot N. Dorff, Jewish Theological and Moral 
Reflections on Genetic Screening: The Case of BRCAJ, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 72 ( 1997) (stating that 
"[t]heologically, the dilemma is to define when we cease legitimately to be God's partners in 
creation and instead become God"s substitute, playing God, as it were, in changing the nature 
of the species"). 
82. Plato, for example, assumed that people were born into different conditions, which he 
categorized as gold, silver and bronze, and should be allowed to move up or down in society 
depending on their abilities. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 160-61 (H. D. P. Lee trans., Penguin 
Books 1955). Some might say that natural inequality results not only from a person's genetic 
endowment but from any inherited benefit, such as class or wealth. Rawls, for example, in-
cludes both "accidents of natural endowment" and "contingencies of social circumstances" as 
undeserved advantages that must be nullified by his conception of justice. RAWLS, supra note 
70, at 15. Yet genetic endowment in turn affects social circumstances, although the exact de-
gree is dependent on the relative impact of genetic and environmental factors in any particu-
lar instance. See supra footnote 15 (discussing the nature-versus-nurture controversy). To the 
extent that natural advantages do not derive, directly or indirectly, from a person's genetic 
endowment, one might say that they are the result of pure luck. 
THE lAW OF ABOVE AVERAGES 541 
"extreme equalitarianism," which Ignores differences in native capacity 
and achievement and eliminates incentives to individuals," and which, in 
his opinion, signifies "the end of that striving for excellence that has pro-
duced history's greatest achievements."83 Others relish excellence as much 
for its own sake as for what it can achieve. According to Thomas Nagel: 
A society should try to foster the creation and preservation of 
what is best, or as good as it possibly can be .... Such an aim can 
be pursued only by recognizing and exploiting the natural ine-
qualities between persons, encouraging specialization and dis-
tinction of levels in education, and accepting the variation in ac-
complishment which results. 84 
Robert Nozick disputes the belief that because natural assets are arbitrarily 
distributed, they are not deserved.85 
Philosophers who are morally troubled by inequality, on the other 
hand, 86 take the position that it is unjust for some individuals to benefit by 
83. jOHN GARDNER, EXCELLENCE: CAN WE BE EQUAL AND EXCELLENT TOO? 30 (1984). 
84. THOM,\S NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 135 (1991). 
85. NOZICK, supra note 78, at 223-24. Nozick rejects the rationale underlying Rawls' 
conception of an "original position" in which individuals choose principles of justice behind a 
veil of ignorance where they are denied knowledge of their actual endowment of natural as-
sets. States Nozick: 
Presumably the underlying principle would be that if any particular features 
are arbitrary from a moral point of view, then persons in the original posi-
tion should not know they possess them. But this would exclude their 
knowing anything about themselves, for each of their features (including ra-
tionality, the ability to make choices, having a life span of more than three 
days, having a memory, being able to communicate with other organisms 
like themselves [all of which Rawls assumes they know about themselves in 
the original position]) will be based upon the fact that the sperm and ovum 
that produced them contained particular genetic materiaL The physical fact 
that those particular gametes contained particular organized chemicals (the 
gene for people rather than for muskrats or trees) is arbitrary from a moral 
point of view; it is, from a moral point of view, an accident. Yet persons in the 
original position are to know some of their attributes. 
Jd. at 227. 
86. Equality is an important goal according to most conceptions of Western democratic 
society; witness the Declaration of Independence, asserting as a "self-evident truth" that "all 
men are created equal," or the statement in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 
that "[a]ll human beings are created equal in dignity and rights." Isaiah Berlin describes the 
innate appeal of the principle in the following passage, as excerpted by Robert Nozick: 
No reason need be given for ... an equal distribution of benefits-for that 
is "natural"-self-evidently right and just, and needs no justification, since it 
is in a sense conceived as being self-justified .... The assumption is that 
equality needs no reasons, only inequality does so; that uniformity, regular-
ity, similarity, symmetry, ... need not be specially accounted for, whereas 
differences, unsystematic behavior, changes in conduct, need explanation 
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and, as a rule, justification. If I have a cake and there are ten persons 
among whom I wish to divide it, then if I give exactly one-tenth to each, this 
will not, at any rate automatically, call for justification; whereas if I depart 
from this principle of equal division, I am expected to produce a special 
reason. It is some sense of this, however latent, that makes equality an idea 
which has never seemed intrinsically eccentric .... 
/d. at 347 n.41 (quoting Isaiah Berlin, Equality, in jUSTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY 131 (Frederick 
A. Olafson ed., 1961)) (alteration in original). 
Yet the notion of equality itself is highly imprecise. Temkin, for example, describes 
nine different ways of expressing social inequality: 
I. The range, consisting of the gap between the levels of welfare of the best and worst off in 
society. 
2. The relative mean deviation, consisting of the sum of the differences between the average 
level of welfare and the welfare of each individual. 
3. The variance, consisting of the sum of the squared differences between the average level of 
welfare and the welfare of each individual. 
4. The coefficient of variation, consisting of the square root of the squared differences between 
the average level of welfare and the welfare of each individual. 
5. The standard deviation of the logarithm, consisting of the squared logarithmic differences 
between the average level of welfare and the welfare of each individual. 
6. The Gini coefficient, consisting of one-half of the relative mean difference (the arithmetic 
average of the absolute difference) between the welfare of each individual. 
7. Atkinson's measure, consisting of one minus the ratio of the equally distributed equivalent 
level of income to the mean of the actual distribution. 
8. The intersection approach, suggested by Sen, in which the result of several measures of 
equality is considered. 
9. Temkin's own approach, which is "complex and multifaceted" and involves identifying each 
material aspect of inequality, measuring it, weighting it in terms of its relative importance, and 
summing the results. 
See L\RRY S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 118-53 (1993) (summarizing nine different ways of ex-
pressing social inequality). Temkin explains the differences between these measures in terms 
of their sensitivity to the complexities of actual society in which different individuals have 
different levels of welfare. The range ignores the pattern of distribution between the extremes, 
so that it would regard a society in which a few people were extremely well-off and a few ex-
tremely poor as less equal than a society in which many people were less well-off, only less 
extremely so, and many people were more well-off, only less extremely so. The relative mean 
deviation ignores the effect of transfers of well-being between people below the welfare mean, 
even though such a transfer may violate the Pigou-Dalton condition (which holds that, other 
things being equal, transfers from poor to rich increase inequality, while transfers in the re-
verse direction decrease it). See A.C. PIGOU, WEALTH AND WELFARE 24 (1912); Hugh Dalton, 
The Measurement of Inequality of Incomes, 30 ECON. J. 48 (1920). The squaring feature of the 
variance, the coefficient of variance, and the standard deviation of the logarithm all give larger 
differences of welfare greater weight than smaller differences, but Temkin objects that they are 
arbitrary and that they generally fail to take account of highly complex welfare distributions. 
The Gini coefficient, along with some of the other measures, he argues, fails to reflect accu-
rately the extent to which inequality matters more among the less well-off than among the 
better-off. Atkinson's measure, he says, is too flexible: It would consider a society to have a 
high degree of "equality" even though welfu.re was extremely unequally distributed, depending 
on the value one attached to an equal distribution of welfare. Finally, Sen's intersection ap-
proach is too prone to producing conflicting results. See generally TEMKIN, supra at 118-53, 
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virtue of their genetic endowment, as compared to others who do not fare 
as well in the arbitrary genetic lottery. 87 These philosophers generally agree 
that unchosen and unearned advantages and disadvantages must be mini-
mized or used for the advantage of less fortunate members of society. AI> 
Rawls states: "It seems to be one of the fixed points of our considered 
judgments that no one deserves his place in the distribution of native en-
dowments, any more than one deserves one's initial starting place in soci-
ety ... ss 
Although liberal philosophers agree on the goal of rectifying the in-
justices of the natural lottery, they disagree substantially on how this should 
be achieved. A basic dispute, for example, concerns just what is to be 
equalized: Is it "welfare," that is, some subjective measure of well-being, or 
is it "resources"?89 Another contentious issue is how much inequality society 
190. 
87. Dworkin, for example, argues that society should rectify inequality of resources that 
results from what he calls "brute luck," which he defines as how risks fall out that are not "de-
liberate and calculated gambles." In contrast, society owes nothing to someone who has less by 
virtue of such gambles, which Dworkin calls "option luck." See Dworkin II, supra note 70, at 
293. . 
88. RAWLS, supra note 70, at 104. This leads Rawls to opt for a "principle of redress" in 
regard to these attributes: "This is the principle that undeserved inequalities call for redress; 
and since inequalities of birth and natural endowment are undeserved, these inequalities are 
somehow to be compensated for." /d. at 100. Indeed, Rawls' difference principle itself-the 
principle that "(t]hose who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from 
their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out," id. at 
101 ,-<lerives from this view of natural endowments as undeserved. See also Ronald Dworkin, 
Why Liberals Should Care About Equality, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 205, 207 (1985) ("(M]arket 
allocations must be corrected in order to bring some people closer to the share of resources 
they would have had but for these various differences of initial advantage, luck, and inherent 
capacity."). 
89. Welfarist theories begin from the economists' premise that individual tastes and val-
ues differ. They hold that an equal distribution must strive to give everyone the resources 
necessary to make them equally happy or successful, or whatever is deemed to count as welfare 
even if the resulting distribution of resources is highly unequal. Advocates of equality of re-
sources balk at the fact that equality of welfare may entitle persons with expensive tastes to 
receive an inordinate share of resources. A fuller description of this dispute is presented by 
Dworkin. See generally Dworkin I and Dworkin II, supra note 70. Dworkin's analysis in tum is 
succinctly described by ROEMER, supra note 70, at 237-52. Equality of resources attempts to 
solve this by providing everyone with the same bundle of goods. People with expensive rather 
than modest tastes will have to devote more of their resources to satisfying these tastes, but 
that, say resource egalitarians, is as it should be. However, equality of resources, in tum, raises 
the problem that some people will have expensive tastes over which they have little or no 
control-perhaps tastes that they inherited. Arguably they should no more be penalized for 
these tastes than for any other throw of the natural dice. Still other people will have plain bad 
luck, which will leave them worse off even though they have the same tastes and receive the 
same share of resources as those who are luckier. 
It might seem that a scheme that aimed to provide equality of resources ought to 
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can tolerate, whether of welfare or resources, in order to assure the pro-
duction of desired goods. For example, meritocratic, libertarian, and free 
market theorists all justify their tolerance for inequality, at least in part, on 
the ground that permitting people to profit from the exercise of their natu-
ral talents is necessary to induce them to increase the total sum of societal 
goods.90 Therefore, many philosophers abandon the quest for absolute 
equality, whether of resources or welfare, in favor of providing everyone 
with a minimum level of assets or of well-being,91 or with "equality of op-
compensate for bad luck as well as for bad genes and other accidents of birth. Dworkin pro-
poses such a scheme: "[A]n equal initial auction, followed by trade and production constrained 
by taxation mimicking hypothetical insurance markets .... " Dworkin II, supra note 70, at 335. 
The thrust of Dworkin's idea is that people should be given an equal amount of resources at an 
initial point at which they know their preferences and the general distribution of natural assets 
in the world, but not their personal allotment of natural assets or, of course, how lucky they 
will be. These people can, if they choose, purchase insurance that will compensate them if they 
receive a poor distribution of assets or encounter bad luck. The point of the insurance market 
is that it enables people to take into account their preferences, including their aversion to risk, 
in determining how much insurance to purchase. The insurance market thus transforms the 
natural lottery and luck into choices, which society no longer has to remedy. Roemer, however, 
observes that, if the goal is to remedy bad luck, then people deserve remediation when they 
purchase little or no insurance and have few natural talents or have bad luck. Otherwise, they 
will be worse off than someone who makes the same insurance choice but has many natural 
talents or good luck. See ROEMER, supra note 70, at 251-52. 
90. Cf NAGEL, supra note 84, at 121 ("Individual motives ... work against equality ... by 
putting pressure even on institutions that give priority to the interests of the worse off to toler-
ate substantial inequalities as the price of efficiency."). Even Rawls would permit substantial 
inequalities in order to increase production, so long as the benefits percolated down to the 
least well-off. See RAWLS, supra note 70, at 78, where he states: 
!d. 
[T]he greater expectations allowed to entrepreneurs encourages them to do 
things which raise the long-term prospects of [the] laboring class. Their 
better prospects act as an incentive so that the economic process is more ef-
ficient, innovation proceeds at a faster pace, and so on. Eventually the re-
sulting material benefits spread throughout the system and to the least ad-
vantaged. 
91. Nagel, for example, asks why someone who is wealthy by virtue of good luck should 
not be permitted to enjoy his wealth, even though most people cannot have the same amount 
of wealth or enjoyment, so long as society guarantees everyone "a decent social minimum." 
NAGEL, supra note 84, at 136-37. He defmes this standard as a "high social minimum, with 
healthy, comfortable, decent conditions of life and self-respect for everyone." !d. at 124. Nagel 
also insists that no one be excluded by discrimination from being able to acquire wealth. !d. at 
137. Madison Powers and Harry Frankfurt advocate a principle of "sufficiency." The latter 
asserts that "[i]f everyone had enough, it would be of no moral consequence whether some had 
more than others." Harry Frankfurt, Equality As a Moral Ideal, 98 ETHICS 21 ( 1987), quoted in 
Madison Powers, Forget About Equality, 6 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS j. 129, 136 (1996). Powers 
holds that everyone should have sufficient resources "to prevent the subordination of some 
groups to the will of others." !d. at 143. Ronald Dworkin posits a hypothetical insurance 
scheme in which people who do not know what their talents or luck will be can buy insurance 
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portunity."92 
to protect themselves against bad fortune, and assumes that these people will purchase insur-
ance to ensure that, regardless of their actual earning ability, they will earn a moderate wage. 
See Dworkin II, supra note 70, at 314c21. He suggests that this wage would approximate the 
earnings level of the thirtieth percentile of the population. /d. at 322. In terms of access to 
health care, Norman Daniels states that everyone should have enough health care to achieve a 
normal function or range of opportunities for their reference class (which will differ according 
to factors such as age and gender) within· the species. See NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH 
CARE 28 (1986). 
92. Falling back on equality of opportunity is a maneuver familiar to the Jaw when con-
fronting uncertainty over which outcomes are just. Instead of focusing on outcome, these 
arguments focus on process. What matters is not how equal or unequal everyone is, but how 
they achieved their relative positions. Inequality per se is not forbidden; only inequality that 
arises from discrimination is not tolerable. Nagel distinguishes, for example, between "the 
direct employment of talent to gain advantages" and "nepotism and bribery." NAGEL, supra 
note 84, at 118. Inequality stemming from the forn1er is acceptable, since to prevent it "we 
would have to abolish competition," while "blocking the influence of discrimination and class, 
by contrast, expand competition." /d. Nozick, as noted earlier, would allow people to enjoy 
unequal holdings so long as the holdings were justly acquired. See NOZICK, supra note 78, at 
151-52 ("A distribution is just if it arises from another just distribution by legitimate means."). 
"Unjust holdings" result when "people steal from others, or defraud them, or enslave them, 
seizing their product and preventing them from living as they choose, or forcibly excluding 
others from competing in exchanges." Id. at 152. 
The most common process-based approach to the problem of inequality is to insist on 
"equality of opportunity." Michel Rosenfeld, for instance, asserts that equality of opportunity 
requires neutralization of inequalities of birth so that everyone has the same means to obtain 
scarce goods. See Michel Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal Opportunity: A Jurisprudential 
Approach, 74 CAL L. REV. 1687, 1702 (1986). Equality of opportunity addresses not only the 
fact that some people invariably will have more than others, but the vexing problem of self-
detern1ination raised by the probability that, even if people had equal natural talents and an 
equal initial distribution of resources, they might not employ them with equal determination. 
Under equality of opportunity, an individual is responsible for both his or her sloth and ti-
midity. . 
Richard Arneson thus advocates "equal opportunity for welfare," according to which 
everyone's welfare would be identical if they availed themselves of the maximally satisfying 
opportunity presenting itself at each stage of life. See Richard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal 
Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 83, 83-84 ( 1989). Rakowski similarly proposes "equality 
of fortune." ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL jUSTICE 138-39 (1991). He explains that "(e)qua!ity of 
fortune maintains that people should have equally valuable resources and opportunities at 
their disposal except to the extent that their voluntary actions, including any gambles they 
freely take, give rise to inequalities." ld. at 138. 
The doctrine of equality of opportunity also responds to an even more fundamental 
problem: the difficulty of distinguishing natural talent from effort and from talent developed 
through effort. Nagel, for example, observes that "it is impossible in practice to disentangle 
the effects of talent from the effects of effort, since effort is expended through the exercise of 
talent, and talent develops into a valuable ability through effort." NAGEL, supra note 84, at 
119; see also Dworkin II, supra note 70, at 313, where he states: · 
It might be helpful ... if we were able to find some way of identifying, in 
any person's wealth at any particular time, the component traceable to dif-
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ferential talents as distinguished from differential ambitions. We might then 
try to devise a tax that would Tecapture, for redistribution, just this compo-
nent. But we cannot hope to identify such a component, even given perfect 
information about people's personalities. For we will be thwarted by the re-
ciprocal influence that talents and ambitions exercise on each other. 
Since everyone has an equal opportunity, each person can make his or her own choices about 
how much effort to expend on developing his or her talents, and society can be indifferent to 
the mixture of effort and natural assets that produces the result. 
There are many different forms of equality of opportunity. One is "political equality 
of opportunity," the idea embodied, for example, in the principle of "one person, one vote," 
or in the rules that permit anyone (meeting certain citizenship requirements, that is} to run for 
and hold public office. Another conception is "formal equality of opportunity," or the absence 
of legal obstacles to achieving a desired result, which Fullinwider defmes formally as follows: 
"X andY have equal opportunity in regard to [A] so long as neither faces a legal or quasi-legal 
barrier [to achieving A] the other does not face." Rosenfeld, supra note 92, at 1696 n.34 
(quoting R. FULL!NWIDER, THE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CONTROVERSY 101 (1980}). Both of 
these approaches fail to assure true equality of social opportunity, an objective that is less clear 
in terms of what it means, whether it can be achieved, and whether its achievement is truly 
socially desirable. 
Equality of opportunity runs into significant objections, however. Unless it is linked to 
some initial equality of resources and natural assets or to a distribution of "sufficient" welfare 
or resources, it appears to tolerate virtually unlin1ited inequality in terms of results. Compare 
Yuckel, who starts at Point A with a natural endowment valued at 50 and ends up at Point B 
with a value of 1000, with Grutz, who is equal to Yuckel in all respects except that Grutz begins 
at Point A with a natural endowment of only I 0 and so ends up at Point B with a value of only 
200. I am indebted to Faust Rossi for introducing me to Yuckel and Grutz. 
Rosenfeld argues that the value of equality of opportunity is just that: It serves "as a 
legitimizing factor in the transition between inequality of initial circumstances [resulting from 
different backgrounds, experiences, and talents] and inequality of result." ld. at 1699. He 
proceeds to explain that equality of opportunity usually accomplishes this transition by re-
quiring "equal means-that is, equal rules and equal tools." ld. (citing DOUGL-\5 RAE ET AL., 
EQU,\l.ITIES 66 (1981}}. Temkin states: 
But john Schaar even thinks that equality of opportunity worsens inequality: 
In previous ages, when opportunities were restricted to those of the right 
birth and station, it is highly probable ... that many of those who enjoyed 
abundant opportunities to develop their talents actually lacked the native 
ability to benefit from their advantages. Under the regime of equal oppor-
tunity, however ... those who genuinely are superior in the desired attrib-
utes will enjoy rich opportunities to develop their qualities. This would pro-
duce, within a few generations, a social system where the members of the 
elites really were immensely superior in ability and attainment to the 
masses. We should then have a condition where the natural and social aris-
tocracies would be identical. 
TEMKIN, supra note 86, at 300 (quoting John H. Schaar, Equality of Opportunity and Beyond, in 
NOMOS IX: EQUAL!TI" 228, 231-32 (R. Pennock and J. Chapman eds., 1967)}. Nozick observes 
that "equality of opportunity has seemed to many writers to be the minimal egalitarian goal, 
questionable (if at all} only for being too weak." NOZICK, supra note 78, at 235. Much depends 
not only on whether any attempt is made to rectify initial positions, but on what opportunities 
are equalized, and how well the equalization is achieved. As Peter Westen notes, "[W]e believe 
in particular equal opportunities, just as we believe in particular unequal opportunities." Peter 
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Despite the gaps and imprecision in the numerous and competing 
theories of equality and their application, they provide a framework within 
which we may analyze the moral status of wealth-based genetic enhance-
ment. For purposes of this analysis, the chief impact of genetic enhance-
ment is that it transforms what were formerly thought of as "natural" 
traits-that is, those that are acquired through the operation of the arbi-
trary genetic lottery, over which individuals have no control-into "ac-
quired" traits. This has several implications. 
If genetic traits are natural, the possessor has no moral right to the 
benefits that they yield. An individual may be deprived of the benefits of his 
or her natural traits in order to improve the lot of others, or to achieve a 
more just distribution of welfare or resources, such as a more equitable dis-
tribution. If the individual is permitted to retain the benefits of natural 
traits, this can only be for one of several reasons: (1) retaining the benefits 
will not make others worse off; (2) requiring the individual to transfer some 
or all of the benefit to others will not increase their welfare or resources; (3) 
no one else has any greater right to the benefits; or (4) allowing the indi-
vidual to retain the benefits is necessary in order to increase benefits for 
others, induding society as a whole. 
Once genetic traits are acquired, they become morally more ambigu-
ous. They may have been acquired immorally, such as by exploiting the 
labor of others, in which case the benefits they confer may be relinquished 
in order to punish the possessor or to deter others. On the other hand, 
genetic enhancements may have been earned through diligence and effort. 
In this case, the possessor has a moral claim to retain the additional value 
created by enhancement, and can only be deprived of it on the basis of 
some overriding principle. In still other instances, the genetic trait may 
have been obtained in a morally neutral manner-neither by exploiting 
others, nor by being earned. Traits acquired in this manner resemble natu-
rally acquired traits, in that the possessor has no moral claim to- them. 
Theories of equality also tend to agree that society has a responsibility 
to rectify or compensate people for the adverse effects that they suffer 
through the operation of the natural lottery. Increasing their welfare or 
resources is justified by the moral desirability of promoting equality, apart 
from any instrumental objective. At the same time, individuals are not enti-
tled to be relieved of the burden of choices that they freely make, including 
the choices of which traits to acquire and how much of one's resources to 
spend on acquiring them. 93 Therefore, people who have the means to ge-
Westen, The Concept of Equal Opportunity, 95 ETIIICS 837, 850 (1985). 
93. Note that the moral questionabiliry of purchased genetic advantages cannot necessar-
ily be cured by falling back on equaliry of opportuniry, in the sense that everyone has the 
opportuniry to purchase enhancements only if he or she has enough wealth. Everyone may 
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netically enhance themselves or their offspring but chose not to might not 
be entitled to remediation. This may have special implications when these 
individuals compete with enhanced individuals for scarce resources. 
Applying this framework to wealth-based genetic enhancement yields a 
number of insights. Adults who purchased enhancements with immorally 
acquired assets would not be entitled to the benefits. Most would also agree 
that genetic enhancements are unearned when they are acquired from 
one's parents. The children have done nothing to entitle them to the ad-
vantages the enhancements yield; from a moral standpoint, their enhance-
ment is no more than the luck of being born into a wealthy family.91 In this 
have equality of opportunity in so far as he or she is free to purchase enhancements in the 
market, but the market price may place enhancements so far beyond most people's reach that 
the opportunity for them is no more than a theoretical possibility. See Westen, supra note 92, at 
839 (noting that an "opportunity" must be more than a "mere possibility" but less than a 
"guarantee"); see- also RAKOWSKI, supra note 92, at 1690 (arguing the same). The lack of suffi-
cient wealth to purchase enhancement deprives people both of a realistic chance of obtaining 
it ("prospect-regarding equality of opportunity") and an equal ability to obtain it ("means-
regarding equality of opportunity"). See id at 1696. As a practical matter, how much inequality 
stems .from purchasing genetic advantages may depend in part on how expensive they are, i.e., 
how many people can afford to purchase them and on the distribution of wealth in society. In 
societies with large inequalities of wealth in which many people are barely able to subsist, few 
would be able to afford even relatively inexpensive genetic advantages. The resulting com-
plexities are reflected in Temkin's discussion of relative degrees of inequality depending on 
the distribution of the relevant equalisand in society. He posits a series of 1000 worlds, each 
with 1000 inhabitants, which he calls "the Sequence," in which the populations vary in size 
according to their well-being. In the first world, 999 people are equally better-off and one is 
worse-off. In the last world, one person is better off and 999 are equally worse-off. Temkin 
asserts that the latter is more egalitarian than the former, since he contends that, as between 
two "reciprocal" worlds, the one with a larger better-off group is less egalitarian. Moreover, if 
one imagines a transition from the less to the more egalitarian world, and considers the mid-
dle world, in which half the people are equally better off and half equally worse off, Temkin 
argues, the transition from the first world to the middle marks a reduction in equality, which 
then is followed by an improvement. See TEMKIN, supra note 86, at 296-97. 
94. See RAKOWSKI, supra note 92, at 159, where he observes: 
So far as gifts from parents to children are concerned, the approximation to 
cases of unadulterated good brute luck generally seems quite close. Children 
do not chose their parents. And although rebellious offspring may forfeit 
their parents' love, to the extent that they enjoy it and profit materially 
from it they do so largely because, in a society based on the nuclear family, 
they were through no merit of their own better placed to win their parents' 
affection than were other people. They also do so because parents often be-
come attached to their progeny through the activities of procreation and 
child-rearing, for which attachment children are in no wise responsible, and 
because many parents feel, whether or not mistakenly, that they have a 
moral duty to provide generously for their children and to leave them the 
bulk of their property when they die. If these observations are correct, and if 
exceptions are not too numerous at whatever level formed the threshold for 
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case, enhanced genetic traits resemble natural traits. The goal of equality, 
therefore, would justify requiring the surplus to be shared with others, at 
least with those who had not voluntarily chosen to remain unenhanced. The 
same would be true of enhancements that adults purchased with "found" 
rather than earned wealth, such as from the proceeds of a lottery. 
The case of the person who obtains the necessary funds by dint of the 
sweat of her brow, without exploiting others or behaving otherwise immor-
ally, is more difficult. This person has a strong moral claim to the benefit 
gained from her genetic enhancements.95 Similarly, a parent who earned 
the resources to purchase genetic enhancements for her children in morally 
acceptable ways may contend that her children ought to be entitled to enjoy 
the benefits.96 
Can the goal of equality justify depriving these persons of the advan-
tages conferred by their genetic enhancements? In some instances, to be 
sure, equality has trumped desert. Progressive income taxation, for exam-
ple, redistributes earned wealth at least in part to promote economic 
equality. But the moral justification for depriving individuals of earned 
advantages is thin, and is likely too weak to sustain the measures necessary, 
as we shall see, 97 to level the genetic playing field. Implementing these 
measures requires that they be premised on something more than an ab-
stract belief in the value of equality. They must be based on the conviction 
that genetic enhancement, if left unchecked, threatens liberal democracy. 
Maintaining a liberal democratic form of government is an important 
social goal. This goal is directly threatened by wealth-based genetic en-
hancement: The inequality of social opportunity that results may be so 
great that a liberal democratic form of government becomes unsustainable, 
and our political system instead becomes autocratic or oligarchic. This fol-
redistributive transfers (a question one cannot well address in the abstract), 
then gifts from parents to children ought to be regarded largely as instances 
of good brute luck from the children's perspective and treated accordingly. 
!d. It is precisely this lack of desert for inherited genetic enhancement that justifies a strong 
societal defense against resulting inequality. 
95. This assumes that we can distinguish between the product of their labors and the 
product of their undeserved natural assets, which many believe is impossible. See NAGEL, supra 
note 84, at 119 (claiming "it is impossible in practice to disentangle the effects of talent from 
the effects of effort"). By unraveling the secrets of the human genetic code, ironically, the 
Human Genome Project in fact may reduce this difficulty by enabling a clearer picture of what 
accomplishments can be attributed to genetic factors rather than to pure effort. 
96. There is an enormous amount of literature on the justice implications of estate taxa-
tion. For a recent collection of articles, see the Colloquium on Wealth Transfer Taxation in 
volume 51 of the Tax Law Review, especially Eric Rakowski, Transferring Wealth LiberaUy, 51 
TAX L. REV. 419 (1996). 
97. See discussion infra notes 157-204 and accompanying text (describing extensive and 
intrusive steps to promote equality). 
550 85 IOWA LAW REVIEW [2000] 
lows from the assumption that a minimum degree of equality is necessary 
for the existence of a modem liberal democracy.98 If social inequality be-
comes too pronounced, liberal democratic political systems, and the capi-
talist economic system upon which they rest, become unstable. As one soci-
ologist states: 
Inequality in the distribution of rewards is always a potential 
source of political and social instability. Because upper, relatively 
advantaged strata are generally fewer in number than disadvan-
taged lower strata, the former are faced with crucial problems of 
social control over the latter. One way of approaching this issue is 
to ask not why the disprivileged often rebel against the privileged 
but why they do not rebel more often than they do.99 
The characteristics of genetic enhancement that threaten to destabilize 
liberal democratic government are the features that distinguish genetic 
enhancement from other forms of self-improvement: its high cost, which 
may place it beyond the reach of all but the very wealthy; 100 the broad and 
fundamental nature of the traits that it could enhance; 101 the magnitude of 
its effects; 102 their multiplicity; 103 the resulting ability to gain advantages in 
multiple spheres of social activity; 101 and the possibility-created by germ 
line enhancement-that these advantages would be passed on to successive 
generations. 105 
These characteristics not only give rise to social inequality; more in-
sidiously, they undermine the belief in equality of opportunity. A wide-
spread belief in equality of opportunity is the method by which liberal de-
mocracies accommodate the reality of capitalist inequality-that everyone is 
not equally endowed with equally beneficial natural assets or blessed with 
the same\luck. Sociologists point out that "[w]hereas most Americans are 
98. This truism about American democratic governmem was recognized as far back as 2 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE's DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 94-105 (Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A 
Knopf ed., 1994). Alrhough some political scienrists, focusing narrowly on formal equality as 
reflected in the principle of "one person, one vote," appear at first to discount the need for a 
minimum degree of social equality, they typically consider social equality to be one prerequi-
site for political equality. For a general discussion, see Jeffrey Riedinger, Property Rights and 
Democracy: Philosophical and Economic Considerations, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 893, 895-97 (1993) 
(examining the relationship between property rights and participatory democracy). 
99. See FRANK PARKIN, CLASS INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL ORDER: SOCIAL 
STRATIFICATION IN CAPITALIST AND COMMUNIST SOCIETIES 48 (1971). 
100. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69 for discussion of point 1. 
101. See supra text accompanying note 70 for discussion of point 2. 
102. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74 for discussion of point 3. 
103. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76 for discussion of point 4. 
104. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78 for discussion of point 5. 
105. See supra text accompanying note 79 for discussion of point 6. 
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willing to tolerate sizeable inequalities in the distribution of resources, they 
typically insist that individuals from all backgrounds should have an equal 
opportunity to secure these resources." 106 John Schaar notes that the belief 
in equal opportunity is instrumental in maintaining the prevailing social 
order, stating that "[n]o policy formula is better designed to fortifY the 
dominant institutions, values, and ends of the American social order than 
the formula of equality of opportunity, for it offers everyone a fair and equal 
chance to find a place within that order. 107 
Assuming, as discussed earlier, that the price of genetic enhancements 
prohibits people of ordinary means from acquiring them, genetic en-
hancement would create profound differences in ability that would endow 
the wealthy with opportunities utterly and irrevocably beyond the reach of 
the majority of the citizens. World history is filled with examples of societies 
similar to those that would result from wealth-based genetic enhancement. 
In medieval Europe, for example, individuals were born with a social status, 
and barring the infrequent case in which peasants were able to obtain edu-
cation in religious institutions or became apprenticed and eventually es-
quired to knights, individuals remained members of the class into which 
they were born. 108 Similarly, in slave-owning societies, people were born 
into bondage and could be freed only by escape (self-exile) or at the pleas-
ure of their masters. 109 The most obvious surviving example of such a soci-
ety is the caste system in India. The caste system remains a constant threat 
106. David B. Grusky & Azumi Ann Takata, Social Stratification, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
SOCIOLOGY 1965 (Edgar F. Borgatta & Marie L Borgatta eds., 1992). According to a 1989 
study by the National Opinion Research Center, in 1989, 66% of those questioned believed 
that hard work was more essential for getting ahead, compared to 14% who believed that lucky 
breaks or help from other people are important, evidencing a strong belief in opportunity for 
anyone who works hard. See AN AMERICAN PROFILE-OPINIONS AND BEHAVIOR, 1972-1989, at 
319 (Floris W. Wooded., 1990). 
107. See jOHN H. SCHAAR, LEGITIMACY IN THE MODERN STATE 195 (1981). But see RUDOLF 
DREIKURS, M.D., SOCIAL EQUALITY: THE ClL\LLENGE Of TODAY 186-87 (1971) (stating that 
"opportunities have always varied with family background" and that "[i]t is obvious that chil-
dren of the same family do not have the same opportunities, for various reasons inherent in 
the dynamics within the family group"); Stanley Aronowitz, Beht•een Nationality and Class, 67 
HARV. EDUC. REV. 188 (1997) (discussing the decline in availability of liberal arts training in 
the United States and the resulting decline in working class mobility); William Darity,Jr. eta!., 
Racial and Ethnic Inequality in the United Sto.tes: A Secular Perspective, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 301 
(1997) (concluding that "there is a long and sustained history of a racially differentiated 
structure of opportunity in the United States"). 
108. See AN INTRODUCTION TO WESTERN CIVILIZATION 217 (George A Hedger ed., 1949) 
(describing the static nature of the medieval class system). 
109. See KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-
BELLUM Soun1 92-97, 109-24 (1956) (discussing the efforts of slaves in the American South to 
attain their freedom). 
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to Lhat nation's democratic institutions. 110 
Genetic social stratification thus would undermine our current social 
system, but it is not certain how seriously. 111 Perhaps society will adapt to 
llO. See ARTHUR BONNER ET AL., DEMOCRACY IN INDIA: A HOLLOW SHELL (1994) (ex-
plaining that the social structure oflndia maintains caste boundaries despite political change). 
ill. The fact that so much of the discussion of the nature and impact of genetic enhance-
ment is so speculative may cause objection, and provoke the response that there is no reason 
to assume that genetic manipulation will have dramatic destructive effects on equality. For all 
we know, genetic enhancement may not be prohibitively expensive; a partially genetically 
enhanced middle class may arise between, the genobility and the genetic underclass. This 
group might form a sufficient buffer to enable democratic institutions to survive. Aristotle 
stated that "cities capable of being well governed are those sorts where the middle is large," 
and that "[d]emocracies are also more stable and longer lasting than oligarchies because of 
those in the middle, for the middle are more numerous in democracies than in oligarchies and 
have a greater share of honors." THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE paras. 1295b34, 1296a7 (Peter 
L. Phillips Simpson trans., University of North Carolina Press 1997). However, the growth of 
fascism in Italy and Nazi Germany prior to World War II shows that: 
[T]he commercial middle classes in and of themselves, even as a majority 
class, do not guarantee the rise of democracy or its maintenance. Structural 
conditions, such as the presence of a powerful feudal aristocracy and a func-
tioning kingly bureaucratic state, can become important inhibitors to the 
democratic elective affinities carried by the middle class. Historically, cir-
cumstances of a crisis nature can turn the middle class away from democracy 
and toward some form of "nativist," conservative despotism, or towards a 
modernist form of despotism. Once such a despotism has been created, the 
middle class may not be powerful enough to overthrow it. It took WWII and 
the American victory, after all, to overthrow fascism and Nazism in Italy and 
Germany. 
RONALD M. GL\SSMAN, 10 THE MIDDLE CL\SS AND DEMOCRACY IN SoCIO-HISTORICAL 
PERSPECfiVE 216 (1995). Another objection to the concerns expressed in this paper might be 
that the impact of genetic enhancement is bound to occur over a sufficiently long period that 
democracy will have time to adjust. Or, as conceded earlier, genetic enhancement may not live 
up to its promise to deliver significant advantages. Yet the impact of genetic enhancement on 
democratic institutions need not result from its actual effects; it may be sufficient that people 
believe that it confers extraordinary benefits that are confined largely to the rich. For the truly 
pernicious aspect of inequality-its association with envy and resentment-derives in large 
part not from people's actual states but from their perceptions of where they stand in compari-
son with those who are better off. See RAWLS, supra note 70, at 534-41. The relationship of 
envy and inequality has been noted by Freud, see GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF 
ENVY 51 f ( 1959), cited by RAWLS, supra note 70, at 539 n.ll; Helmut Schoeck, ENVY: A THEORY 
OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1969) (cited by RAWLS, supra note 70, at 538 n.9), and Nozick, among 
others. Nozick states: "It is plausible to connect equality with self-esteem. The envious person, 
if he cannot (also) possess a thing (talent, and so on) that someone else has, prefers that the 
other person not have it either." NOZICK, supra note 78, at 239 (citations omitted). Dworkin 
assesses the success of his theory of equality of resources by means of an "envy test": "No divi-
sion of resources is an equal division if, once the division is complete, any [person] would 
prefer someone else's bundle of resources to his own bundle." Dworkin II, supra note 70, at 
285. Walzer makes the following interesting observation with regard to envy: 
Opponents of the vision [of equality] often claim that the animating passions 
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the social artifacts of the genetic revolution and the result, while markedly 
different from present arrangements, will be relatively stable. The genetic 
underclass might cede power to their genetic superiors in return for en-
joying the material benefits made possible by genetic advances. In this sce-
nario, the underclass would accept the division between social strata, and be 
content with being upwardly mobile only within the confines of their own 
class. The genobility, in tum, would rule according to enlightened princi-
ples of noblesse oblige, taking care to permit sufficient benefits to trickle 
down to maintain political and social equilibrium. A democracy of sorts 
might even persist, with the underclass electing representatives who either 
belonged to the upper class or who were committed to preserving its privi-
leges. In essence, such a system might not look very different from our own, 
given the extent to which we increasingly elect representatives who are con-
siderably more privileged than their constituents. 
This system, however, seems highly unstable. For one thing, the mem-
bers of the genetic upper class would require great self-control to avoid 
over-reaching. At minimum, they would need to maintain effective means 
of monitoring and regulating the behavior of their peers to prevent anti-
social excesses of greed. The system also would be vulnerable to dema-
gogues who achieved power by promising to redistribute genetic endow-
ments more evenly. Assuming that the principle of one-person/one-vote 
persisted, a numerically inferior genetic upper class could be out-voted by 
the underclass and Congress could become dominated by elected officials 
pledged to employ the full force of government to rectify genetic imbal-
ances. 
The genobility might respond with reprisals in an effort to preserve its 
privileged status. At one extreme these could range from threats to with-
hold the fruits of genetic medicine from non-privileged segments of society, 
to overt interference with the democratic process. At the other, the genetic 
upper class is liable to amass sufficient wealth and influence to enable it to 
control the media, which would in turn permit it to affect the outcome of 
elections in a manner quite out of proportion to its numbers. Efforts by the 
underclass to preserve its hegemony might prove no more successful than 
current efforts to reform campaign finance laws in order to dilute the 
power of special interests. 
In the end, we might embark on an era of social chaos as the system 
of egalitarian politics are envy and resentment, and it's true enough that 
such passions fester in every subordinate group .... But envy and resent-
ment are uncomfortable passions; no one enjoys them; and I think it is accu-
rate to say that egalitarianism is not so much their acting out as it is the con-
scious attempt to escape the condition that produces them. 
WALZER, supra note 77, at xiii. 
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swung in ever-widening arcs between rule by underclass demagogues and 
by the genetic aristocracy. Eventually, this could degenerate into mob rule 
and, then, anarchy. To rid itself of its status as the class of the genetically 
disadvantaged, the mob might even destroy the scientific foundations of the 
genetic revolution, perhaps by physically dismantling research centers and 
erasing mapping and sequencing data. · 
Alternatively, post-genorevolutionary society could devolve into to-
talitarian rule by a genetic autocracy. The genetic upper class would employ 
whatever repressive techniques were necessary in order to obtain power and 
to keep the underclass in check. Advances in genetic science might even 
enable the genobility to genetically manipulate the underclass in ways that 
make it more docile. 
While it is impossible to predict with certainty what effect wealth-based 
genetic enhancement will have on society, what is clear is that it creates not 
only a moral challenge but a political threat. From a moral standpoint, 
those who obtain enhancement may not have done anything to deserve it. 
Adults may have obtained the means necessary to purchase enhancement in 
objectionable or morally irrelevant ways-through exploitation or the brute 
luck of inheritance. Moreover, it is difficult to argue that children earned 
their new-found advantages. 112 Yet genetic enhancement poses more than 
an ethical quandary. Even if the resources necessary to purchase genetic 
enhancement are earned in a moral sense, wealth-based enhancement is 
likely to have a severe societal impact. Somatic enhancement alone could 
dramatically widen the gap between the haves and have-nots, and crippling 
class warfare would ensue. Germ line enhancement could create, quite lit-
erally, a master race. A future as bleak as this is not perhaps inevitable, but 
it is unquestionably within the realm of possibility. The question then be-
comes whether there is any practical way to prevent this. 
IV. PROMOTING GENETIC EQUALITY 
In the face of the serious threats to equality embodied by wealth-based 
genetic enhancement, how can we preserve or promote equality? One ap-
proach would be to "level up." Society could provide every person access to 
genetic enhancement. This solution, however, would be prohibitively ex-
pensive. 113 
For the sake of argument, imagine that the government decided to di-
vert a large portion of the gross national product to a massive enhancement 
112. This is patent in the case of more remote generations enhanced through prior gem1 
cell manipulations. 
113. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (describing cost of providing universal 
access to genetic enhancement). 
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entitlement program. What enhancement services would the entitlement 
program provide? 114 If the objective were to give each person an equal 
amount of enhancement resources, those who started out with a more fa-
vorable distribution of natural assets would still maintain a superior posi-
tion. If instead we attempted to give everyone an equal or minimum degree 
of enhancement, or an equal or minimum amount of enhancement-created 
opportunity, how would we measure equivalence? Would an extra inch of 
height be equal to an extra ten points of IQ? Some measure of equivalence 
would be necessary, and given the subjectivity of personal value reflected in 
the controversy between welfare and resource theories of equality, it is diffi-
cult to conceive how an objective ranking of enhancements could be con-
structed. 115 We cannot solve the problem by giving everyone an equal 
amount of money and allowing each individual to purchase those en-
hancements that he or she desires. Unless all enhancements are equally 
priced, people who desire expensive enhancements would be less advan-
taged than individuals content with cheaper ones. 116 Moreover, since society 
will not be able to provide everyone with access to the same enhancements 
that the wealthy can purchase, the wealthy will always stay ahead of the rest 
of the population. Obviously, we could solve the problem by giving every-
one the maximum amount of enhancements available. Here too, however, 
the cost would be prohibitive. These same problems would plague any at-
tempt to level the playing field by giving the unenhanced some other 
countervailing benefit, like money, information or political power. 
Since some people begin with a more favorable distribution of natural 
assets, society may wish to subsidize access to enhancements for the geneti-
cally disadvantaged. By benefiting those who were worst off genetically, this 
would tend to comport with Rawls' difference principle. 117 Yet, this ap-
proach would encounter many of the same problems of cost and measuring 
equivalence already discussed. In addition, allocating enhancements to the 
genetically disadvantaged would necessitate identifying genetically disad-
vantaged individuals or groups within the population, and measuring their 
degree of disadvantage. This would raise serious practical, moral, and po-
litical objections. Determining what counts as a genetic disadvantage is 
114. This raises the old debate between reason and welfare equality. 
115. Dworkin argues that a market in which resources can be traded or "auctioned" is 
necessary to achieve equality because it is the only way that a "metric" can be established by 
which to compare the resource demands of'different individuals. See Dworkin II, supra note 70, 
at 289. 
116. Dworkin's answer is that everyone should be given enough to enable them to pur-
chase the quantity of disability insurance that they would buy if they had an equal amount of 
resources and knew their individual "tastes, ambitions, talents, and attitudes toward risk." 
Dworkin II, supra note 70, at 316-17. But these conditions are impossibly artificial. 
ll7. See RAWLS, supra note 70, at 75. 
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similar to trying to identify whether or not someone has a disability-a de-
termination that is controversial, 118 and often seemingly arbitrary. 119 Meas-
uring the extent of a disability is extremely difficult. The State of Oregon 
encountered this problem when it tried to allocate Medicaid services based 
in part on how much they alleviated disability. 120 Moreover, even if we 
118. See, e.g., Maxwell Mehlman et al., When Do Health Care Decisions Discriminate Against 
Persons uoith Disabilities?, 22 J. HEALTH POL, PoL'Y & L. 1385, 1386-87 (1997) (describing 
disability anti-discrimination laws). The ami-discrimination statutes defme "disability" as "(a] 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" 
of an individual. Americans Wit:li Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994). "MaJor Life 
Activities means functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, see-
ing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1994). The 
Supreme Court in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), recently held that reproduction is a 
major life activity. This suggests that infertility also will be regarded as a disability, an issue 
that lower courts currently are divided over. Compare Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 911 F. 
Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that infertility is covered by the ADA because reproduction 
is a major life activity), uoith Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that infertility is not covered by the ADA because reproduction is not a major life 
activity). Certainly the current legal conceptions of disability leave out many less severe condi-
tions that disadvantage people. At the same time, some persons with disabilities object to 
attempts to rectify their condition. See, e.g., HARLAN LANE ET AL., A JOURNEY INTO THE DEAF-
WORLD 403 (1996) (discussing how the use of cochlear implants in deaf children will result in 
ethnocide, "the systematic blocking of a language minority from coming into its own and 
pursuing its way of life"); Robert A Crouch, Letting the Deaf Be Deaf Reconsidering the Use of 
Cochlear Implants in Prelingually Deaf Children, 27 HAsTINGS CTR. REP. 14 (July-Aug. 1997) 
(arguing against the use of cochlear implants in prelingually deaf children so that they may 
thrive in the Deaf community); Andrew Solomon, Defiantly Deaf, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1994, § 
6 (Magazine), at4 (quoting Patty Ladd, a British Deaf scholar, who describes cochlear implants 
as "[t]he Final Solution"). 
119. Dworkin, for example, complains in response to Rawls' difference principle that 
"[t]here is a conceded degree of arbitrariness in the choice of any description of the worst-off 
group, and this is, in any case, a group whose fortunes can be charted only through some 
mythical average or representative members of that group." Dworkin II, supra note 70, at 339. 
120. · Ultimately, Oregon abandoned its effort after it failed to design a program that com-
ported with laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability. For a description of the 
problems encountered by the Oregon Medicaid program, see MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN & 
jEFFREY R. BOTKIN, ACCESS TO THE GENOME: THE CHALLENGE TO EQUALIW 69-73, 86-87 
(1998); Alexander Morgan Capron, Oregon's Disability: Principles or Politics?, 22 HAsTINGS CTR. 
REP. 18, 18-20 (Nov.-Dec. 1992); David C. Hadorn, M.D., The Problem of Discrimination in 
Health Care Priority Setting, 268 JAMA 1454, 1454-59; Paul T. Menzel, Oregon's Denial: Disabili-
ties and QJ,tality of Life, 22 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 21, 21-25 (Nov.-Dec. 1992); The Oregon Health 
Care Proposal and the Americans uoith Disabilities Act, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1296, 1296-1313 (1993); 
D. Orentlicher, Rationing and the Americans uoith Disabilities Act, 271 JAMA 308, 308-14 (1994); 
OREGON HEALTH SERVS. COMM'N, PRIORITIZATION OF HEALTH SERVICES: A REPORT TO THE 
GoVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE (1993) (on file with author); Health Care Financing Admin., 
Special Terms and Conditions Regarding the Oregon Plan, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 423, 423-24 (1994); 
Oregon Carrying Out Neuo State Health Care Plan: QJ,testions Abound as First Phase Begins in Program 
to Cover All Residents, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 19, 1994, at Al3. 
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could identifY and quantifY genetic disadvantage, we would need to estab-
lish a "normal" degree of genetic well-being to be obtained by the disad-
vantaged, so that we could allocate the correct amount of enhancements or 
money with which to purchase enhancements. 121 "Normalcy," however, is 
highly arbitrary, value-laden, and subjective. 122 Furthermore, normality will 
remain in flux as the distribution of advantages and disadvantages within 
the population shifts, and as the average level of advantage increases in 
correspondence to the number of enhanced individuals. Finally, any at-
tempt by the government to identifY and rectifY genetic disadvantage 
smacks of eugenics. Eugenics is politically suspect, if not unthinkable. 123 
121. See discussion supra notes 118-19 (describing subsidizing disadvantaged with genetic 
enhancements). 
122. See Whitehouse et a!., supra note 20, at 16-18 (criticizing Normal Daniels' "normal 
function" standard of distributive justice for access to mental health and other health care 
services). 
123. Thousands of persons around the world became the victims of eugenics policies dur-
ing the Twentieth Century. Nazi Germany implemented the most infamous policies, resulting 
in the murder of two hundred thousand psychiatric patients, nonconformists, and ill camp 
inmates, all eliminated ostensibly to preserve financial resources. See GOtz Aly et a!., Medicine 
Against the Useless, in CLEANSING TilE FATHERL-\ND: NAZI MEDICINE AND RAciAL HYGIENE 23, 
23-24 (1987). The National Social Physicians' League, a German organization boasting a 
membership composed of 6% of German physicians, supported the Nazi government's 
eugenics policies in arguing "that the useless dissipation of costly medications drawn from the 
public store cannot be justified." Garland E. Allen, Science Misapplied: The Eugenics Age Revis-
ited, CURRENT, Dec. 1, 1996, at 7. German Protestant theologians argued that "God had cre-
ated such supra-individual entities as the family, nations or races, whose future well-being 
overrode the rights of individuals .... " MICHAEL BURLEIGH, ETHICS AND EXTERMINATION: 
REFLEGfiONS ON NAZI GENOCIDE 131 (1997). This rationale allowed theologians to support 
sterilization policies, although they did not support euthanasia. See id. at 130-52. The follow-
ing question from a mathematics textbook further illustrates how embedded eugenics was in 
Nazi German society: "If the construction of an insane asylum requires 6 million RM, how 
many housing units for norn1al families could be built at 15,000 RM apiece for the amount 
spent on insane asylums?" Allen, supra, at 7. While many of the persons elinunated or steril-
ized were disabled in some manner, the Nuremberg laws made the racial overtones of Nazi 
eugenics policies explicit by preventing jews from marrying Germans and expelling jews from 
public life. See STEFAN KOHL, THE NAZI CONNECTION: EUGENICS, AMERICAN RACISM, AND 
GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALISM 97-98 (1994). 
Nazi Germany was not alone in implementing eugenics policies. From the beginning 
of their efforts, Nazi eugenicists maintained a close relationship with their counterparts in the 
United States. See id. A pamphlet created by the California-based Human Bettern1ent Founda-
tion and sent to German racial hygienists and Nazi administrators maintained "that steriliza-
tion served to protect the sterilized person, his or her family, and society at large." Jd. Nazi 
Germany was encouraged by the success of the eugenics movement in California, and pointed 
to California's experience and to U.S. Supreme Court decisions to justifY its own eugenics 
program. See id. at 43, 101. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld Virginia's compulsory steriliza-
tion law in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), with Justice Holmes's majority opinion stating 
that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough." Jd. at 207. It was not until the racial basis 
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If leveling up is not a feasible response to genetic enhancement, the 
of Nazi eugenics became evident that American eugenicists began to distance themselves from 
their German colleagues. See KOHL, supra, at 97-104. Approximately 60,000 Americans were 
forcibly sterilized in 34 states during the 1930s. See Nordic Eugenics. Here, of All Places, 
ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 1997, at 36 [hereinafter Nordic Eugenics]. 
More recently, China passed the Maternal and Infantile Health Law in 1995, pres-
suring persons with a family history of genetic problems to undergo genetic testing, and com-
pelling family doctors to recommend an abortion if the fetus had a particular genetic condi-
tion. These policies became particularly worrisome when Genset S.A., a French genetic re-
search company, came to an agreement with the Chinese government that would allow Genset 
to do DNA profiles of the entire Chinese population. See Mike Pezzella, 1Llnd71Ulrk Deal Between 
China and French Firm Raises Eugenics Fears, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Dec. 2, 1996, at 14. 
Additionally, a 1988 law in China bans marriages by mentally disabled persons unless they are 
sterilized. See Jody W. Zylke, Examining Life's (Genomic) Code Means Reexamining Society's Long-
Held Codes, 267 JAMA 1715, 1715 (1992). 
Revelations of Sweden's eugenics program shocked the international community. 
Sweden began sterilizing "social undesirables" in 1935, and the National Institute for Racial 
Hygiene, charged with administering the program, existed until 1976. See James Walsh et al., 
Unnatural Selection: A Startling Revelation of Sweden's Eugenics Program Exposes Similar Medical 
Engineering Around Europe, TIME INT'L, Sept. 22, 1997, at 66. During this period, approxi-
mately 62,000 Swedes were sterilized for various reasons, ranging from having a severe mental 
handicap to having poor sight. 62,000 SI!'edes Sterilized Against Their Will, SCANDINAVIAN PRESS, 
Oct. 31, 1997, at 13. At age 17, Maria Nordan was given the choice of remaining in a school 
for "intellectually subnormal elements" or being sterilized and entering normal society. Faced 
with these two undesirable alternatives, Maria chose sterilization. The learning disability that 
put her in the special school was caused by her poor eyesight and lack of spectacles, unknown 
to the headmistress who offered her the choice. See Walsh et al., supra, at 66. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, Sweden's eugenics program was propagated by the Social Democrats, with their empha-
sis on social welfare and efficiency. By sterilizing the mentally disabled, Sweden could support 
its welfare state by reducing health care and schooling costs for the disabled. See Gunnar Bro-
berg & Mattias Tyden, Eugenics in Sweden: Efficient Care, in EUGENICS AND TilE WELFARE STATE: 
STERILIZATION POLICY IN DENMARK, SWEDEN, NORWAY, AND FINLAND 135 (Gunnar Broberg & 
Nils Roll-Hansen eds., 1996). 
Similarly, Norway, Finland, Denmark, and Canada also employed eugenics in the 
name of efficiency. See id. In Alberta, Canada, approximately 2,800 people were sterilized 
between 1928 and 1972 to prevent mentally defective persons from having children. The 
victims of the policy included "Indian girls as young as 14, already-infertile Downs Syndrome 
boys, children with cerebral palsy, illiterate immigrants from Eastern Europe and delinquent 
youths from bad homes .... " Canada. Sterilized in Alberta, ECONOMI~T. Nov. 9, 1996, at 46. 
Approximately I I ,000 individuals were sterilized in Denmark, while Norway and Finland each 
acknowledge sterilizing 1,000 women under their eugenics programs. See Nordic Eugenics, 
supra, at 36. 
Eugenics policies in these countries were usually justified based on their promotion of 
efficiency: "[D]ysgenic groups were not only a threat to the quality of the race, they were a 
heavy burden on society." Frank Dikotter, Race Culture: Recent Perspectives on the History of 
Eugenics, 104 AM. HIST. REV. 467, 469 (1998). Race was a factor in many of the programs 
described above, however, as was most evident in Nazi Gern1an policies. "Information about 
human genetics can be used to stigmatize ... virtually anyone deemed economically costly or 
socially undesirable." /d. at 478. 
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alternative is to level down. 124 The most straightforward approach would be 
to prevent anyone from obtaining genetic enhancement. A ban on genetic 
enhancements could be aimed at a variety of targets. Similar to laws that 
punish illegal drug use, or rules that prohibit the use of performance-
enhancing drugs in sports, purchasing or possessing enhancements could 
be illegal. 125 Health care professionals and institutional providers, such as 
hospitals and IVF clinics, could also be targets of the law. Legislators could 
make it a crime for health care professionals to provide genetic enhance-
ments. 126 Violators could face disciplinary actions by state medical boards, 
including loss or suspension of their licenses. 127 Hospitals and other facili-
124. The potential role of leveling down as a remedy for general inequality is well-
recognized. Rawls' difference principle itself, by which a benefit for the better-off is only just if 
it also benefits the least well-off, has been characterized as "a constraint imposed on talented 
men and women .... "WALZER, supra note 77, at 15. Others acknowledge that, in order to 
reduce inequality, it may be necessary to transfer resources or welfare from the better off to 
the worse off. For example, Rakowski proposes "equality of fortune" as the cure for inequality, 
according to which "(r]esources should be taken from those whose complement of powers is 
above average and given to those whose abilities fall short," although he adds that this ap-
proach is valid "so long as restoring equality does not place inordinate strain on the more 
fortunate .... "RAKOWSKI, supra note 92, at 138. Rosenfeld views leveling down as necessary in 
some cases to promote equality of opportunity. He gives the example of an apple orchard 
open for public harvesting once a year on a first-come, first-served basis in a society in which 
not everyone has a car. To ensure equality of opportunity, it may be necessary for people who 
drive to the orchard to be denied admission: "(E]nsuring an opportunity may ... require that 
certain competitors be deprived of some of the means at their disposal." Rosenfeld, supra note 
92, at 1692. 
125. Making simple possession illegal would have the curious result that children whose 
parents enhanced them without their consent would be in violation of the law. A ban not 
reaching these children would be fatally incomplete. 
126. Similar laws have been proposed for attempts to clone humans, including laws out-
lawing the use of somatic cells in the production of human clones, see, e.g., H.R. 923, 1 05th 
Cong. (1997), S. 1599, 105th Cong. (1997}, S. 1601, 105th Cong. (1997); laws prohibiting the 
cloning of humans, see, e.g., S. 1574, 105th Cong. (1998); S.B. 90-1243, Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997), 
H.B. 122-675, Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1997), S.B. 8, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998), S.B. 68, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 
1998), S.B. 1344, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997), S.B. 122-218, Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1997), A.B. 221-9116, 
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997), S.B. 221-5993, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997); laws prohibiting attempts to 
clone through somatic cell nuclear transfer and the use of Federal funds for such purpose, see, 
e.g., S. 1602, l05th Cong. (1998), H.B. 90-2235, Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997), A.B. 221-9183, Reg. 
Sess. (N.Y. 1997); and laws banning research using cloned cells or tissues, see, e.g., H.B. 1237, 
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1997), A.B. 1251, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997). 
127. Violators could also face ethical sanctions by professional societies. The American 
Medical Association, for example, has declared that it is unethical for physicians to provide 
genetic enhancement to anyone unless they can provide "equal access ... irrespective of in-
come or other socioeconomic characteristics." AMA Council on Judicial and Ethical Affuirs, 
Ethical Issues Related to Prenatal Genetic Testing, 3 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 633, 641 (1994). The 
AMA also condenms genetic enhancement that does not provide "clear and meaningful bene-
fit to the fetus or child" or that causes a "trade-off with other characteristics or traits." !d. at 
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ties like IVF clinics that offer enhancement services could lose their li-
censes, their accreditation, or their ability to receive reimbursements under 
Medicare and Medicaid. 128 Finally, if genetic enhancements were proprie-
tary products like drugs or medical devices, the Food and Drug Admini-
stration could deny marketing approval. 129 
Why wait until enhancements are developed and then ban their use? 
Why not prohibit research aimed at developing enhancement technologies 
in the first place? The federal government has already banned federal 
funding of research on embryos and fetuses. 130 Privately-funded research 
640. 
128. The federal government has hinged Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement on com-
pliance with a number of regulatory measures, such as the Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994) (prohibiting "patient dumping," or the practice 
of transferring indigent emergency room patients to other hospitals). 
129. The FDA has asserted jurisdiction over licensing of enhancement products such as 
tanning agents and wrinkle creams. See United States v. Article Consisting of 36 Boxes, Etc., 
284 F. Supp. 107 (D. DeL 1968), affd on other grounds, 415 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1969) (wrinkle 
creams as drugs); 43 Fed. Reg. 38,206 (1978) (tanning agents as drugs). In addition, the FDA 
asserts jurisdiction over drugs and devices produced through genetic engineering, and has 
published regulatory guidelines for industry. See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, 
Guidance for Industry, (last modified Mar. 1 998) 
<http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/somegene.txt>. Another potential government drug regulator 
is the Drug Enforcement Administration; after all, the Controlled Substances Act which it 
enforces is the primary legal scheme devoted to the prohibition of socially undesirable drug 
use. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 811 (1997) (authorizing the Attorney General 
to classify and regulate controlled substances). Under section 812, substances are scheduled as 
follows: Schedule 1: high potential for abuse, no currently accepted medical use, lack of ac-
cepted safety for use under medical supervision; Schedule II: high potential for abuse, has a 
currently accepted medical use, abuse may lead to severe psychological or physical depend-
ence; Schedule III: less potential for abuse than Schedule I and II substances, has a currently 
accepted medical use, abuse may lead to moderate or low physical or high psychological de-
pendence; Schedule IV: low potential for abuse compared to Schedule III substances, has a 
currently accepted medical use, abuse may lead to limited physical or psychological depend-
ence compared to Scheduje III; Schedule V: low potential for abuse compared to Schedule IV, 
has a currently accepted medical use, may lead to limited physical or psychological depend-
ence compared to Schedule IV. !d. § 812 (b)(l)(5). 
While products such as drugs and devices might be proprietary, processes used in 
genetic enhancement, such as DNA testing and manipulation, might be patented and licensed. 
It is unclear if the FDA has jurisdiction over this type of activity. For a further discussion, see 
Maxwell Mehlman, How WiU We Regulate Genetic Enhancement? 34 WAKE FOREST L REV. 671, 
699-703 (1999). 
Health insurers and other third party payers such as employers and government 
entitlement programs are not suitable targets for enhancement regulation since they are not 
likely to pay for enhancement services. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. 
130. The first ban relating to research using fetuses accompanied the establishment of the 
National Conm1ission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research. See 42 U.S.C. § 289g (1999) (prohibiting research "on a living human fetus" that is 
not done "for the purpose of assuring the survival of such fetus"). The reconm1endations of 
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could be restricted by penalizing health care institutions that participated 
in clinical trials, 131 and by urging the FDA to deny permission to transport 
experimental enhancement products across state lines for human testing. 132 
Yet these restrictive approaches have limitations. 133 Penalizing people 
who genetically enhanced their children would trigger intense constitu-
the National Commission were codified in 45 C.F.R. 46 (1998). The provisions of 45 C.F.R. § 
46.208 govern activities directed toward fetuses in utero, while 45 C.F.R. § 46.209 governs 
activities directed toward fetuses ex utero. Both are geared towards allowing only research 
posing a minimal risk to the fetus. Additionally, 45 C.F.R. § 46.204 provides for the establish-
ment of Ethical Advisory Boards responsible for evaluating the merit of individual research 
proposals that fall outside of 45 C.F.R. § 46. The creation of the President's Commission for 
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research drained 
resources from the Ethical Advisory Board, however, thus creating a de facto "moratorium on 
fetal research posing more than minimal risk, unless expected to enhance the health of the 
particular fetus." Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan, Cltm.ing Human Beings: Do Research Moratoria 
Work?, in 2 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS Of THE NATIONAL 
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION H1, H8 (1997). In 1985, Congress amended the Public 
Health Service Act banning funding for "any research or experimentation ... on a viable 
living human fetus ex utero or a living human fetus ex utero 'for whom viability has not been 
ascertained" unless the research was geared towards increasing the survival prospects of the 
particular fetus or the research would not subject the fetus to increased risk of harm. The 1988 
NIH authorization continued this moratorium. See Cook-Deegan, supra at H8. Funding for 
experiments using fetal tissue became a concern soon after. Assistant Secretary of Health 
Robert Windom responded to an NIH request for authorization to support research into using 
fetal tissue to treat Parkinson's disease by imposing a funding moratorium pending considera-
tion by an ad hoc panel of his questions. See Letter from Robert Windom to Dr. Wyngaarden, 
reprinted in Report of the Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel, 1988 NAT'L INST. ON 
HEALTH B I-B3. In 1993, the National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993 removed 
the legislative moratorium on fetal research that was in place since 1985. Pub. L No. I 03-43, 
107 Stat. 122 (1993). This moratorium was restored in the NIH appropriations bills for fiscal 
years 1996 through 1998. Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and 
Related Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-78, Ill Stat. 1416, 1517. For a discussion of 
these moratoria, see generally Cook-Deegan, supra. 
131. For example, the federal government requires hospitals and other provider institu-
tions that conduct non-federally funded experiments to conform to guidelines for protecting 
human subjects, at risk of being disqualified from receiving federal research funds for other 
projects. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102-103 (1998); Jesse A. Goldner, An Overoieuo of Legal Controls on 
Human Experimentation and the Regulatory Implications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 ST. 
LOUIS U. LJ. 63, 99 (1993) (explaining that federal regulations for research have been made 
applicable to all institutions doing research, including hospitals, universities, and medical 
schools, regardless of the source of funding). 
132. The FDA would deny the sponsors of such trials an approved IND (in the case of a 
drug) or IDE (in the case of a medical device). For a discussion of the FDA's involvement in 
human experimentation, see Richard A. Merrill, The. Architecture of Government Regulation of 
Medical Products, 82 VA. L REV. 1753, 1777-82, 1821 (1996). 
133. For a more complete discussion of the gaps and weaknesses in government regulation 
of genetic enhancements, see Maxwell Mehlman, Houo Will We Regulate Genetic Enhancement?, 
34 WAKEFORESTL REV. 671 (1999). 
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tional debate. Particularly in the case of passive enhancements involving 
traditional "coital" methods of reproduction, the Supreme Court is likely to 
apply a strict scrutiny standard under which the right to decide what type of 
child to conceive or bring to term can be overridden only by a compelling 
state interest, and then only if the state uses the least intrusive means of 
regulation. 131 Genetic enhancement accompanying less traditional methods 
134. The extent of procreative rights entitled to constitutional protection is undear. The 
existing cases can be divided among those involving coital reproduction, those involving non-
coital assisted reproduction, and those involving surrogacy. To date, most of the cases have 
dealt with coital reproduction. Coital reproduction cases can be further divided into those that 
tend to uphold the right to procreate and those that tend to uphold the right not to procreate. 
In Skinner v. Oklo.homa, 316 U.S. 535 ( 1942), the Supreme Court invalidated Oklahoma's Ha-
bitual Criminal Sterilization Act as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In broad dicta, the Court stated that "[w]e are dealing here with legislation which 
involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the 
very existence and survival of the race." !d. at 541. Based on this dictum, "it seems indisput-
able that even a conservative Supreme Court would find that married couples have a funda-
mental constitutional right to reproduce by coitus." John A Robertson, Embryos, Families and 
Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 959 
(1986). Some commentators disagree with this analysis, arguing that "Skinner is too weak a 
reed to carry so much constitutional weight." Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 14 73, 1484-85 ( 1995 ). Even if married individuals were found to have a right to 
coital reproduction, the same cannot necessarily be said of single individuals because "the 
Supreme Court has not yet held that fornication and marriage laws violate an unmarried 
person's right to privacy." Robertson, supra, at 964. 
The Court's decisions concerning birth control and abortion seem to uphold the right 
not to procreate. In Griswold. v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court held that Connecti-
cut could not prohibit the use of contraceptives by married persons, stating that the right of 
privacy protected the decision by married couples whether or not to have children. The Court 
extended this privacy right and applied it to individuals, whether married or single, in Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), striking down a law preventing the use of contraceptives by 
unmarried individuals. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court applied the right of 
privacy to a woman's decision to procure an abortion, holding a law prohibiting abortion to be 
unconstitutional. The Court reaffirmed this right in Plo.nned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). A plurality of the Court took an expansive view of procreative liberty, stating that 
"personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, 
childrearing, and education" are "central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." !d. at 851. The Court did give greater weight to the State's interest in protecting the 
fetus than under Roe, however. 
Few cases deal with noncoital reproduction. In Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th 
Cir. 1990), the Court of Appeals held that the Bureau of Prison's prohibition of artificial in-
semination of wives by male prison inmates was "reasonably related to furthering the legiti-
mate penological interest of treating all inmates equally." !d. at 1400. It is unlikely, however, 
that this decision will have an impact outside the prison context. See NEW YORK STATE TASK 
FORCE REPORT, supra note 26, at 138. In a much broader decision, Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. 
Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990), the District Court granted the plaintiff-physician's motion for 
sunm1ary judgment, holding unconstitutionally vague Illinois' abortion law prohibiting the 
sale of and experimentation with a fetus produced by fertilization of a human ovum by a hu-
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of reproduction, IVF for example, may be entitled to less constitutional 
protection, but even then, the courts are likely to take a hard look at overly 
intrusive governmental regulation. Somatic self-enhancement, while not 
raising issues of reproductive freedom, would set the state's interest in 
promoting equality against the individual's constitutionally protected inter-
est in personal liberty and autonomy, including the right to make life-style 
decisions that do not harm others. 
Consumers may decide to purchase enhancement drug products, biol-
ogics, or devices marketed for therapeutic reasons, yet employ the products 
man sperm unless the experimentation was therapeutic. The court also found the law uncon-
stitutional because it was an impermissible restriction on "a woman's fundamental right of 
privacy, in particular, her right to make reproductive choices free of governmental interfer-
ence with those choices." !d. at I376. 
In addition, surrogacy and donorship has not been addressed frequently by the judi-
cial system. In In re Balry M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), the New Jersey Supreme Court stated 
that a father's procreative right did not mandate enforcement of the surrogacy contract when a 
surrogate mother changed her mind. The court reasoned that doing so "would be to assert 
that the constitutional right of procreation includes within it a constitutionally protected con-
tractual right to destroy someone else's right of procreation." !d. at 1254. In a California sur-
rogacy case, Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), the surrogate mother refused to 
relinquish the child to whom she gave birth pursuant to the surrogacy agreement. The court 
rejected the argument that the biological mother had a constitutional right to the child, stating 
that "[s]ociety has not traditionally protected the right of a woman who gestates and delivers a 
baby pursuant to an agreement with a couple who supply the zygote from which the baby 
develops and who intend to raise the child as their own." !d. at 786. 
Some commentators argue that the recognition of the right to coital reproduction 
necessarily implies a right to noncoital reproduction, arguing that "[t]he couple's interest in 
reproducing is the same, no matter how conception occurs, for the values and interests un-
derlying coital reproduction are equally present." Robertson, supra, at 960. The constitutional 
protection of coital reproduction is based on many factors, however, including: 
I. The importance ofbodily integrity. 
2. The intimacy of the marital relationship and the integrity of the family unit. 
3. The relationship between coital reproduction and sexual intimacy. 
4. The importance of being a parent and raising a child. 
5. The importance of carrying on a genetic line. 
6. The religious dimensions of decisions about procreation and child rearing. 
7. The woman's interest in carrying a developing fetus and giving birth. 
8. The intrusiveness of attempts to enforce laws limiting decisions about procreation. 
9. The danger that placing control of reproduction in the hands of the state will lead to 
eugenic policies. 
NEW YORK STATE TASK fORCE REPORT, supra note 26, at 144-45. Thus, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that, as a forn1 of reproduction implicates more of these concerns, it becomes more 
significant as a constitutional right. If noncoital reproduction does not implicate these con-
cerns, it may not occupy a position similar to that accorded to coital reproduction in the con-
stitutional scheme. Noncoital reproduction by married couples would implicate many of these 
factors, while assisted reproduction by unmarried persons would not implicate marital privacy. 
See id. at 145. Entering the realm of donorship and surrogacy departs further from these val-
ues, and introduces the competing interests of the surrogate. See id. at 146. 
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for unapproved or "off-label" enhancement purposes. Consequently, while 
FDA restrictions on sales of these products may survive constitutional chal-
lenge as an appropriate regulation of interstate commerce, they would be 
hampered by the way in which these products are likely to become com-
mercially available. A genetically-engineered drug that enhanced cognition, 
for example, may be approved to treat cognitive impairment, such as the 
effects of Alzheimer's disease. 135 Upon approval for a therapeutic purpose, 
however, people would request it for unapproved enhancement purposes. 
The experience with human growth hormone, mentioned earlier, is a 
prime example. 136 This genetically-engineered drug has been approved for 
short children with "a lack of adequate endogenous growth hormone se-
cretion."137 Yet reports suggest that parents also request doctors to pre-
scribe it for children who are merely short, and there are anecdotal ac-
counts of parents requesting the drug for children who are already tall, in 
order to increase their prospects of playing competitive basketball. 138 
The FDA does not effectively regulate off-label uses of unapproved 
drugs; it merely limits the ways in which the manufacture may promote the 
drug for unapproved uses. 139 Even if the FDA attempted to completely pro-
hibit manufacturers from promoting drugs for an unapproved use, 140 the 
public would learn about enhancement uses through media reports, the 
internet, and word-of-mouth. 141 Targeting health professionals who pro-
135. See Whitehouse et al., supra note 20, at 14-16. 
136. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing human growth hormone). 
137. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE 993 (52d ed. 1998). 
138. See Rita Rubin, Giving Growth a Synthetic Hand: Use of Hormone Sparks Debate, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, july 7, 1986, at AI. 
139. The only FDA restrictions on off-label use limit its promotion by manufacturers. See 
David A Kessler, Regulating the Prescribing of Human Drugs for Nonapproved Uses Under the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 15 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 693 (1978). However, Congress recently author-
ized the agency to permit manufacturers to disseminate reports of studies on unapproved uses 
so long as the manufacturer is actively engaged in obtaining marketing approval for the unap-
proved indication. 21 U.S.C.A. § 360aaa to 360aaa-6 (West Supp. 1998). 
140. But see Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998) (rul-
ing that FDA regulation of off-label uses "represented an impermissible restriction on com-
mercial free speech"). 
141. See, e.g., Alex Kuczynski, Getting a Fix on Youth?, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), 
Apr. 26, 1998, at IE; Glen MacNow, NFL Drug Game Gets More Serious, SEATI"LE TIMES, Dec. 
22, 1991, at Cl; Susan V. Seligson, Anti-Aging Comes of Age: Maverick Doctors at Nevada's New 
Cenegenics Clinic Say You Should Buy into Their Program If You Want to Stay Young in Mind and 
Body, HEALTH, Apr. I, 1998, at 62; Doctor Lichten's 5 Step Program to Living Longer and Better 
(visited Feb. 12, 1997) ; Human Growth Hormone: You Can Grow Young Again (visited June I, 
1998) <http://www.healnet.com/grodo/HGH>. An Illinois study found that, of the teenage 
steroid users in the state, twenty-one percent said a teacher or coach suggested they use ana-
bolic steroids. Seventy-two percent obtained steroids from non-medical sources, with fourteen 
percent obtaining the steroids from a teacher or coach. See Athletes Are Not Alone in Steroid Use, 
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vided enhancement products to their patients would present similar obsta-
cles. The FDA presently has no authority to control the prescribing behav-
ior of physicians. Consequently, they are free to prescribe products for un-
authorized uses. 142 There is nothing unlawful about a physician prescribing 
human growth hormone to enhance children, a purpose that is not indi-
cated on the product label. Currently, the only effective action the agency 
can take is to ban or limit sales of the product-for both therapeutic and 
enhancement purposes. 143 Yet in the case of products approved to treat 
serious and especially popularized diseases, 144 this would carry an intolera-
bly high political price. 
L.A TIMES, Mar. I9, I992, at E3. 
I42. See 2I U.S.C.A § 396 (West Supp. I998) (stating that nothing in Chapter 2I 1s m-
tended to interfere with a health care practitioner's authority "to prescribe or administer any 
legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health 
care practitioner-patient relationship"); see also Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Pre-
scription Drugs: Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration, 37 
Fed. Reg. I6503 (I972) (to be codified at 2I C.F.R. pt. I30) (proposed Aug. I5, I972) (stating 
that a physician is not required to gain FDA approval "in order to lawfully prescribe [a] drug 
for an unapproved use"). 
I43. The FDA has overseen the withdrawal of drugs when they have turned out to be un-
safe after they have been approved. The diet drugs Pondimin (fenfluramine) and Redux 
(dexfenfluramine) were withdrawn after reports emerged that the drugs were related to heart 
valve abnom1alities. See FDA Yanks Tuoo Diet Drugs Used in Popular Fat-Busting Pill Combos, 
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Oct. 6, I997, at 8; see also Thomas J. Moore et a!., Time to Act 
on Drug Saftty, 279 JAMA I 57 I (I998) (discussing safety monitoring after marketing of drugs). 
The painkiller Duract was withdrawn after being connected with cases of serious liver failure. 
Posicor, a drug used for treating high blood pressure, was withdrawn because of its possible 
lethalness when used in combination with other drugs. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Neuo Painkiller 
Is Withdrawn After Four Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, I998, at AI. Such withdrawals of approved 
drugs are rare, with only six in the last decade, but pressure to speed up the approval process 
n13Y cause more unsafe drugs to be approved. See id. The agency also has restricted the use of 
some products to physicians with specialized training. Treatment using the Contigen Bard 
Collagen Implant, the first injectable treatment for urinary stress incontinence caused by 
intrinsic sphincter deficiency, can only be provided by "a physician specializing in inconti-
nence who has had urology training in the procedure." Sharon Snider, FDA Approves New 
Injectable Product for Incontinence (last modified Oct. I2, I993) 
<http://www.fda.gov ./bbsltopics/ANSWERS/ANS0053I.html>. 
I44. Medical researchers complain about the "disease-of-the-month" mentality that swings 
public concern, and more importantly, public funds, from one disease to the next depending 
on which ailment has captured the momentary attention of the media. See Janny Scott, 
Women's Neuo Push for Health, Stepped-Up Activism Nationwide Is Focusing on Breast and Ovarian 
Cancer. Groups Want Improved Insurance Coverage and More Funds for Research, L.A TIMES, Apr. 
30, I99I, at AI (quoting Dr. John Laszlo of the American Cancer Society as stating that "[t]he 
process of deciding how much we want to do for our health in this country is more haphazard, 
perhaps, than I would like to see"); see also Daniel S. Greenberg, Special Treatment for Celebrity 
Afflictions?, WASH. POST, June I2, 1996, at A21 (discussing the making of "health-research 
choices on the basis of celebrity status and exaggerated hopes of breakthroughs"). 
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The same problem would beset efforts to prevent research on genetic 
enhancements. Consider a ban on the research of genetically engineered 
drugs designed to enhance cognitive function. Reasonable people may be-
lieve that this ban would be justified on the ground that developing this 
product would give those who used them an unfair advantage in competi-
tions for scarce resources like college acceptances or aptitude-based job 
slots. 145 But these same products could be employed successfully to treat 
diseases of cognitive defi.ciency, like Alzheimer's and dementia. It is ex-
tremely difficult to curtail research on a specific product use, and in any 
event, there is little point-once the product is developed for therapeutic 
use, it can be converted to enhancement uses. 
Moreover, an effective ban on access to genetic enhancements, 
whether aimed at individuals obtaining them for themselves or their chil-
dren, or at providers and manufacturers, would require an elaborate en-
forcement scheme. The programs would be similar to ones currently em-
ployed to control the use of performance enhancing drugs in sports and 
the use of illicit recreational drugs. Accordingly, the Drug Enforcement 
Agency rather than the FDA may be the most appropriate government 
agency to regulate genetic enhancements. After all, the DEA, pursuant to 
the Controlled Substances Act, is responsible for enforcing restrictions on 
access to physiologically active products that society deems objectionable. 146 
Similar to the War on Drugs and the effort to ban drugs in sports, re-
stricting access to genetic enhancements to promote equality is likely to be 
extremely intrusive and expensive. Moreover, it is likely that a ban will not 
be completely effective. Enhancement drugs, although perhaps compli-
cated to manufacture, may be easy to conceal. Similar to the way that "back-
alley" abortions could be obtained prior to Roe v. Wade, even enhancements 
that depended on sophisticated medical procedures, like rYF, might be 
procured if one "knew the right person." 147 The overwhelming consumer 
demand for genetic enhancements is certain to spawn a robust black mar-
ket. 148 Furthermore, the experience with the abortion controversy indicates 
145. For a fuller discussion of the problems of unfair competition between enhanced and 
unenhanced individuals, see infra notes 172-204 and accompanying text. 
146. See supra note 129 (describing .regulation of controlled substances). 
147. It is estimated that, in the early 1960s, one out of every five pregnancies was termi-
nated by abortion, even though the procedure was illegal. In 1962 alone, more than one mil-
lion abortions were believed to have been performed, one half by physicians. See Zad Leavy & 
Jerome M. Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding Lauos, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 
123 (1962). 
148. See Mark Zeigler, Illegal Doping Is Everyuohere Nouo, and the Culprits Are Rarely Caught, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 17, 1997, at C1 (stating that performance enhancing drugs are 
"seeping through the sports world like an injectable steroid is absorbed into the blood 
stream," and the only people who are caught are either "poor or stupid"). Performance en-
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that people who are prevented from obtaining genetic enhancements do-
mestically may procure them abroad. 149 
hancing drugs are available through a variety of sources. European factories openly manufac-
ture them, Tijuana pharmacies sell them over-the-counter, and web sites are dedicated to 
providing advice on how. to manufacture, obtain, and use them. See id. Another example is the 
black market in drugs to treat AIDS that have not been approved in the United States. Patients 
have even formed "buyers clubs" to facilitate access to these products. See Jon S. Batterman, 
Brother Can You Spare a Drug?, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 191, 207-08 (1990) (describing under-
ground networks whereby unapproved drugs are funneled into the United States). More re-
cently, states are reported to be concerned that adding the .anti-impotence drug Viagra to the 
list of drugs approved for reimbursement under Medicaid would cause supplies to be diverted 
to "street use." See Kris Mayes, Some States OK Viagra for Medicaid Recipients, PLAIN DEALER, 
June 18, 1998, atA-6 (stating that New York is reluctant to spend tax dollars to provide Viagra 
to Medicaid recipients). 
149. Individuals have often circumvented government prohibitions to obtain illegal abor-
tions or unapproved tream1ents and drugs for cancer and AIDS, travelling to Mexico, me 
Bahamas, and Europe to do so. See MEHLMAN & BarKIN, supra note 120, atll9 (showing that 
the problems of regulating genetic enhancements are not new). One way to avoid this problem 
is to regulate the provision of genetic enhancement services through international agreements. 
See Sev Fluss, Legal Aspects of Transplantation: Emerging Trends in International Action and National 
Legislation, 24 TRANSPLANTAllON PROC. 2121-22 (1992); Christian Williams, Combating the 
Problems of Human Rights Abuses and Inadequate Organ Supply Through Presumed Donative Consent, 
26 CASE W. RES.]. INT'L L. 315, 359-64 (1994) (arguing for international agreements that 
mandate presumed consent as an international standard). Off-shore availability could also be 
addressed by preventing consumers from accessing or penalizing consumers for accessing 
genetic enhancement services. Access could be prevented through travel restrictions, just as 
some countries have done to limit access to abortion services and as the United States has 
done in prohibiting travel to Cuba, Albania, and China. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 
( 1965) (upholding restrictions on travel to Cuba); Seth F. Krein1er, The /.nw of Choice and Choice 
of Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 451, 452-58 (1992) (outlining travel restrictions placed by several European 
countries on women seeking abortions). Violators of travel restrictions could lose their pass-
ports and be fined or imprisoned for travelling without a passport. See Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1994) (requiring United States citizens to have a United 
States passport when departing or entering the United States); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 
( 1981) (upholding revocation of passport for traveling without a passport). Consumers also can 
be penalized for obtaining genetic enhancement through forfeiture of health care coverage. 
See, e.g., Mark V. Sauer, Reproductive Prohibition: Restricting Donor Payment Will Lead to Medical 
Tourism, 12 HUM. REPROD. 1844-45 (1997). These penalties rely on customs officials being 
able to test for the presence of genetic alterations. Courts have allowed routine medical tests 
on aliens seeking to enter the country. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(b) (1997) (outlining the procedures 
regarding medical examination of aliens). While a customs officer may routinely search per-
sons entering the country, even in me absence of a warrant or probable cause, see 19 U.S.C. § 
482 (1996) (stating the rights and restrictions upon customs officers regarding searches of 
vehicles and persons), the officer must have reasonable suspicion of an unlawful act. See 
United States v. Hirnmelwright, 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that it was reasonable to 
search a woman who was suspected of carrying drugs). Even were genetic enhancement de-
tected and the individual fined or imprisoned, however, me individual would remain en-
hanced. Efforts to limit the damage already done, as through sterilization or reversal of the 
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It will be burdensome to enforce a ban on genetic enhancements be-
cause it will be difficult to determine whether or not an individual is ille-
gally enhanced. Accordingly, the enhanced individual, the person who en-
hanced them, or both may elude punishment. This problem is com-
pounded by the technical difficulties we may encounter in our attempts to 
detect the presence of enhancement products or enhanced DNA in the 
human body. 150 A similar problem plagues attempts to ban performance-
enhancing drugs in sports. Athletes and their coaches are becoming in-
creasingly adept at deceiving drug screening tests. For example, athletes 
may use naturally-occurring body builders like erythropoeitin to disguise 
the exogenous enhancement. 151 Furthermore, athletes may be able to con-
sume an enhancement substance to increase muscle mass, for example, and 
then terminate its use sufficiently in advance of a screening test so that its 
consumption cannot be detected. 
The enforcement of restrictions on genetic enhancements will be com-
pounded by the degree of difficulty society will encounter in attempting to 
distinguish between therapeutic and enhancement uses. The difference 
between the two is frequently not dear. 152 Someone might claim, for exam-
ple, that an improvement in appearance was required to treat feelings of 
inadequacy, or that an increase in strength or dexterity was an effort to 
avoid injury. Moreover, many genetic enhancements are likely to have 
lawful medical uses. 153 Someone may take human growth hormone to be-
enhancement, may run into constirutional difficulties. See supra note 134 (discussing repro-
ductive freedom). A final method of regulating potential consumers of genetic enhancement is 
to prevent the transfer of money abroad for purchasing banned genetic technologies. See 
MEHLMAN & BOTKIN, supra note 120, at 55-85 (examining potential solutions to suppress an 
underground market for genetic enhancement). Such measures are likely to be ineffective, 
however, as the experience with Swiss bank accounts, offshore investment companies, and 
drug money laundering shows. See id. Another method of regulating off-shore access to genetic 
enhancement is to control the activities of professionals who go abroad to provide these serv-
ices or refer consumers abroad by limiting biomedical research abroad and holding liable 
clinicians who refer patients internationally. See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Biology and the Bill of 
Rights: Can Science Reframe the Constitution, 13 AM.JL & MED. 249, 275-77 (1987) (providing 
examples of United States doctors circumventing United States regulations by conducting 
biomedical research abroad). Any efforts to ban genetic technologies, however, would prevent 
us from reaping the potential benefits of that technology. See MEHLMAN & BOTKIN, supra note 
120, at 20-37 (highlighting several noteworthy benefits of genetic technologies). 
150. For a discussion of what steps may be required to accomplish this, see Part VI Conclu-
ston. 
151. See John Maher, Drug EPO Causes Sticky Situations, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 26, 
1992, at E3 (explaining that athletes prefer erythropoietin to blood doping because it is more 
difficult to detect); Ziegler, supra note 148 (listing popular perfornumce enhancing drugs such 
as human growth horn1one, erythropoietin, and designer steroids). 
152. See supra note 19 (discussing therapeutic/enhancement distinction). 
153. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text (discussing off-label enhancement uses 
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come a professional basketball player, while someone else may take the 
substance to combat pituitary dwarfism. A ban on enhancements would 
require a complicated system to distinguish between legitimate and pro-
hibited activities involving the same products. 151 In addition, banning ge-
netic enhancement in conjunction with assisted reproductive technologies, 
like those delivered in IVF clinics, would require a regulatory regime more 
extensive than the one currently in place. 155 
of approved therapeutic products). 
154. State and federal drug enforcement officials are largely unsuccessful in stemming the 
flow of prescription drugs flowing into the illicit drug market. See Dan Weikel, Prescription 
Fraud: Abusing the System, L.A TIMES, Aug. 18, 1996, at AI. According to DEA statistics, ap-
proximately 27% of illicit drug use involves prescription drugs. See Charles W. Hall, A Prescrip-
tion for Trouble in Suburbia; Va. Police Step Up Efforts Against Fraud at Pharmacy, WASH. POST, May 
26, 1996, at BOI. The possibility of unintentionaliy deterring legitimate use of drugs for 
treating illness and pain makes preventing illicit use of prescription drugs even more difficult. 
See Michael Perrault, Complexities of Drug Laws Confuse Some Practitioners, KAN. CITY Bus. J., 
Feb.21, 1997,at4. 
155. Until recently, the federal government had not passed legislation specific to fertility 
clinics. Exaggerated success rates prompted the Federal Trade Commission to take action 
against fertility clinics in the late 1980s, however, and subsequent congressional hearings 
resulted in the passage of the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 
U.S.C. § 263a-l to 263a-7 (1994). The act requires assisted reproductive programs to report 
success rates to the Center for Disease Control (CDC) so that the statistics may be standard-
ized. /d. § 263a-l(a). Also, the Act establishes a voluntary pilot program under which states 
may work with the CDC and the. Department of Health and Human Services to certify fertility 
clinics. !d. § 263a-2. No funds were allocated for the Act's implementation until 1996, how-
ever, and the CDC did not publish a success rate report until December 1997, using data from 
cycles initiated in 1995. See NE\VYORK STATE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 26, at 401. Nor 
have states rushed to participate in the pilot program. See Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Insurance 
and Consumer Protection, 109 HARv. L. REV. 2092, 2106 (1996). 
The Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act (CLIA) allows health officials to monitor 
clinical laboratories, but "the regulations required under CLIA are too generic for infertility 
labs." Kathryn Wexler, Fertile Ground for Deception, WASH. PoST, Jan. 2, 1996, at Z07; see also 42 
U.S.C. § 263a (1994). Some critics of the current system favor a national regulatory body re-
sponsible for licensing and inspecting IVF programs, but the cost of establishing an agency for 
this purpose may be too costly. See John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the 
FamiZv. 47 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 920-21 (1996). Like federal regulation, regulation by state gov-
ernments is lacking. While there is some state regulation of infertility clinics, there are not yet 
any comprehensive laws covering the field. See Wexler, supra. Louisiana requires that assisted 
reproductive programs meet standards set by the American Society for Reproductive Medicine 
(ASRM) and be directed by a licensed physician and trained in IVF. L\. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
9: 128 (West 1997). New Hampshire requires medical evaluations and procedures be governed 
by rules adopted by the state health department or, in .the absence of any health department 
rules, guidelines set by the ASRM. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:31 (1995). Other states 
require that a licensed physician perform or supervise all assisted insemination procedures. 
See, e.g., ARK. CODE" ANN.§ 9-10-202 (Michie 1995); IDAHO CODE§ 39-5402 (1998); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN.§ 3111.32 (West 1997); OR. REV. STAT.§ 677.360 (1995). 
As a result, most regulation of assisted reproduction is a product of private profes-
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The strongest objection to banning genetic enhancements is that both 
society and well as enhanced individuals benefit from the enhancement. 
For example, a person with an enhanced scientific ability (assuming that 
this collection of traits was amenable to genetic manipulation) might make 
important discoveries that would be impossible, or take much longer, for an 
unenhanced scientist. Even proponents of equality recognize the need to· 
permit a certain degree of inequality in order to increase social benefit. 156 
In short, we might want to permit an individual to be enhanced if we be-
lieve that the enhancement will benefit the individual and society. 
Social benefit; coupled with the practical limits on the effectiveness of 
a complete ban on genetic enhancements, make a total ban both unrealistic 
and undesirable. Some people will manage to enhance themselves at any 
cost. Moreover, in some cases, we will want people to enhance themselves. 
This leads to several policy suggestions. 
One approach could involve enhancement licensing. A system of li-
censing individuals to obtain genetic enhancements would yield social 
gains, as well as take some of the pressure off of a regulatory embargo that 
attempted to prevent the wealthy from purchasing enhancements. Licenses 
would be granted on the condition that enhanced persons employ their 
abilities in some pre-defined, socially beneficial manner. By reducing the 
number of people who obtain enhancements, a licensing program would 
lessen the degree of social inequality, and the threat that genetic inequality 
poses to democratic institutions. 157 
sional organizations. The American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) sets minimum 
standards for IVF, gamete intrafallopian transfer, and other related procedures. The ASRM's 
guidelines require that programs performing these techniques employ individuals with train-
ing specified by the ASRM. NE\VYORK STATE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 26, at 408. The 
Society of Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART) accepts standardized statistics from in-
fertility clinics for annual publication. See Wexler, supra. Those clinics, enrolling as active 
members of SART, must meet SARTs qualifications, but SART does not independently verity 
compliance with the guidelines. See id. The College of American Pathologists (CAP) and the 
ASRM jointly administer a voluntary laboratory accreditation program, but the cost and time 
requirements dissuade even some good clinics from participating. !d. Only recently did the 
CDC announce its intention to create a model certification program with CAP and the ASRM. 
See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 26, at 413. Thus, both government and 
private regulation of infertility services is lacking, resulting in many horror stories: a doctor 
using his own sperm to impregnate women, doctors taking eggs from patients for implantation 
in other patients, a dirty instrument resulting in a couple having one black child and one white 
child. See Wexler, supra. 
156. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing view that some inequality in-
creases net societal benefit). 
157. Temkin, for example, contends that a society in which only a few people are much 
better off than others is more equal than one in which a lot of people are much better off and 
only a few are much worse off. See TEMKIN, supra note 86, at 297. The question is whether the 
gains in equality are worth the costs of interdiction. Even if restrictions are adopted on paper 
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This licensing system would be similar to legally-enforced professional 
licensing schemes that give their holders the powers and privileges denied 
ordinary citizens in return for agreements to abide by rules designed to 
promote social goals and to refrain from behaving in socially undesirable 
ways. The system would also bear some resemblance to licensing imposed 
on the ownership or use of dangerous products like handguns and automo-
biles. The administrative costs could be financed by licensing fees. 
A licensing requirement could be enforced in the first instance against 
providers of genetic enhancement products or services. Providers would be 
required to be licensed as a supplier. This license would carry with it re-
strictions and reporting requirements. 158 Individuals who sought enhance-
ments would apply to a licensing board and would be required to articulate 
the social benefits that would flow from their enhancement. Applicants who 
were approved would periodically report to the board to provide assurance 
Of satisfactory performance. Licensed enhancements that involved ma-
nipulation of DNA would be genetically "tagged" so that lawfully enhanced 
individuals could be distinguished from those who obtained enhancements 
on the black market. 159 Failure to fulfill the terms of the license would be 
penalized by loss of access to the enhancement or to its benefits. Depending 
on the nature of the enhancement, the penalties could include deprivation 
of supplies of the enhancement product, actual biological reversal of the 
enhancement, various forms of social handicapping, 160 surtaxes or mone-
tary penalties, and perhaps in cases of egregious violations, such as the use 
of enhancements to cause serious harm to others, imprisonment. Similar 
penalties would be imposed on persons who were discovered to have sup-
plied or obtained enhancements without being licensed. 161 
for their symbolic value, the intangibility of these gains compared with the magnitude of the 
potential costs may well discourage vigorous enforcement. 
158. A similar program operates under the Controlled Substances Act to keep track of the 
prescription of narcotics and other dangerous drugs. See supra note 129 and accompanying 
text (describing regulation of controlled substances). 
159. This technology, in which a portion of identifying but non-functioning DNA is in-
serted along with functional DNA, is already being developed by agricultural biotechnology 
companies to enable them to trace the use of genetically engineered seeds. See Michael Pollan, 
Playing God in the Garden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 44. The use of genetic 
tagging for law enforcement purposes would resemble tagging explosives with a chemical that 
enables the seller to be identified. See Robert F. Service, NRC Panel Enters Fight Over Tagging 
Explosives, SCIENCE, jan. 24, 1997, at 474. 
160. Handicapping is discussed infra as a remedy for the unfairness of competitions be-
tween enhanced and unenhanced individuals. See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text. 
161. I acknowledge that numerous problems remain to be solved with such a regime, and 
that, like the War on Drugs, it will require careful tuning to avoid overly extensive violations of 
individual liberties. This article is meant to be the start of a debate, not its conclusion. 
One of the more vexing issues that the enforcement of a licensing scheme would 
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raise, for example, is the issue of genetic privacy. Licensed individuals (and mose suspected of 
obtaining enhancements on me black market) would be required w undergo DNA testing to 
verify me extenl of their enhancemems or to disprove me accusation that mey were enhanced 
illegally. DNA is oflen described as a "future diary," emphasizing the private nature of me 
information it contains about an individual's future. See George J. Annas, Rules for Gene Banks: 
Protecting Privacy in the Genetics Age, in JU~TICE AND THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 75, 82 
(fimomy F. Murphy & Marc A Lappe eds., 1994). Privacy is a multi-din1ensional concept, 
denoting "{I) informational privacy concerns about access to personal information; (2) physi-
cal privacy concerns about access to persons and personal spaces; (3) decisional privacy con-
cerns about governmental and other mird-party interference wim personal choices; and (4) 
proprietary privacy concerns about me appropriation and ownership of interests in human 
personality." Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC SECRETS: 
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31, 33 {Mark A. Romstein 
ed., 1997) [hereinafter Allen, Genetic Privacy]. While genetic privacy can evoke each of lhese 
concerns, it most often refers to informational privacy. The information available from DNA is 
potentially born sensitive and embarrassing for me individual. See Annas, supra, at 83. Addi-
tionally, the availability of me information to insurance companies and businesses arouses 
fears of genetic discrimination. See Karen Rothenberg et al., Genetic Information and the Work-
place: Legislative Approaches and Policy Challenges, 275 Sci. 1755 ( 1997) (describing protections 
against genetic discrimination in me workplace). 
In tension wim the desire to protect individual privacy is the potential usefulness of 
genetic information to mird parties. DNA data banks containing DNA "fingerprints" allow law 
enforcement officials to link a suspect to a crime or to identify a victim's remains. See generally 
Dan L. Burk & Jennifer A Hess, Genetic Privacy: Constitutional Considerations in Forensic DNA 
Testing, 5 Gw. Mr\SON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1 ( 1994) (discussing the plausible threat of misuse of 
DNA samples given me shortcomings present in current policy provisions); E. Donald Shapiro 
& Michelle L. Weinberg, DNA Data Banking: The Dangerous Erosion of Privacy, 38 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 455 (1990) (calling for slate legislatures to limit DNA uses strictly); JoAnn Marie Longo-
bardi, Note, DNA Fingerprinting and the Need for a National Data Base, 17 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 
323 (arguing me benefits of a national DNA database); Michael J. Markett, Note, Genetic Dia-
ries: An Analysis of Privacy Protection in DNA Data Banks, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 185 (1996) 
(recommending actions for Congress and slate legislatures to deal with DNA problems). Simi-
larly, defense attorneys may wish to use genetic evidence to exonerate their clients. See Mark 
A. Rothstein, Genetic Secrets: A Policy FrameU'ork in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND 
CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA, supra, at 451, 480 [hereinafter Rothstein, Genetic 
Secrets]. Genetic information could also be used as evidence in personal injury cases, allowing 
defendants to argue that plaintiffs have a below-average life expectancy, or in domestic regu-
lation cases, born to determine parentage and to predict a parent's future healm in a child 
custody hearing. See id. at 481-82. Additionally, genetic privacy conflicts wim me interests of 
blood relatives, especially when the information would allow early diagnosis of diseases the 
onset of which could be avoided by taking early precautions. In such cases, medical profes-
sionals are faced wim a conflict between confidemiality and the duty to warn. See Roberta M. 
Berry, The Genetic Revolution and the Physician's Duty of Confidentiality: The Role of the Old Hippo-
cratic Virtues in the Regulation of the NeU' Genetic Intimacy, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 401 (analyzing the 
effects on emics in the wake of greatly changing genetic medicine); Sonia M. Suter, Note, 
Whose Genes Are These AnyU'ay? Familial Conflicts Over Access to Genetic Information, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 1854 (1993) (balancing me interests of various family members in genetic controversies). 
Insurance companies and employers have a strong economic interest in gaining access w 
genetic information, allowing insurance companies to refuse coverage of at-risk individuals 
and allowing employers to control costs by not hiring individuals at risk for occupational ill-
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Another method might involve establishing an enhancement lottery. 
The licensing scheme I have so far described would be open only to those 
people with sufficient financial resources. This would perpetuate the ine-
qualities that would result from wealth-based access to enhancements. To 
circumvent this problem, society could provide access to enhancements to 
some people who lacked sufficient resources. One approach would be a 
government program that subsidized enhancements for certain persons, 
ness. See Kathy L. Hudson et al., Genetic Discrimination and Health Insurance: An Urgent Need for 
Reform, 270 SCI. 391 ( 1995) (recognizing the shortcomings of current law and the need for new 
legislation); Rothenberg et al., supra, at 1755; Rothstein, Genetic Secrets, supra, at 468-79 (dis-
cussing the institutionalization of standards for the review of genetic developments in the 
insurance industry); Mark A Rothstein, The !JJu• of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the Workpln.ce, 
in GENETIC SECRETS, supra at 281 [hereinafter Rothstein, Medical and Genetic Privacy in the 
Workpln.ce] (tracing the historic development of medical privacy in the workplace). Genetic 
screening programs are in place in over 75 of the nation's largest firms. See Shapiro & Wein-
berg, supra, at 480. Schools also have an interest in accessing genetic information as a tool for 
educational programming. See Rothstein, Genetic Secrets, supra, at 487. Additionally, the United 
States military has an interest in genetic infom1ation, and uses DNA fmgerprinting to identifY 
the remains of war casualties, collecting and storing nearly 1.5 million samples by 1996. See id. 
State legislative efforts to address the genetic privacy issue focus prin1arily on the 
· illegitimate use to which genetic information is put, rather than access to the information. A 
handful of states prohibit discrinllnation on the basis of genetic information of asymptomatic 
individuals. See generally Rothenberg et al., supra (describing state laws prohibiting genetic 
discrimination). Much of the legislation falls short of the goal of protecting genetic privacy 
because of the narrow definition given to genetic information, limiting the use of information 
acquired through genetic testing while continuing to allow the use of family history and phe-
notype indicators in the workplace. /d. at 1755. In 1996, however, New Jersey prohibited 
employment discrimination based on genetic infom1ation broadly defined. See Natalie Anne 
Stepanuk, Comment, Genetic Information and Third Party Access to Information: New Jersey's Pio-
neering Legisln.tion as a Model for Federal Privacy Protection of Genetic Information, 4 7 CATH. U. L 
REV. ll 05 _(1998) (clain1ing the judiciary must take an active role in keeping up with rapidly 
changing genetic developments). Most state law provisions protecting genetic privacy appear 
as "prohibitions on mandatory genetic testing or disclosure of test results for employment or 
health insurance," informed consent requirements for testing or disclosure of information, 
"and proclamations of the confidentiality of genetic information." Michael S. Yesley, Genetic 
Privacy, Discrimination, and Social Policy: Challenges and Dilemmas, 2 MICROBIAL & COMP. 
GENOMICS 19,20 (1997). 
Like state legislation, federal legislation focuses more on the use of genetic infom1a-
tion rather than access to such information. The Equal Employment Opportunities Commis-
sion (EEOC) has interpreted the Americans with Disabilities Act to prohibit genetic discrimi-
nation in the work place. 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL§ 902.8 (1991). Similarly, 29 U.S.C. § 
18ll(a)-(g) (1996), prevents group health insurance plans from using genetic information in 
establishing eligibility rules and from treatmg genetic infom1ation as a preexisting condition 
absent a diagnosis of the condition. No federal legislation protects genetic privacy, however, 
and state regulation of prohibition on mandatory genetic testing continues to allow dissemi-
nation of genetic information. For example, employers may still make offers of employment 
conditional on the release of medical records and consent to blood testing. See Rothenberg et 
al., supra. Thus, regulation of genetic privacy is limited. 
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perhaps those who, in return for their license, promised to provide the 
most desirable set of social benefits. But this would embroil the government 
in an enhancement rationing program in which it was required to judge the 
relative merit of different proposals, a task that would raise objections 
similar to those that have been lodged against health care rationing pro-
grams in general. 162 On the other hand, the licensing plan I propose does 
not raise these objections because the licensing authority would not com-
pare individuals seeking enhancement but would allow anyone to purchase 
enhancements so long as they agreed to meet certain minimum social ob-
jectives. 
A more agreeable solution might be to establish a national lottery for 
genetic enhancements. 163 Everyone would be given one chance in each 
drawing. The winner, or winners, 164 would be entitled to resources that 
would enable them to purchase the maximum package of enhancements 
lawfully available in the private market. However, to qualify for the en-
hancements, they would have to become licensed. Similar to the licensing 
program itself, the lottery could be financed by the license fees paid by 
those who purchased enhancements. Among the advantages of a lottery 
approach is that its randomness would give continued vitality to the con-
cept of equality of opportunity. 
A final proposal might be for regulation of germ line enhancement. 
Social equality would be threatened particularly by the creation of a geno-
bility-a class of related individuals who use genetic enhancement to 
achieve and maintain an unassailable grip on wealth, power, and social 
privilege, and who pass their advantages on to successive generations. A 
genetic aristocracy is antithetical to the philosophy and ideals upon which 
liberal democratic political systems rest. 165 If genetic enhancements are 
obtainable at all, then, to some extent, the formation of an enhanced class 
162. For a description of objections to rationing kidney dialysis on the basis of an individ-
ual's social worth, see Maxwell]. Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Lifosaving Medical Treatments, 
1985 WIS. L. REV. 239, 256-60. A different but no less troubling set of objections might be 
directed at private philanthropic subsidies. 
163. Botkin and I proposed this idea earlier in ACCESS TO THE GENOME, supra note 120, at 
124-28, where we described the history of state-run lotteries, including their use to reduce 
perceptions of hopeless inequality, their utility in allocating scarce drugs, and their acceptance 
by the courts as a fair means of distributing unavoidable privations, such as those fuced in the 
classic "life-boat" case, U.S. v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (E.D. Pa. 1842). 
164. The odds of winning could be adjustable, increasing or decreasing depending on 
political perceptions of the degree of inequality created by wealth-based purchases of en-
hancements in the marketplace. For a more complete description and defense of a lottery for 
genetic enhancements, see MEHLMAN & BOTKIN, supra note 120, at 124-28 (1998). 
165. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text (describing threats to democracy cre-
ated by genetic aristocracy). 
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cannot be prevented. Persons wealthy enough to purchase enhancements 
would be able to provide their children with greater material advantages 
than unenhanced persons. Accordingly, these children may also be able to 
purchase genetic enhancements. 166 Yet the formation of a genobility is far 
more likely to occur if individuals were permitted to enhance their germ 
lines. Their offspring would inherit these genetic advantages, which could 
be supplemented with additional germ line enhancements that they pur-
chased, which in tum would be passed on to their children, and so on. 167 
The social threat created by the inequality that would result from germ 
line enhancement may not be readily mitigated by the licensing require-
ment that would accompany the lawful acquisition of somatic enhance-
ments. It is difficult to imagine how to ensure that the person's child would 
abide by the licensing conditions to which his or her parents consented. 
Society could require enhanced children to become licensed upon reaching 
the age of majority or else forfeit their enhancement advantages. 168 Being 
licensed at the age of majority may not be sufficient, however, to counteract 
the inequality that occurred at an earlier age. 159 
In this case, the solution would seem to require prohibiting germ line 
genetic enhancement altogether. Conceivably the threat to social equality 
could be met by banning only those forms of germ line enhancement that 
involved gene transfer, and not the passive sorts of germ line enhancement 
that would occur with genetic selection for enhancement, selective abortion 
for enhancement, or pre-conception enhancement. Given the constitutional 
protection of reproductive freedom, it might be more politically realistic to 
make it illegal for individuals to alter germ cells for enhancement reasons 
than to discover their genetic endowment, to select embryos for implanta-
tion, or to abort a fetus. 
A ban on germ line engineering would raise numerous, but not insur-
mountable, problems. For example, some may contend that a ban uncon-
stitutionally interferes with procreative liberty. 170 Yet the state may assert a 
166. This is one of the reasons for implementing a program to reduce unfairness, de-
scribed below. See infra notes 171-204 and accompanying text. 
167. The intergenerational transmission of enhanced traits will not be completely auto· 
matic. Enhanced DNA material may be altered during the reproductive process, for example, 
by recombination or "crossing-over" of chromosomes, resulting in the cancellation of the 
enhancement effect. For a description of crossing-over, see Dennis S. Kaijala, A Legal Research 
Agenda for the Human Genome Initiative, 32JURIMETRICS 121, 136 (1992). 
168. For a description of the ways in which enhanced individuals could be stripped of their 
advantages, and of methods to level the playing field between enhanced and unenhanced 
persons, see infra notes 170-204 and accompanying text. 
169. Moreover, the children may have been able to employ their enhancement advantages 
to too large a degree during their period oflegal minority. 
170. For a discussion of the constitutional dimensions of this liberty right, see supra note 
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compelling interest in preserving democratic liberties from being engulfed 
by a genetic aristocracy. Detecting altered germ cells would be difficult and 
intrusive. 171 Nevertheless, the intrusiveness may be necessary to promote a 
minimum level of genetic equality. 
V. UNFAIRNESS 
Regardless of the manner in which we attempt to reduce the inequali-
ties that would be created by wealth-based genetic enhancement, genetic 
enhancements are inevitable. A vigorously and effectively enforced licens-
ing scheme would go some distance toward offsetting the advantages en-
joyed by enhanced persons, but not far enough. Enhanced individuals 
would be in a more privileged social position than unenhanced persons. 
This raises the question of whether, and in what ways, society can curb ge-
netically produced unfairness. 172 
This unfairness will be most acute when the unenhanced compete with 
the enhanced for scarce societal resources, or when an enhanced individual 
exerts power over an unenhanced person in a relationship in which their 
134. 
171. The difficulty of prohibiting germ line enhancement is illustrated by the protocol 
proposed to NIH in August of 1998 by French Anderson. Anderson sought to remedy ADA 
deficiency disease and alpha thalassemia by genetically altering cells in an early-stage fetus. 
Since the fetus' cells would not have been completely differentiated, some of the genetic al-
terations might be incorporated into cells that eventually would develop into reproductive 
cells, with the result that the alterations would be passed on to the fetus' own offspring. See 
Robert Cooke, Pushing a Human Limit: Gene Therapy That Could Affect Future Generations, Too, 
NEWSDAY, Aug. 30, 1998, atA06. 
172. Many of the philosophers who are concerned about inequality at a societal level are 
also troubled by the consequences of inequality at the personal level. Walzer, for example, 
argues that the problem is not so much inequality per se, but how the superior person behaves 
toward the inferior: "The experience of subordination--of personal subordination, above all-
lies behind the vision of equality." WALZER, supra note 77, at xiii. Indeed, his goal of main-
taining separate spheres of justice-which prevent a person from attaining a privileged posi-
tion in one sphere merely because she enjoys an advantage in another-is aimed at precluding 
the domination of one person or class by another. See id. at 17. Bruce Ackern1an actually posits 
the notion of "genetic domination," although he focuses on the domination of the genetically 
disadvantaged by those who fare better in the natural lottery, rather than on the domination 
of the unadvantaged by the genetically enhanced. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL jUSTICE IN 
THE LIBERAL STATE 132 (1980). Even meritocrats are uncomfortable when the talented lord it 
over others. Gardner, for example, states that "(i]n its moderate forms-held within bounds-
emphasis on individual achievement allows a healthy play of individual gifts, holds out an 
invitation to excel, but does not necessarily sanction the ruthless subordination of those who 
are less able, less vigorous, or less aggressive." GARDNER, supra note 83, at 35. N~zick, as men-
tioned earlier, considers theft, fraud, and the forcible exclusion of others from competition as 
examples of activities that create "unjust holdings." NOZICK, supra note 78, at 152. 
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interests conflict. 173 These circumstances can occur in a large number of 
settings: between rivals for someone's affection, or in interpersonal rela-
tionships, like those between romantic partners; in contests, including 
sports, games, beauty pageants, and talent shows; in competition for access 
to limited privileges, such as admission to academic institutions; in fiduci-
ary relationships, like those between patients and health care professionals, 
trustees and beneficiaries, directors and shareholders, attorneys and clients, 
and insurers and insureds; and in ordinary business relationships, such as 
those between seller and buyer, landlord and tenant, realtor and purchaser, 
lender and debtor, manufacturer and consumer, and employer and em-
ployee. The object of the competition may be any desirable good: money, 
employment,· status, affection, sexual favors, political influence, or market 
power. The relative advantage conferred by genetic enhancement would 
depend on both the context and the nature of the enhancement; in a test of 
strength, for example, enhanced intelligence may be of little value. 174 Un-
fairness could be either a zero-sum situation in which the enhanced person 
obtained benefit at the unenhanced person's expense, or a situation in 
which both the enhanced and the unenhanced person gained, but the share 
gained by the enhanced person was proportionately greater than would be 
the case if the parties were equivalently advantaged. 
To a certain degree, all of these situations are subject to external rules 
of behavior. These rules may be formal public laws; legally enforceable pri-
vate law, such as the by-laws and other governing principles adopted by 
corporations, partnerships and unincorporated associations; or social 
173. In particular, I am concerned with zero-sum games, in which the enhanced would 
gain at the expense of the unenhanced. As Powers states, "[t)he true object of egalitarian moral 
concern ... must be those inequalities that permit some to benefit greatly only by making 
others substantially worse-off .... "Powers, supra note 91, at 138. But cf NOZICK, supra note 
78, at 228 ("Life, over time, is not a constant-sum game, wherein if greater ability or effort 
leads to some getting more, that means that others must lose."). I also am troubled by compe-
titions in which, although both the enhanced and the unenhanced gain, as a result of the 
advantages enjoyed by the enhanced, the gains are unequaL Many of the advantages conferred 
by genetic enhancement may not be at the expense of others, however. As Nagel points out: 
Any advantage to the better off at no cost to the worse off is all to the good, 
even if it is due to causes for which the recipients are not responsible .... 
For example, there can be no possible objection to some people's naturally 
enjoying immunity to certain diseases or perfect health or sunny disposi-
tions, even though this makes them much better off than those who are con-
stitutionally sickly or depressed. 
NAGEL, supra note 84, at 107. 
174. See infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text for a discussion of the complexities 
raised by the possibility that A, who has an enhanced trait X, competes against B who has 
enhanced trait Y, which confers different advantages than trait X, or against C, who is not 
enhanced but who enjoys other natural or acquired advantages. 
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norms or customs. 175 How should these systems of rules respond to the po-
tential unfairness created by genetic enhancement? Should the rules treat 
these differences as if they did not exist or did not bear on the activity? Or 
should the rules attempt, in some fashion, to level the playing field? If one 
person possessed an advantage over another, should the rules permit that 
individual to reap its benefit at the other's expense? 176 Although it would be 
fascinating to consider non-legal responses based on social norms and cus-
toms, the focus of the remainder of this paper will be on legally enforceable 
rules, that is, on public and private law. 
If we attempted to level the genetic playing field in response to ge-
netic enhancement, what would our options be? We can either decrease the 
advantages of those persons who were genetically enhanced, or we could 
improve the lot of the unenhanced. In short, we can level "up" or "down." 
Leveling up would entail giving those who were not genetically en-
hanced some countervailing benefit. This could be money, professional 
advice, information that was hard to come by, or any other desirable re-
source that would help level. the playing field. It could be a preference in 
access to a scarce resource-an affirmative action program, for example. 
Yet it is difficult to conceptualize how this approach would work in the 
context of personal interactions. Would an unadvantaged person be per-
mitted to draw on some public store of resources to place her on the same 
level as the enhanced person? Since we cannot afford to provide genetic 
enhancement to everyone, the stock would not consist of genetic enhance-
ments. Yet, desirable resources are scarce. Accordingly, it would cost too 
much to put the unadvantaged on the same level as the enhanced. 
175. There does not appear to be any consensus on the proper use of the terms "law," 
"norn1s," and "customs." A good illustration of the confusion is one commentator's remarks 
that, based on differences in enforcement, "a norn1 is like a law, except that a private person 
sanctions the violator of a norm, whereas a state actor sanctions the violator of a law," which 
the commentator then follows with the observation that, based on the source of the rule, the 
term "norm" does not include "the rules self-consciously fornmlated and issued by private 
institutions, such as trade associations." Eric Posner, Law, &anomies, and Inefficient Nonns, 144 
U. PA. L REV. 1697, 1699, 1700 (1996). Because a trade association might be subject to a legal 
sanction for breach of contract for violating its by-laws, it is hard to figure out why this author 
would not consider its rules to be norms, if not laws (albeit private ones). In any event, in this 
Article, I use the terms as follows: a public law is a rule made and sanctioned by the govern-
ment; a private law is a legally enforceable rule made by a non-governmental organization; 
and a social norm or custom is a rule established by custom and usage that is not legally en-
forceable. 
176. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 ("Courts of justice are instituted in 
every civilized society, in order to protect the weak from the insults of the stronger .... "). But 
see Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921) ("Our whole system of law is predicated on the 
general, fundamental principle of equality of application of the law. 'All men are equal before 
the law ... .'"). 
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A less expensive alternative might be to level up only those who, rela-
tive to the enhanced, were the most disadvantaged. This would resemble 
laws prohibiting employment discrimination against persons with disabili-
ties.177 These laws require employers to subsidize persons with disabilities so 
177. A great deal of attention has been paid by scholars and lawmakers to this manifesta-
tion of the general issue of potential unfairness: when individuals are disadvantaged compared 
to others according to some societal norm (here I am not using the term "norm" to refer to an 
informally sanctioned rule, but to the frequency of a characteristic in the population which is 
accepted as "normal"), or when individuals are treated as if they were disadvantaged. A bevy of 
legislative enactments, federal and state, together with innumerable court decisions and schol-
arly writings, for example, deal with fairness toward persons with physical and mental disabili-
ties. See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 705 (20)(A} (1998) (defming "individuals 
with disability"); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1999) (defming disability}; 
School Bd. of Nassau County v. Airline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (holding that tuberculosis is a 
disability for an elementary school teacher); Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Deter-
mining When an Employer's Financial Hardship Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391 ( 1995 ); Daniel A Malin & Scott A. Moss, Public Funding for Dis-
ability Accommodations: A Rational Solution to Rational Discrimination and The Disabilities of the ADA, 
33 HARV. C.R.-C.L L REV. 197 (1998); Stephen L. Mikochick, The Americans with Disabilities 
Act: A Model for Title VII Enforcement, 2 CORNELLj.L & PuB. POL'Y 25 (1992}; Rosalie K. Mur-
phy, Reasonable Accommodation And Employment Discrimination Under Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1607 ( 1991 ); Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Conm1ent, Overcoming Barri-
ers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation And Undue Hardship in the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1423 (1991 ). Protections are also provided for those who 
are disadvantaged by virtue of being uneducated or poor, or who come from an oppressed 
racial or ethnic background. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (striking 
down as unconstitutional a state law excluding African Americans frohl jury service, stating 
that the purpose of the post-Civil War Amendments was "to secure to a recently emancipated 
race ... all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy"); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 
(1886) (finding a denial of equal protection in the application of a facially neutral law admin-
istered against Chinese applicants for building permits}; Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 
776 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t)he Framers obviously meant [equal 
protection] to apply to classifications based on "national origin, the first cousin of race"). 
Dworkin suggests that disabilities are not different in kind from lack of advantage: 
"Though skills are different from handicaps, the difference can be understood as one of de-
gree: we may say that someone who cannot play basketball like Wilt Chamberlain, paint like 
Piero, or make money like Geneen, suffers from an (especially common) handicap." Dworkin 
II, supra note 70, at 314-15. Yet Dworkin's parenthetical puts his finger on the difference. A 
disability is a disadvantage relative to a societal standard, albeit a standard that in some cases 
is merely arbitrary or based on prejudice. That is, it is a difference between the individual and 
the large part of the relevant population. Lack of advantage, on the other hand, reflects a 
condition which, although it is within the same range as the bulk of the rest of the population, 
is deficient relative to someone else. As has been pointed out elsewhere, this analysis acknowl-
edges that what is deemed a disability or a lack of advantage, being relative, may change be-
tween different populations and over time. If by virtue of diet or exercise, most people in the 
future were to bench-press 500 pounds, the person who could bench-press only 50 pounds, 
while arguably not disabled in today's world, might be regarded as such in that future society. 
Similarly, recall Erasmus' homily that, in the country of the blind, the one-eyed man is king. 
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATION 278 (4th ed. 1992). 
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that in competitions for employment they can contend with persons who 
are not disabled. 178 This tactic levels the employment playing field precisely 
because only the disadvantaged employees or applicants for employment 
receive the benefit. 
This approach is intuitively appealing. Much like Rawls' difference 
principle, the focus is on improving the position of the worst off. 179 Yet it 
would produce odd results if it were applied to a more realistically complex 
society in which some people were enhanced, some (the unenhanced) were 
merely "normal," and some were disadvantaged. If through access to 
countervailing benefits, the disadvantaged were truly brought up to the 
level of the enhanced, they would surpass those who previously had been 
neither advantaged nor disadvantaged. The formerly unadvantaged would 
eventually constitute the disadvantaged. Unless everyone were made equal, 
a policy of benefiting the worst-off would ultimately create an infinite re-
gression. 180 Hence, there would always be a disadvantaged group at risk for 
The law appears to have little concern for the unfairness that arises at the interper-
sonal level when one person is advantaged and the other person, while not disadvantaged 
compared to societal norms, is at a comparative disadvantage. Elites do not seem to attract 
significant legal attention, at least not systematically. A number of explanations might be 
offered for this curious state of affairs. Historically, the law may have found it too difficult to 
identify and measure superiority, or at least certain kinds of superiorities, such as those of the 
mind. A similar explanation is said to account in part for the peculiar doctrine in tort law that 
physical but not mental impairments alter the standard of care. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 2838, cmt. b ( 1965 ); Stephanie I. Splane, Note, Tort Liability of the Men-
tally Ill, 93 YALE L.J. 153 (1983). Alternatively, the societal benefits from elite accomplishment 
may be deemed to outweigh the costs of unfairness, an issue which is discussed more fully 
below at notes 196-97 and accompanying text. Of course, it is always possible that, as the 
devotees of the critical legal studies movement contend, the law simply is a tool wielded by the 
ruling elites predominantly for their own benefit. See Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Mona-
han, Lauo, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 
36 STAN. L. REV. 199 (1984) (describing, along with other articles in this symposium issue, the 
essence of critical scholars' views). 
178. In an attempt to resolve the tension between fairness and efficiency, the law only 
requires the employer to provide a "reasonable" amount of subsidy, in the form of a "reason-
able accommodation" or "reasonable modification." See generally Mehlman et al., supra note 
118 (describing reasonable accommodation under the ADA). 
179. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing Rawls' view of justice). To more 
accurately reflect Rawls' difference principle, this approach would be expressed as follows: 
Wealthy people will only be permitted to obtain genetic enhancement if this resulted in ·some 
countervailing benefit for the worst-off. Although Rawls himself might be content with benefit 
in the form of a trickle-down from the accomplishments of the enhanced, leveling up would 
provide direct subsidies to the worst-off, at least when they competed with the enhanced. 
180. This problem, of course, plagues affimuttive action programs, and lies in large part 
behind the successful constitutional challenges that have been asserted against them: 
Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level of tol-
erability then would be entitled to preferential classifications at the expense 
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being treated unfairly by the enhanced and also, under a genetic "affirma-
tive action program," by the formerly disadvantaged who had been leveled 
up. 
We may, however, decide to level down. Since we cannot prevent all 
people from obtaining genetic enhancements for themselves or their chil-
dren, unfairness might be avoided by preventing enhanced persons from 
taking advantage of their enhancements when competing with the unen-
hanced or exerting power over them. 
We can identify methods that may level down the playing field by re-
viewing how rules currently respond to the potential unfairness inherent in 
interactions between unequal individuals. Here, instead of advantages con-
ferred by genetic enhancement, society is concerned with natural or ac-
-quired advantages like beauty, strength, intelligence, social status, or 
money. By examining current public and private law, we see a number of 
ways in which the rules attempt to level the playing field by reducing the 
relative benefit of these sorts of advantages. For example, in some cases, we 
prohibit unfair competition. A private law example is the ban on the use of 
performance-enhancing drugs in sports competitions. 181 Rowing and wres-
tling competitions are separated into weight classes. In these competitions, 
athletes who have an advantage in weight are precluded from competing 
with those who weigh less. 182 
Banning competitions between advantaged and unadvantaged indi-
viduals is not confined to sports. The Securities and Exchange Commission, 
for example, prohibits insider trading. Here the advantage is information 
that is not available to the public about a corporation whose stock is pub-
licly traded. The law attempts to prevent those who possess this information 
from converting it into financial gain. The advantaged individual is given 
of individuals belonging to other groups. Those classifications would be free 
from exacting judicial scrutiny. As these preferences began to have their de-
sired effect, and the consequences of past discrimination were undone, new 
judicial rankings would be necessary. 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 297 (1978). Advocates of affirmative ac-
tion attempt to justify preferences in part on the basis that those who are given preferences 
belong to historically disadvantaged groups, while those who now become disadvantaged 
belong to historically favored groups, but it is unclear how this treats the newly disadvantaged 
individual fairly. "Nothing in the Constitution supports the notion that individuals may be 
asked to suffer otherwise impem1issible burdens in order to enhance the societal standing of 
their ethnic groups." /d. at 298. 
181. See United States Olympic Committee, Drug Control Education (last modified january 
24, 2000) <http://www.olympic-usa.org/inside/in_1_3_7 _l.html> (describing various drugs 
that are prohibited by the United States Olympic Committee including those that enhance 
performance such as stimulants and anabolic agents). 
182: See DIAGRAM GROUP, RULES OF THE GAME 46-49 (Jack Wilkinson ed., Paddington 
Press Ltd. 1974) (describing the weight limits in boxing and wrestling). 
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the choice of either disclosing the information or not trading stock in the 
company. 183 
In other instances, the rules permit a transaction to take place only if 
the person with the advantage shares it with the unadvantaged. For exam-
ple, the law of contracts sometimes requires the sharing of information in 
certain business transactions. This occurs when the advantaged person 
knows that "disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party 
as to a basic assumption on which that party is making the contract," and 
non-disclosure would be a failure to act in good faith and "with reasonable 
standards of fair dealing." 181 Presumably these transactions are not prohib-
ited altogether because it is not too costly to enforce the forfeiture rule and 
there is a sufficiently high possibility that, given adequate enforcement of 
the rule, the result will be fair. 
Similarly, in some cases, society handicaps the person with the advan-
tage. This occurs, for example, in horse racing where jockeys who weigh 
less than their cohorts are deprived of their advantage by having to carry 
weights. 185 Better golfers are also deprived of their advantage by removing 
183. Although Congress has addressed the issue of insider training through the Insider 
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 
(1988), and the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-376, 98 Stat 1264 
(1984), there is no statutory defmition of insider trading. The courts and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission primarily based the prohibition on insider trading on S.E.C. Rule 10b-
5 (17 C.F.R. §240.1 Ob-5 (1999)), which prohibits employment of manipulative and deceptive 
devices. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 2d Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668, 40 S.E.C. 
907 (Nov. 8, 1961) available in 1961 WL 3743, at *4 (stating that "[i]ntimacy demands restraint 
lest the uninformed be exploited"). The scope of the prohibition was circumscribed in Chi-
arella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 223 (1980) (holding that an individual possessing infor-
mation not available to the public, but who is not a corporate insider, does not violate the 
prohibition on insider trading in the absence of a relationship between the individual and the 
seller that gives rise to a special duty). In United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 643 (1997), 
however, the Court reaffirmed that a person violates the insider trading prohibition when "he 
misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty 
owed to the source of the information," protecting the securities markets from abuse by corpo-
rate outsiders. Additionally, S.E.C. Rule 14e-3 (17 C.F.R § 240.14e-3) prohibits insider trad-
ing in the context of tender offers. For a discussion of an alternative source of a definition of 
insider trading, see Steve The!, Statutory Findings and Insider Trading Regulation, 50 VAND. L. 
REV. 1091 (1997) (discussing the implications of a provision of the Insider Trading and Secu-
rities Fraud Enforcement Act on the law of insider trading, and exploring the use of statutory 
law findings as a technique for establishing substantive law). 
184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(d) (1981); see Ollerman v. O'Rourke 
Co., 288 N.W. 95 (Wis. 1980) (holding that a vendor had a duty to inform a non-commercial 
purchaser of residential lot of the existence of an underground well). 
185. A wicked depiction of handicapping the talented is provided by Kurt Vonnegut in the 
short story Harrison Bergeron, which begins: 
The year was 2081, and everybody was finally equaL They weren't only equal 
before God and the law. They were equal every which way. Nobody was 
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strokes from the score of other golfers. 186 
In other cases, the rules do not prohibit the competition, but allow the 
unadvantaged to avoid the outcome if it seems too unfair. The doctrine of 
unconscionability in contracts-which applies to advantages in the form of 
information or market power-is this type of rule. 187 Another example is 
the fiduciary rules that permit a court to void a transaction by a trustee of a 
trust if the result WOU}d be unfair tO the beneficiaries. IBB 
smarter than anybody else. Nobody was better looking than anybody else. 
Nobody was stronger or quicker than anybody else. All this equality was due 
to the 2llth, 212th, and 213th Amendments to the Constitution, and to the 
unceasing vigilance of agents of the United States Handicapper General. 
KURT VONNEGUT, Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 7 (1968); See also 
DIAGRAM GROUP, RULES OF THE GAME, supra note 182, at 258 (describing that "weights are 
adjusted to try to give horses an equal chance of winning"). 
186. See Blakney Boggs, Your Game Handicaps Help Promote Equal Competition, ORANGE 
COUNTY REGISTER, Aug. 13, 1998, at D13 (explaining that a handicap "is a way to level out the 
playing field between golfers of different abilities"); see also Greg Wilcox, See Blue, Tee from the 
White; Foru•ard Tees Mean More Iron, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 6, 1998, at 58 (describing how 
players are grouped according to their handicaps so that they can compete against golfers of 
similar skill). 
187. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 153 (1981); id. § 208 ("[I]fa contract or 
tem1 thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce 
the contract."); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) 
(stating that a contract may be unconscionable if there is "an absence of meaningful choice on 
the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to 
the other party"); Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Jimeniz, 371 N.Y.S.2d 289 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) 
(holding as unconscionable a contract written in English only and entered into by the defen-
dant, who spoke and read only Spanish, without the plaintiffs representative explaining the 
terms to him); jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (holding as 
unconscionable defendant's sale 9f a $300 freezer for $1,234.80, including credit charges, to 
the plaintiffs, who were welfare recipients). See generally Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhe-
sion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L REV. 629 (1943) (discussing adhe-
sion contracts). Having found a contract to be unconscionable, the court-may protect the dis-
advantaged individual by refusing to enforce the contract, enforcing the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or limiting the application of the unconscionable clause so the result is 
not unconscionable. See U.C.C. § 2-301(1) (1981). 
188. See 1 AUSTIN SCOTT & W. FRATCHER, THE L\W OF TRUSTS § 2.5, at 43 (4th ed. 1987) 
("If the fiduciary enters into a transaction with the beneficiary and fails to make a full disclo-
sure of all circumstances known to him affecting the transaction, or if the transaction is unfair to 
the beneficiary, it can be set aside by him.") (emphasis added). Elsewhere Scott states: "Where he 
deals directly with the beneficiaries, the transaction may stand, but only if the trustee makes 
full disclosure and takes no advantage of his position and the transaction is in all respects fair 
and reasonable." 2 AUSTIN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170.25, at 1387 (3d ed. 1967). Scott 
also states: "In the case of a purchase by a trustee of the trust property with the consent of the 
beneficiaries, however, it would seem that if the price is not fair the transaction can be set 
aside even though the trustee made full disclosure." /d. § 496, at 3536; see also Alison Ander-
son, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UClA L REV. 738, 760 
(1978) ("Where bargaining power is roughly equal, specific fiduciary duties can be waived by 
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Finally, rules sometimes level the playing field by eliminating the 
arm's length nature of a transaction. The advantaged person is permitted 
to engage in the transaction; but is not allowed to employ the advantage in 
a manner that takes advantage of the other party. This is the result of fidu-
ciary rules that mandate the fiduciary's undivided loyalty towards the en-
trustor and prevent the fiduciary from serving an interest other than that of 
the beneficiary. 189 
In other cases, however, the rules do not attempt to level the playing 
field, preferring instead to ignore or even to celebrate the advantages that 
some people have over others. With the exception of affirmative action 
programs, for example, admissions criteria at selective educational institu-
tions do not adjust applicants' accomplishments in light of their back-
ground or abilities. A person applying to Harvard with an IQ of 120 com-
petes with applicants with IQ's of 160; the fact that an A in AP Calculus or a 
high score on the SAT's achieved by the person with the 120 IQ is a far 
greater accomplishment than the same grade achieved by the person with 
the 160 IQ, is irrelevant. 190 Many athletic competitions force athletes to 
compete with those who are considerably younger. Older baseball and bas-
ketball players sometimes compete against players straight out of high 
school. 191 Shorter basketball players are not allowed to shoot from steplad-
the parties on the basis of full disclosure to and consent by the client. Because informational 
disparities so often mean that bargaining power is unequal, however, all fiduciaries have an 
unwaivable obligation of fairness toward the other party."). 
189. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (stating that the fiduciary has 
a duty of"undivided loyalty"); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 51 N.E.2d 674,675-76 
(N.Y. 1943) (reiterating the duty of loyalty); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 170 (1959) 
(requiring a duty ofloyalty). 
190. Gardner, for example, acrually extols standardized testing because it ignores family 
background: 
It is now argued that the tests give an advantage to the individual of good 
family background and place the individual of poor family background at a 
disadvantage. This is true in some measure. But it must never be forgotten 
that the tests introduced an objectivity into the measurement of human 
abilities that never before existed. Before the tests were developed a great 
many people seriously believed that the less-educated segments of society 
were not capable of being educated. And the view is still prevalent in many 
societies. 
GARDNER, supra note 83, at 63. 
191. See Tom Verducci, Kids' Stuff, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 4, 1994, at 50 (describing 
baseball as a young man's game}; see also Tom McNichol, Is There a Generation Gap in Pro 
Sports?, USA WEEKEND, Apr. 5, 1998, at 016 (describing the generation gap in basketball and 
the lack of respect from younger players, some of whom are "still hanging out with their high 
school buddies"); cf Valerie Lister, Study Shows No Direct Link of Age, Injury Rate, USA TODAY, 
Oct. 28, 1997, at 12C (stating that younger players have a higher sports-related injury rate 
than older players). 
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ders, and there are no professional leagues for players of "normal" 
height. 192 In football, the slight take the field at their peril. 
This raises the question of whether the unfairness problem incited by 
wealth-based genetic enhancement should be ignored, as it is with college 
entrance criteria and in certain sports settings. 193 What would justify ignor-
ing the problem? 
In many cases, the fact that the rules ignore advantages, or certain ad-
vantages, is probably arbitrary, coincidental, or an historical artifact of no 
theoretical significance. In horse racing, for example, jockey's weights are 
equalized on the premise that it is the quality of the horse and the jockey's 
horsemanship that should matter. 191 There are no weight categories in 
football because that is just not how the game was conceived. Organized 
chess competition only recently began to prohibit the use of cognitive en-
hancers like nicotine or stimulants. 195 
Nevertheless, we can posit several principled reasons why it may be in-
appropriate to deprive genetically enhanced individuals of their advantage 
in specific transactions or relationships. 
First, allowing certain unfair advantages would prevent the loss of so-
cietal benefit from the transaction. An enhanced scientist, for example, 
presumably enjoys personal advantages by virtue of being enhanced. But 
192. Apparently an effort was once made to establish such a league, without success. See 
Elizabeth Comte, WBL A Short Circuit with a Worldu•ide Reach, SPORTING NEWS, May 21, 1990, 
at 44 (describing the efforts of players to meet the maximum height requirement of the WBL); 
Brian Hanley, World Basketball League Rules, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 15, 1998, at 79 (describing 
the differences between the WBL and the NBA). 
193. Not everyone agrees that leveling down is an appropriate solution. For example, 
Gardner states with disdain: 
[1]n efforts to minimize differences in performance, we can detect not only 
the hand of the generous person who honestly regrets that some must lose 
the foot race but the hand of the envious ones who resent achievement, de-
test superiority in others, and will punish eminence at every opportunity. 
These latter are the ones Henri Becque had in mind when he said, "The 
defect of equality is that we only desire it with our superiors." 
GARDNER, supra note 83, at 109-10. Nagel objects to an egalitarian position that "would permit 
haute cuisine, haute couture, and exquisite houses to disappear just because not everyone can 
have them." NAGEL, supra note 84, at 138. Under his insurance-based scheme, Dworkin would 
not redistribute resources to people because they lacked talent so long as they were able to 
earn, or to insure themselves against not earning a moderate wage. Dworkin's logic is inter-
esting: While almost everyone would buy insurance against not earning a moderate wage, no 
one would buy insurance against not earning an enormous income because the cost of the 
insurance would be too great, since almost everybody would be entitled to a payout. See 
Dworkin II, supra note 70, at 314-21. 
194. See DIAGRAM GROUP, RULES OF THE GAME, supra note 182, at 258. 
195. See Chess: DrugTestingHasArrived, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, at D7 (describing new 
Spanish requirements that chess competitors be tested for amphetamines and other drugs). 
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despite the unfairness to unenhanced persons who compete with her for 
admission to MIT or in developing patentable inventions, we might forego 
trying to strip her of her personal benefits. By allowing her to benefit per-
sonally, we encourage people like her to purchase scientific enhancements 
that benefit society. This might well be the justification for not leveling the 
playing field in terms of intelligence in the case ofadmissions to institutions 
of higher learning. 
An example of a societal benefit that might sufficiently justify allowing 
enhanced individuals to retain personal benefit are reductions in the costs 
of accidents. A naturally talented automobile mechanic might be expected 
to make safer repairs than someone with less talent, and therefore might be 
entitled to a hiring preference over someone who lacked her abilities. 196 
The same might be said for an enhanced automobile mechanic. The argu-
ment becomes even more compelling in the case of persons responsible for 
the safety of large numbers of people: airline pilots, railroad engineers, 
operators of nuclear power plants, and the like. 197 In these situations, there 
196. Gardner gives the example of an airplane mechanic. See GARDNER, supra note 83, at 
120. A similar consideration operates in the field of disability discrimination. Employers are 
required to make reasonable accommodations to enable disabled employees to function in 
their firms, but not if the disabled person would create an unreasonable risk of harm to co-
workers or to the public. See DiPompo v. West Point Military Academy, 770 F. Supp. 887, 894 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the government need not accommodate the plaintiffs dyslexia 
in his application for a position as a firefighter because "plaintiff could not engage in routine 
training, inspection and response to emergencies using necessary materials,. including the 
hazardous materials handbook"). 
197. One story, probably apocryphal, has a conference of geneticists and ethicists ponder-
ing the case of an airline pilot who had inherited a propensity to suddenly black out, and 
wondering whether it would be fair to prevent him from flying. As the debate wore on, one 
attendee who had to leave early to catch a plane interrupted with: "Just tell me what airline he 
flies for." 
An interesting analogy arises in the law of torts. In general, people are held to the 
standard of a "reasonable person" under like circumstances: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS§ 283 (1965). A failure to behave like a reasonable person, which causes injury to an-
other, subjects the actor to tort liability. This standard is modified, however, in the case of an 
actor who is physically (but not mentally) disabled. See id. § 283c. We hold a blind person to 
the standard of a reasonable blind person. If we wanted to impose a duty on enhanced indi-
viduals to employ their superior traits to avoid accidents, we would not hold them to the stan-
dard of a reasonable person, but to the standard of a reasonable enhanced person. Thus, a 
driver whose vision had been enhanced to better than 20/20 would not merely be held to the 
standard of a reasonable, unadvantaged individual, but to the standard of a reasonable person 
with superior vision. If the enhanced driver should have spotted a child running across the 
road in time to stop the car, even though a person with nom1al vision could not have seen the 
child, then under an enhanced person's standard, the driver could be liable for failing to stop 
in time. The enhanced person would be treated much the same way that professionals are 
treated, that is, held to a higher standard of care than non-professionals. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 appears to take this approach. It states: 
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might be a concern about which people will become enhanced pilots, yet all 
agree that having enhanced pilots is beneficial. 
Second, there will be a certain level of difficulty in detecting enhance-
ment. If enhancement cannot be detected, then systems of rules might have 
no choice but to ignore the unfairness created by competitions involving 
"The actor is required to recognize that his conduct involves a risk of causing an invasion of 
another's interest if a reasonable man would do so while exercising .. : such superior atten-
tion, perception, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgn1ent as the actor himself has." 
There are a few cases in which the courts have held people with superior abilities to a higher 
standard, but most of these involve professionals. In an interesting remark in Dillenbeck v. City 
of Los Angeles, 446 P.2d 129, 136 n.10 (Cal. 1968), however, the California Supreme Court 
reasoned that a professional, such as an attorney or physician, is held to a higher standard of 
care than a lay person because of the professional's greater expertise, rather than because the 
professional holds herself out as such: "Essentially, the 'expert' cases flow from the proposition 
that each person in society is expected to exercise that degree of care which can reasonably be 
anticipated from him in light of his peculiar attributes, including knowledge, perception, and 
memory." !d. One of the few exceptions is Fredericks v. Castora, in which the court held a pro-
fessional truck driver to the standard of an ordinary driver when he caused an accident driving 
the family sedan. Fredericks v. Castora, 360 A.2d 696 (Pa. 1976). lnjohnston v. United States, 
568 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Kan. 1983 ), a federal court noted that a government contractor 
cannot hide behind the so-called "contract specification defense"-which protects a contractor 
from products liability if the contractor follows design specifications-"where the manufac-
turer has special knowledge or expertise." !d. In Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Wyo. 
1983 ), the court rejected the reasonable person standard in a case involving an accident 
caused by a professional truck driver, opting instead for an instruction that would pern1it the 
jury to consider evidence that the driver "was more skillful than others as a result of his expe-
rience as a driver." !d. In Dillenbeck, a police officer who killed a motorist in the course of a 
high-speed chase was held to the standard of one who possessed superior knowledge and skill 
by virtue of his "extensive training and experience." Dillenbeck, 446 P.2d at 136. 
What is interesting about tort law in this respect, however, is that a good argument 
can be made that we should not alter the standard of care for an enhanced individual when it 
comes to avoiding accidents. Instead, we should hold them merely to the standard of a reason-
able, unadvantaged person. The reason is that, by doing so, we encourage people to improve 
their vision, which in itself will avoid accidents, whereas if we made people with better vision 
liable under a higher standard, we would discourage them from enhancing their vision, 
thereby losing the benefit in terms of accident avoidance. Whether we imposed a higher or 
norn1al standard would depend on whether we thought that the benefits from reduced acci-
dents on account of having drivers with better vision outweighed the costs of accidents caused 
by these drivers when they did not act like someone with improved vision. 
A sin1ilar analysis might be made of rules that permit a party to a contract to benefit 
from superior information so long as the result was not too unfair. In this case, the argument 
would be that, by permitting the party with superior infom1ation to capitalize on that infor-
mation, we give an incentive to create and obtain that information. The societal gain in infor-
mation, it is reasoned, outweighs the unfairness to the inferior party to the transaction. See 
Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Lau• of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1, 19 n.49 (1978) (viewing fiduciary relationships "from an economic point of view ... as a 
deliberate forn1 of risk sharing ... and fraud as economically undesirable" because it is ineffi-
ciently based on misinformation). 
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enhanced and unenhanced individuals. This frustrates our efforts to pro-
hibit the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sports. The earlier discus-
sion of licensing catalogued the difficulties in detecting enhancement and 
the potential solutions. It must be stressed that this is a critical issue. In all 
likelihood, technical solutions will be found, only to be superceded by tech-
nical innovations, leading to new technical solutions. 
One partial solution to the detection problem might be to permit un-
enhanced individuals to assert a rebuttable presumption against persons 
with whom they interacted or competed with that they believe are en-
hanced. Unless persons against whom the presumption was asserted could 
establish that they were not enhanced, the rules would proceed to level the 
playing field (by having courts undo the deal; penalizing the person pre-
sumed to be enhanced for participating in a prohibited competition, and so 
forth). Failure to produce evidence suggesting that the person was not en-
hanced would satisfy the other party's burden of proof. 198 
Third, it will be difficult to distinguish between enhancement and ef-
fort. Society should arguably focus its leveling efforts on advantages derived 
from genetic enhancement, rather than on advantages obtained through 
personal effort. Otherwise, the effect will be to discourage effort, leading to 
sloth and loss of social benefit. It may be difficult, however, if not impossi-
ble, to distinguish between achievements that are earned and achievements 
that result from enhancement. Accordingly, some may argue that the rules 
ought to ignore whether or not someone was genetic enhanced. 
Regardless of the difficulty of distinguishing between enhancement 
and effort, genetic enhancement may be so serious a social threat that it is 
appropriate to level playing fields. Indeed, society deprives people of 
plainly earned advantages in order to promote equality or fairness. Though 
not without its critics, progressive income taxation transfers earned wealth 
in part to achieve a more just distribution of resources. Weight categories in 
sports are enforced regardless ofwhether an athlete's size is the product of 
diet and exercise or steroids. Fiduciary law requires individuals with supe-
rior information to disclose it to beneficiaries, clients, and patients, even 
though it may have taken great effort to obtain the information. 199 Simi-
198. Presumptions of this sort are familiar in the law of leveling. In fiduciary relationships, 
when the beneficiaries of a trust challenge a transaction between them and the trustee, the 
burden shifts to the trustee to prove that the transaction was in the beneficiaries' best interests. 
See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyand Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE LJ. 
879, 900 (" [T]he presence of a fiduciary obligation significantly affects the conduct of litigation 
by affecting the allocation of burdens of proof. If a suit challenges a transaction between a 
fiduciary and a beneficiary, the fiduciary has the burden of proving that it dealt candidly and 
fairly with the beneficiary."). 
199. Cf Salis v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 989, 997 n.10 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (noting that 
fiduciary law imposes duty to disclose information required to obtain a patient's informed 
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larly, an enhanced person might be required to disgorge her advantage (of 
information, market power, and the like), even though she obtained some 
or all of it through her own efforts. Alternatively, the fact that someone was 
enhanced could establish a rebuttable presumption that any advantage re-
lated to the enhancement was due to the enhancement rather than to ef-
fort. 
Fourth, there are non-enhancement advantages. Just because someone 
is not genetically enhanced does not mean that they lack sufficient re-
sources or talents to compete fairly with someone who is enhanced. The 
unenhanced person may possess great wealth, have some special store of 
knowledge, or have access to the best advisors. Therefore, leveling the ge-
netic playing field may exacerbate unfairness if it focuses on genetic en-
hancements to the exclusion of these other types of advantages. If society 
attempted to correct for all differences between people, there would be no 
end to societal interference. 200 
On the other hand, the advantages conferred by genetic enhancement 
could be so great that it would be appropriate to single them out for reme-
diation. Moreover, where enhancement merely created a rebuttable pre-
sumption of unfairness, the enhanced individual would be free to prove 
that her enhancement advantages were equaled or outweighed by non-
enhancement advantages possessed by the complaining party.201 
Fifth, denying a person of the advantages of genetic enhancement 
would require a high level of intrusiveness into his or her life. Given the 
difficulties of detection and differentiation described above, any attempt to 
level the playing field would invite public intrusion into highly personal 
affairs. To rebut an inference of enhancement, for example, a person would 
have to reveal his or her personal and medical history, including particu-
larly sensitive information relating to genetic makeup and reproductive 
activities. 
If the stakes are high enough, however, we seem willing to require 
consent because of the physician's "superior knowledge"). 
200. Nozick, for example, defends his lack of concern over inequality by arguing that 
people are good at different things. See NOZICK, supra note 78, at 243-46 (articulating this 
theory). 
201. For example, a physician who is a patient of another physician's is owed the same 
duty of infom1ed consent as a lay patient. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 n.l4 
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating that even if the patient were a member of the medical profession, 
because of different degrees of medical knowledge between persons such as a specialist and a 
general practitioner, "it is only in the unusual case that a court could safely assume that the 
patient's insights were on a parity with those of the treating physician"). In the unlikely event 
that the physician-patient claimed lack of informed consent, the defendant would be permit-
ted to show that the plaintiffs own knowledge and experience compensated for the lack of 
disclosure. 
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people to compromise their privacy rights. For example, athletes must 
submit to physical examination and to yield samples of bodily fluids for 
testing, often under nearly public conditions. 202 Given sufficient concern for 
maintaining privacy and the confidentiality of sensitive personal informa-
tion, and so long as the least intrusive means were employed to decide if 
someone was enhanced, the cost might be justifiable. 
Finally, potentially steep transaction costs are a significant drawback. 
Leveling the genetic playing field will be costly. Forums, advocates, and 
referees would be required to resolve fairness disputes; black markets, both 
domestic and foreign, would require policing; and the specter of a "war on 
genes" is not an attractive one. Yet again, the threats posed by genetic en-
hancement might well be worth the cost of leveling. ' 
In short, there seems to be no reason why we should ignore the un-
fairness created by wealth-based genetic enhancement. This principle, how-
ever, could be circumvented in situations where the balance of social to 
personal benefit clearly demonstrated a substantial net benefit to society, or 
in situations in which the costs of leveling were deemed to be greater than 
the costs of unfairness. In all other cases, one or more of the leveling tech-
niques listed earlier would be appropriate. 
VI. LEVELING THE GENETIC PlAYING FIELD 
Although our overall objective would be to minimize the unfairness in 
interactions between enhanced and unenhanced individuals, at the same 
time we want to maximize the societal benefit from individual enhance-
ments. This raises the question of how to respond when the two objectives 
are incompatible, i.e., when individual unfairness can be prevented only by 
sacrificing societal benefit. 
The answer depends on the nature and magnitude of the unfairness 
and of the foregone societal benefit. Ultimately, public policy should favor 
preventing unfairness if the cost of unfairness is deemed to exceed the ex-
pected societal benefit. Conversely, a substantial amount of societal benefit 
should be sought at the expense of a relatively small amount of individual 
unfairness. The more substantial the unfairness, and the more equal the 
costs of unfairness and societal benefits tend to be, the more emphasis 
should be given to correcting the unfair transaction. 
Suppose we are reviewing applicants for scarce medical research 
funding. Successful research is expected to yield significant societal bene-
fits. Applications are submitted by both unenhanced individuals and indi-
202. See Kathleen Taylor, Intrusive, Degrading Procedure: Why We Oppose Random Urine Tests 
for Drugs, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 4, 1986, at A9 (arguing against this procedure because of the 
high degree of privacy invasion). 
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viduals enhanced in ways that significantly increase their chances of re-
search success. All other things being equal, we ought to award funding to 
the enhanced individuals. If the impact on the unenhanced individuals' 
careers is deemed significant enough, however, consideration might be 
given to mitigating the unfairness. Perhaps society could allocate a certain 
amount of funding for the unenhanced (a sort of "unenhanced persons' 
affirmative action program"), or favor applications involving both en-
hanced and unenhanced investigators. 
There are a number of techniques that we may employ to mitigate ge-
netic unfairness. Some of these techniques are more costly than others, 
both in terms of implementation costs and foregone social benefit. The 
enhanced individual might be required to share with the unadvantaged 
person the enhancement surplus. At a minimum, enhanced individuals 
would have to disclose that they were enhanced. In a business transaction, 
enhanced individuals who, by virtue of their enhancement, obtained supe-
rior information could be required to disclose that information to unen-
hanced persons in order to become licensed. Where a transaction is ex-
pected to yield societal benefit, sharing might be the preferred mitigation 
technique because it encourages the enhanced party-who will retain at 
least some personal benefit-to engage in the transaction. If sharing is im-
practical, like in zero-sum situations, or if the implementation costs of 
sharing are too great compared with the expected societal gain, unfairness 
might be mitigated instead by handicapping the enhanced party. For in-
stance in contests, including athletic competitions, the enhanced individual 
could be put at a disadvantage, such as being given a longer distance or a 
harder question. 
Another technique worth considering is allowing the interaction to 
take place but permitting the unadvantaged party to apply to a court or an 
administrative agency to challenge and overturn or adjust a result if it is too 
unfair. This flexible, post-hoc approach might be appropriate where the 
unfairness costs and societal benefits of a transaction were difficult to pre-
dict in advance. Making outcomes voidable reduces transactions costs by 
allowing us to review only those results that seem too unfair. 
An interesting option is to eliminate the arm's length nature of trans-
actions between enhanced and unenhanced individuals. Like fiduciaries, 
the enhanced would be made responsible for the welfare of the unen-
hanced, a sort of genetic noblesse oblige. As in true fiduciary relationships, 
this could decrease the costs of monitoring the behavior of the enhanced by 
substituting a system of sanctioned trust for a regime of direct external 
controls.203 Additionally, it would create social benefit by encouraging the 
203. See Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Patient-Physician Relationship in an Era of Scarce Resources: 
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unenhanced to interact-for their benefit-with the enhanced. 204 
Finally, society could prohibit non-beneficial interactions. An alterna-
tive to handicapping enhanced athletes, for example, would be to forbid 
them from competing against athletes who were unenhanced. This compe-
tition might be allowed only if the costs of enforcing the prohibition were 
great compared to the unfairness. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The reader may be struck, as I am, by how different society would look 
if it adopted the suggestions I have made. Individual liberty and reproduc-
tive decision-making would be circumscribed in ways that presently seem 
unthinkable. A licensing system would control large blocks of human be-
havior. A massive "War on Genes" would target the domestic enhancement 
black market, and considerable foreign policy energies would be devoted to 
regulating the international gene trade. Much of an individual's hope for 
upward social mobility would be contingent on the outcome of a national 
genetic lottery. Finally, genetic privacy would be compromised by an enor-
mous DNA data program, involving collection of DNA at birth, mandatory 
comparisons with parental DNA to detect illegal germ line enhancement, 
and periodic sampling later in life to identify individuals who were en-
hanced, but lacked an enhancement license, or who were employing their 
enhancements unfairly. 
The reader may object that the threats to democracy are too specula-
tive, and the perceived importance of equality and fairness too small, to 
sustain these major infringements on liberty and privacy. In particular, the 
reader may balk at the image invoked by the film "GAITACA,"205 in which 
genetic monitoring is constant and ubiquitous. But there are iikely to be a 
number of important reasons for maintaining a system of universal genetiC 
profiling irrespective of promoting egalitarian objectives. First, health care 
Is There a Duty to Treat?, 25 CONN. L REV. 349, 368-71 (1993) (illustrating support for this 
plan); Susan P. Shapiro, The Social Control of Interpersonal Trust, 93 AM. J. Soc. 623 (1987) 
(supporting this argument). 
204. As I discussed elsewhere, making a relationship fiduciary only tells us in general terms 
what behaviors are expected. See Mehlman, supra note 203, at 349 (detailing the behaviors 
expected from a fiduciary relationship); see also Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: 
Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and Health Care Providers, 51 U. PnT. L REV. 365 
(1990) (making the same argument). In some cases, it requires no more than disclosure of the 
advantage enjoyed by the fiduciary. In other cases, the fiduciary is prohibited from taking 
certain actions to the detriment or relative detriment of the beneficiary. The design of fiduci-
ary rules to govern interactions between genetically enhanced and unenhanced persons will 
require careful consideration and most likely will follow a period of case-by-case determina-
tions by courts and administrators. 
205. G.-liTACA (Columbia Pictures 1997). 
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providers will increasingly need access to genetic information about their 
patients as medical treatments become tailored to a patient's individual 
genetic make-up in order to increase efficacy and decrease unwanted side 
effects.206 Second, access to personal genetic information will be important 
in any system of universal health insurance, such as President Clinton's 
proposal, that relies at least in part on private. insurance. Insurers in such a 
system have an incentive to "cherry-pick"-that is, to sell policies only to 
healthier individuals who can be insured at a lower cost. The only way to 
prevent this is to pay insurers more when they insure costlier individuals, 
an approach called "risk adjustment." But to accurately predict how expen-
sive it will be to insure someone and adjust payments to insurers accord-
ingly, the health insurance system needs to know who is at risk for inherited 
disorders. This requires access to individual genetic profiles. Finally, DNA 
profiles are likely to be used by law enforcement for forensic identification, 
and by commercial enterprises for security purposes. And one further 
comment on the society portrayed in GATTACA. There, genetic profiling 
was employed by the class of enhanced individuals to maintain their privi-
leged position. I envision the use of genetic profiling for exactly the oppo-
site purpose: to promote equality and fairness. 
Still, there is no question that all this seems odd and unsettling. But 
the alternatives are far more chilling. Imagine a society with a struggling 
genetic underclass locked into subservience by a ruling, self-perpetuating, 
genetic aristocracy, or a prolonged period in which the promise of genetic 
advances is lost amid mounting social chaos. One thing is certain, we are 
about to find ourselves engulfed in an unprecedented revolution in science 
and social policy. 
206. A new field called "pharmacogenetics" has arisen to pursue this objective. 
